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ABSTRACT
SELF-RELIANCE OR DEPENDENCY IN THE HORN OF AFRICA
May 1988
THOMAS R. NEILSON, B.A., SUNY CORTLAND
M.Ed. NORTHEASTERN UNIVERSITY
Ed.D., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS
Directed by: Professor Robert J. Miltz
This dissertation is about refugees in Somalia, how
they got there, where they came from, and why they stay.
It discusses the community development program, the
notion of self-reliance and the manipulation of these
concepts to create a circumstance of regional dependency.
The research puts refugee circumstances in Somalia
into a global context of economic and military oppres-
sion. Dispelling the myths of poor farm management,
drought, overpopulation, and backwardness, war is named
as the primary cause of refugee origins worldwide.
A major theme of the research is that we live in a
corporate warfare/welfare world in which development aid
pursues hearts and minds, as well as markets. Within
this system, development workers must understand local
political/social structures and put them into the context
of global political/economic realities.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
Background
This dissertation is rooted in my work with the
United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) in
Somalia in 1983 and 84. It also incorporates my
experiences from work and travel since leaving the United
States 18 years ago during the Vietnam war.
During the sixties, I was part of the anti-war
movement and a supporter of civil rights, but I was slow
in connecting the two. It wasn't until Martin Luther
King returned from Vietnam and connected the war, racism,
poverty, labor exploitation, and global domination that
many of us began making these relationships.
King became dangerous to the government and was
assassinated. The FBI and CIA could deal with the Civil
Rights Movement as long as it was "Love Thy Neighbor" and
sitting at lunch counters, but demanding economic justice
was another issue. I took my activism, my idealism, my
anger, and my boredom to Colombia, South America with the
Peace Corps, where I became an extension agent for
agribusiness, soon to realize that the Peace Corps was
just another instrument of US foreign policy.
I left the States with the notion that I was going
to teach Colombians about farming. Two decades later, I
look back and say that my good intentions were racist.
1
2My concept of social change was developed from a position
of cultural and racial superiority. it was a "white
liberal" attitude of "helping minorities", a process in
which the reality of oppressed people is named by the
privileged in power.
Leaving Colombia in 1974, I swore I would never work
for Peace Corps again, but two years later the
organization said they would send me to Senegal. I had
never been to Africa and I knew I had much to learn about
the continent and its people.
I worked for an organization called Promotion
Humaine, francophone for community development. Like my
previous Peace Corps work, it was another welfare program
for selected villages that had contacts with the
government. It was a "Hearts and Minds" program to win
friends for the United States. In Senegal, I was the
anti-neo-colonialist wanting to organize Senegalese
villagers against corporate control of their land and the
food they ate. This was racist as well because
Senegalese villagers did not need a white guy to organize
them for anything.
Senegal had the greatest impact on me. Daily I
observed the violence of cash cropping, indiscriminate
pesticide use, infant mortality, and debt. One big
difference, however, between the villagers and me was
that I could walk away from it anytime I chose. I have
3been aware of class inequalities since childhood, but it
was in Senegal that I really began struggling with a
class analysis of oppression.
I went to Kenya with Peace Corps because I was
^ job in program evaluation and later as training
director. This was an opportunity, I thought, to impact
on the system from a position of power within the system
^J3d therefore have influence on policy. I was wrong.
Six months of work on program evaluation was covered up
by Peace Corps/Kenya, never leaving Nairobi. The irony
of all this was that I was then asked if I was interested
in an Associate Director's position in Kenya. I refused.
Working with HCR/Somalia was more of the same. I
was increasingly frustrated and angry because I could see
no place in the system to do anything other than collude
with the oppression. During the last two decades I have
known many development workers who carry around their
activism, idealism, frustration, and anger looking to do
good deeds. Obstacles that impede these good deeds
include naivete, cynicism, racism, classism, sexism,
nationalistic chavinism, and little awareness of
political economy. This research will discuss these
obstacles by examining the concept of self-reliance.
The dissertation is about self-reliance because
"helping" refugees to self-reliance was a main part of my
job description with the HCR. Self-reliance was in
4nearly everyone else's job description, as well. A
serious problem in Somalia was getting people to agree on
what self-reliance was. Chapter One discusses some
theoretical views concerning self-reliance.
The refugee program in Somalia is a case study of a
global issue. In Somalia many development workers saw
circumstances as isolated from any greater global
context. Chapter Two addresses political and economic
considerations that relate to refugee origins worldwide.
It focuses on US foreign policy, the global dimensions of
which must be understood before working in another
country. Two key concepts are power and privilege.
Chapter Three presents an analysis concerning self-
reliance as a feasible objective in Somali camps. It
addresses the systemic realities of development work in
Somalia by including the opinions of several development
workers and some suggestions for "durable solutions".
Chapter Four draws on the systemic power and
privilege from the preceding chapters and focuses on the
geo-political realities specific to the Horn of Africa,
particularly their relationship to development work and
foreign policy in the Horn, especially with people in
Somali refugee camps. In this chapter, self-reliance is
looked at in terms of self-determination. Liberation
struggles are more easily understood when the dynamics of
self-determination are contrasted with the dominant
5Characteristics of colonialism and imperialism.
Community development was also part of my job
description. Community development was to be a key
component to the durable solutions exercise for refugees.
Chapter Five discusses why community development wasn't
successful, primarily because of the systemic issues
raised in the first four chapters.
Community development in Somalia had a training
component to train its workers. Chapter Six offers a
^^se study of a training for which I was largely
responsible. The power relationships within the
hierarchy of a small, local training program resemble the
relationships I see at the national and global level.
The last chapter presents my analysis and
conclusions. An exciting part of this research has been
the number of past colleagues who participated by filling
out a questionnaire, as well as the several interviews
with US government representatives in Washington. Twenty-
five out of 50 questionnaires were returned, a very high
rate of 50%. Eleven of these 50 were sent to people
currently working with the National Refugee Commission
(NRC) in Somalia or HCR/Somalia. None of them replied.
Excluding the 11 current employees of NRC and HCR,
the return on the questionnaire was 64% which indicates
the interest and concern these colleagues have with their
work in the Horn.
I am writing largely from personal experience.
Truth is a function of experience. It is a function of
time. This dissertation is truth as I know it from 39 +
years of experience. I do not consider myself an
authority on the Horn or on refugees. I offer that in
this document may exist a bit of wisdom for anyone on his
or her way to work with refugees, to work in the Horn, or
anywhere in the world. It may help you decide what to
take and what baggage to leave behind.
Purpose of the Study
The primary question to be answered in light of the
preceding issues is:
What are the issues and problems related to
self-reliance, what are the preconditions necessary for
self-reliance, and do these preconditions allow for self-
reliance as a feasible objective in Somali refugee camps?
Significance of the Study
The significance of this research is that it
addresses the creation and continuation of a dependency
situation among people in the Horn of Africa. It
discusses how foreign aid can perpetuate dependency
(intentionally or not) rather than facilitate
self-reliance, and raises some critical ethical and
political considerations for people working in this area.
7Economic and political power is at the root of
refugee origins. Understanding the global, regional, and
local power structures and its imposed limits is
essential before attempting legitimate development
e.g. education for self-reliance.
The research has provided an opportunity for people
who have worked with refugees in Somalia to share ideas
and discuss alternatives. The results of the research
offer information to an audience which includes the
UNHCR, the US State Department, the Somali Government
(SDR)
,
voluntary agencies, all donors of aid,
politicians, and the United States public.
Clarifications
Assumptions
1. Overpopulation, poor farm management by small
farmers, and drought are not the causes of refugee
populations. War is the primary reason.
2. When discussing community development for
self-reliance there are two major concepts that have been
researched in considerable depth by others: (1)
a. Self-reliance is not a phenomenon that is legislated.
b. Broad based community development and growth are not
realized merely through skill acquisition; i.e. education
and training alone cannot foster self-reliance. Other
larger factors such as security and sel f-management must
8be acknowledged if effective development is to take place
and be sustained.
3. As instruments of change, education and training are
necessary components for community development programs.
However
,
they must be linked to community-based and
•^oritrolled participation since only in this manner can
communities focus on the heart of their problems.
Definitions ( 2
)
The key terms for this research will be defined in
the following way:
1* Self-reliance - Viewed as central to empowering
the disenfranchised by developing skills in awareness,
problem solving, and decision making. The key to self-
reliance as a development alternative is to include and
give power to target people in the decision making pro-
cess at all levels of project development and management.
2 . Self-management - As a concept it means a direct
comprehensive democracy in the economic, political, and
cultural unit which affords democratic representation to
all participants in the production process.
3. Participation - Seen as both a motivating force
in learning and as an empowering force through addressing
the needs of people/learners . As it relates to
self-reliance in a developmental context, it reguires
that these people are included in and have access to
power in the decision making process at all stages of
project development and management.
Community development - Based on the belief that
the abilities and energies of people in a community can
be used to improve their lives through the use of
democratic processes and voluntary efforts; A process of
social action in which people of a community organize
themselves for planning and action, define their common
individual needs and problems, make and execute plans
with a maximum of reliance on community resources.
Design of Study
This study is a descriptive and analytical treatment
of the community development program in Somali refugee
camps set in a regional and global context.
In that my methodology is essentially qualitative,
the following steps were taken to insure validity of the
study while answering the following implementing
questions
.
1. What is the existing literature pertaining to
theoretical issues of self-reliance?
The initial step was a critical literature review of
the primary and secondary source material available in
this area. Many of the contributors have a developmental
analysis referred to as dependency theory. For purposes
of this study, dependency theory is viewed as a system
actively exploiting people in oppressed countries for
10
their labor, resources, and markets to increase the
wealth of people from oppressor countries.
2. Where do refugees come from worldwide?
Contributors include environmentalists, political
econo- mists, academicians, news reporters, and accounts
from UN, US State Department, and voluntary agency
(volag) personnel.
Personal experience provides primary source
irifoi^s^tion through conversations, meetings, interviews,
and observations.
3. What is the feasibility of self-reliance in Somali
refugee camps?
This chapter is a political economic review of the
issue through four lenses at four levels; local,
national, regional, and global. Key themes in this
chapter are "Food as a Weapon" and "The Myth of
Neutrality." My information is from personal experience
and from the literature.
4. What are the geo-political concerns in the Horn of
Africa?
There is a lack (if not a poverty) of good,
comprehensive writing concerning the Horn. To a degree
this derth of literature is from a lack of access to the
primary sources of production and dissemination of
information in Ethiopia. Habte suggests that this is
complicated with misinformation "from the absence of
11
systematic accountability from a community of scholars
who specialize in the area." (3)
As a consequence, anyone purporting to be an expert
in the region can get his/her manuscripts published with
the consequence of having considerable influence on
public opinion.
If not an expert, I am at least knowledgeable of my
sphere of the Horn, and from that knowledge comes a power
to affect people's thinking. I know this experience has
given me a perspective that is important to share. I am
also aware that the people who participated in this
research do not represent all sides of the argument.
This was a matter of inaccessability and unwillingness on
behalf of some people to cooperate with the research.
For others, non-participation was a matter of safety.
I have reviewed publications that are pro-Soviet,
pro-US, and pro-Mengistu. I have met with the National
Union of Eritrean Women (NUEW) and been in contact with
people connected to the Eritrean People's Liberation
Front (EPLF)
,
The Eritrean Medical Association (EMA)
,
The
Oromo Liberation Front (OLF)
,
and the Western Somalia
Liberation Front (WSLF)
.
5. How does non formal education facilitate
self-reliance in Somali refugee camps?
The core of this chapter is my personal experience
working in Northwest Somalia. My primary responsibili-
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ties were protection and assistance issues both of which
were part of the community development program. Sources
include daily interaction through conversations,
meetings, memos, letters, reports, and observations. The
interactions listed above are with Ethiopian refugees and
people who have worked with refugees including voluntary
agencies, the UN, the US State Department, the Somali
government and Somali residents.
6. What are the practical considerations behind
implementing a community development training program?
This chapter is a product of my work and includes
conversations, memos, meetings, and reports in Somalia.
7 . What are the analysis and conclusions from this
research?
In Somalia, analysis of the notes and observations
began immediately. Obtaining data through work
experience was the action part of the research. Similar
to Freire's praxis, I reflected on the interactions with
co-workers, as I continued my work in the field. This
process continued in a cyclical pattern of action and
reflection throughout the research.
The information is important. Most questionnaire
and interview respondents want to see the finished
product. People were eager to discuss their work which
is illustrated by the percentage return of
questionnaires. The research has provided an opportunity
13
for me to think critically about my work over the last
two decades and has influenced my choices for the future.
Collection of data from a year's work in Somalia
provides an accurate day to day account of events. These
records are added to multiple sources of data collection
from diverse organizations and individuals. All
documentation is accurate. Anonymous sources of
information and questionnaires have always been available
to be shared with the Chair of my committee. For
reasons of safety, all refugee names are fictitious. All
cases where only one name is used represents a fictitious
name except in the case of writers. A full name such as
Clare Rolfe or Representative Blavo are real names.
Questionnaire and Interview
Data from one questionnaire is included. I was
assisted at different times in questionnaire development
and testing by colleagues who were from my committee, co-
workers, Ethiopian, Somali, and the University of
Massachusetts School of Education Research and
Development Office. It was sent to volag, US State
Department, HCR, and SDR employees who worked and still
are working with refugees in Somalia.
Interviews were conducted in Washington with 13 US
State Department, United States Aid in International
Development (USAID)
,
and Food For Peace (FFP)
14
representatives
.
Data from the questionnaire and interviews was
referenced in chapters two through seven. The
questionnaire data was codified with a Likert scale to
reveal any patterns present in the research. A strength
of the research lies with the participants who have
cooperated in providing data and analysis.
FOOTNOTES
1. See dissertations of S. Gajanayake, 1985, and D.
Graybill, in process, CIE, U/Mass, Amherst.
2. These definitions draw largely from the work of H.
Reed and B. Loughran, Beyond Schools
. CITP, CERC,
U/Mass, Amherst, Ma, 1984; The definitions for
community development and self-reliance are
compatible with SDR documents and are the
definitions that I shall use for purposes of this
research. They are the theoretical bases for the
HCR sponsored community development program, the
goal of which is self-reliance. I expect that the
process of this dissertation will reveal other
definitions of these terms, which may lead to a
better understanding of any contradictions that
exist in the practical application of this work in
Somalia
.
3. A. Habte, "Books on the Ethiopian Revolution: A
Review Essay," in Socialism and Democracy,
Fall/Winter 1986.
CHAPTER 2
THEORETICAL ISSUES OF SELF-RELIANCE;
A LITERATURE REVIEW
"Remove the chains of oppression and the yoke of
injustice, and let the oppressed go free." Isaiah
58 : 6
In order to analyse the self-reliance initiative in
Somalia and through it the issues and problems of
community development in Somali refugee camps, it is
necessary to examine the various existing theories of
self-reliance and how these relate in practice to
community development.
Of these self-reliance theorists, people such as
Nyerere, Mao Tse-tung, Ho Chi Minh, and Rousseau stressed
agrarian reform as the basis on which to build an
egalitarian self-reliant society. Cohen and Uphoff from
Cornell University, and Galjart and Buijs from Leiden,
and Galtung have written extensively about participation
as a necessary part of the developmental process. Rogers
and Maslow write about self-actualization, and Freire
stresses critical conciousness and self-confidence to
describe self-reliant individuals and groups, both of
these concepts being important qualities in Gandhian
nonviolence. Shadid, Prins, and Nas emphasize the
realities of access, the right to inclusion.
Participation, self-reliance, self-help, and community
15
development are abstract concepts and easily
misunderstood when loosely defined or not defined at
all. Self-reliance can be "implemented" by a centralized
authority in a condescending, altruistic, and harmful
way. It can be utilized to manipulate people for
amusement, power, and financial gain. In these cases,
P^^^i^ip^tory movements are co-opted into autocracy or
poorly organized to the point of ineffectiveness.
Ideology stressing control of production, access to
land, or a right to participate in making local decisions
is a process to empower. This is usually threatening to
elites in controlling positions, be they heads of state,
corporate directors, or representatives of international
organizations such as the UNHCR. Self-reliance and self-
determination require committment and struggle. They are
not romantic notions of rags to riches.
As a development strategy, it is wrong to think of
self-reliance as a new concept, a creation from a think
tank in Geneva, Beijing, Dar es Salaam, or Amherst. On
the contrary, it has probably existed from the beginnings
of human development as a natural and essential form of
social behavior.
Five years after William Walker's invasion of
Nicaragua, Smiles (1859) wrote about the destruction of
colonizers who exploited overseas sources of raw
materials. He wrote:
17
"There is a fundamental ideological and practicalincompatibility between nineteenth century liberalcapitalism and self-reliance." (i)
Smiles considered capitalism to be individualistic
and competitive. He considered collective self-reliance
as the only compatible approach favoring community and
group interests.
Julius Nyerere and Uiamaa
The notion of collective self-reliance was
fundamental to u~i amaa
,
Nyerere 's program for internal
development. Rooted in agrarian reform, a major
objective of u^ amaa was an increase in agricultural crops
local consumption as opposed to cash crops for
European markets. Availability and access to food is
unquestionably an essential component of self-reliance,
but agriculture was a means to a greater goal for Nyerere
and this was human dignity in a Tanzania built on
traditional democratic, non-capitalist structures.
Writing in 1963 he stated:
"We in Africa have no more need of being converted
to socialism than we have of being taught
democracy. Both are rooted in our past in the
traditional society which produced us." (2)
The strategy was inclusive rural participation in
decision making implemented through communal village
organization
.
In 1967, Nyerere stated in the Arusha Declaration
that his political party (TANU) was:
18
"...involved in a war against poverty and
oppression.
.. it is our weakness that has lead to ourbeing oppressed, exploited, and disregarded."
( 3 )
He called for a revolution that would put an end to
weakness, oppression, humiliation, and exploitation. He
suggested that one way for Tanzanians to liberate them-
selves was to avoid external finance through gifts, loans
and private investment. Gifts of food claimed Nyerere,
could undercut the Tanzanian marketing of local food.
have high interest rates and often political and
economic stipulations attached to them. Private invest—
ment is in the donor's interest as it allows for repatri-
ated profits at the expense of the Tanzanian economy.
"The prosperous nations," Nyerere wrote, "have not
accepted a responsibility to fight world poverty." (4)
The worst crime of colonialism to Nyerere was
t>slittling indigenous cultures as backward, inferior to
Europe, or non-existent. He wanted to instill confidence
among Tanzanians to dismantle these oppressive structures
on their own. He emphasized that wealthy nations will
not readily give up privilege to help the poor:
"On the surface they look very strong - they have
the police, they have the army and they have the
economy which can keep them in power for a long,
long time. They appear determined to stay in power.
So if you look at it purely from the outside, you
see that these people can stay for a long time. The
African opposition inside can organize the masses,
but they have no fire power. The government has the
monopoly on fire power. These young men and women
who defy the state have nothing except their courage
and when you see that kind of confrontation you say,
how can they do anything? These people can go on
19
for a long time." (5)
Nyerere emphasized the importance of education as an
integral element of ujamaa, stressing that classrooms
existed everywhere, at markets, at offices, in fields, on
buses, that everyone was an ujamaa teacher, and that this
way of life would free from dependency and lead Africa's
struggle for self-determination. "We are so import
dependent," he once said, " we import even our management
ability," to tell us what to do. (6)
writes that the ujamaa model was a promising
alternative in its organization of rural people into
decentralized, self-managed communities which by their
nature change political and economic power relation-
ships. He suggests that this type of organization
strengthens the:
"political conciousness of the rural population in
reference to its own cultural, technical, and social
being." (7)
The alternative Buntzel describes is attractive, but
it is important not to regard ujamaa or any model as a
formula within itself that changes power relationships.
Further, decentralization of political and economic
structures does not automatically change power
relationships and strengthen political conciousness.
Shiviji cautions that collectives like those in
Tanzania may come under the control of bureaucratic
bourgeoisie and become susceptible to foreign political
20
and economic intervention and cutural intrusion. Buntzel
concurs that this is an "invariable result of organizing
the rural population from above." (8)
Organizing from above, the oppressor need not be
foreign, rather can easily be internal and local. Nyerere
admitted that even though TANU tried to facilitate
participation, leadership was unorganized and imposing:
'We're better organized now than we were in 1967.So the problem is not socialism. The problem is theprocess of implementing socialism." ( 9 )
Van Vroonhoven argues that the problem was
convincing people it was in their interest to farm
communally when many had decided that they preferred to
remain on their own plots of land.
In Freedom and Socialism (1968) Nyerere referred to
village people as sovereign and encouraged leadership to
identify with the masses by living with them and
experiencing their lives:
"iri the course of building socialism, and especially
in a poor, underdeveloped country, naturally you are
groping in the dark. You make some decisions that
are right and others that are not." (10)
Van Vroonhoven writes sixteen years later that it
was an imposition for many people:
"Peasants were persuaded by arguments, lured by
substantial subsidies, but frequently also forced
and sometimes under threat of violence moved to new
settlements." (11)
not always prudently chosen, according to Van Vroonhoven,
by the government.
21
In Freedom ^ ^yelopment, Nyerere clearly states;
"Unless the purpose and socialist ideology of an
understood by the membeL from theginning, at least to some extent, the villagewill not survive the early difficulties." (12)
This applies not only to the village, but to the
national government as well, similarly, it applies to
villagers as well as to officials at all levels of the
bureaucracy, technicians and managers in business and
industry, TANU, and foreign interest groups who either
intentionally oppose and resist ujamaa or who may not
understand what it is. Parker (1979) and Shivji (1976)
support this argument by pointing out that the manipula-
tion and pressure of multinational corporations (MNC) and
foreign capital groups was always present and strong.
The Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) has
^^iticized agro—businesses that have penetrated rural
agriculture systems with capital and technology:
"
— with their foreign capital investments they tend
to P^oinote concentration of the ownership or control
of land, to displace labor and cultivators on fam
lands and thus to contribute to the perpetuation of
rural poverty." (13)
U1 Haq reasons that the only alternative to this
social and economic oppression is:
"...a genuinely socialist system based on a
different ideology and a different pattern of
society. It means a major change in the political
balance of power within these societies and drastic
economic and social reform." (14)
With control of production and decision making power
in the hands of a national or local elite, the infra-
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structure for self-reliance will not exist and the forma-
tion of self-reliant groups will be neither seriously
promoted nor tolerated by controlling interests, be they
local or foreign; feudal or capitalist.
Developmentally
,
control through a centralized, top
down infrastructure at the global, regional, and natonal
levels has been responsible for an increase in poverty as
measured in the actual numbers of poor and increasingly
poor people throughout the world. it is reflected in
disease, unemployment, and most of all hunger. (14a)
Gandhi and Self-Sufficiency
Similar to Nyerere's agrarian reform, Gandhi
envisioned a network of self-governing, self-reliant
villages trading with other self-managing villages.
Small cooperative units organized at a grass-roots level
with an ever-increasing control of production would allow
less advantage for dictatorship from above and afar.
This was his recipe for democracy (Fischer 1954)
.
Gandhi's democracy was in terms of community
education in sanitation and hygiene, cattle breeding, and
fertilization of fields, spinning and weaving cloth, and
cooperative arrangements to market produce and purchase
necessary items.
At Tolstoy farm, Gandhi was "insistent on sanitation
and environmental preventive medicine, or the need to
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turn waste into wealth." (15) Above all, it was to allow
people to "discover that in themselves and in their
cooperative efforts lay their salvation." (16) Working
cooperatively was a critical first step towards a self-
determinating society, one in which people could liberate
themselves from cultural dependence. Cultural dependence
was the worst form of dependence to Gandhi and the worst
crime perpetrated by colonial powers.
Rabindranath Tagore believed that India had made its
own shackles. in a letter to Gandhi, Tagore wrote:
"Prisoner, tell me who was it that brought this
unbreakable chain? It was I, said the prisoner, whoforged this chain very carefully." ( 17 )
Standing in the face of powerful governments,
exploitative economic structures, and oppressive
majorities, the result is a shrinking human being who has
seemingly lost control of his/her peace and security with
an inability to change the situation. When this
submission happens, explained Gandhi, the road is open to
dictatorship and totalitarianism.
The danger in a poor country, Gandhi cautioned was
to have a virtue made of necessity, be it in the form of
money, clothing, food, or external control in a political
and/or economic sense. When this occurs, consumption can
be imposed on the poor whereby they can be easily
manipulated by the rich.
For Gandhi, the village was the locus of struggle and
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the organizational center for democracy. Solidarity
through partici-pation would provide people with the
potential to successfully confront the exploitation of
foreigners and local elites. His circles of intercon-
nected villages paralleled Nyerere's ujamaa in its
insistence on local self-sufficiency, mainly in food.
Gandhi's development ethics blended social,
cultural, and economic factors. Unlike colonial powers,
he drew no distinctions between ethics and economics;
"Economics that hurt the moral well-being of anindividual or a nation are immoral and therefore
sinful
. Thus the economics that permit one country
to prey on another are immoral." (18)
isnce for Gandhi started with the individual
and found its greatest application at the village level.
Individual self-help and self-sufficiency (counting on
one's own resources) were integrated with "solidarity and
interdependence among equals." (19) The individual was
like the village, both being independent for basic needs
and yet "interdependent for many other needs in which
dependency is a necessity." (20)
Gandhi was influenced by the writings of many,
including Thoreau, Rousseau, Ruskin, Emerson, Tolstoy,
utopian socialists (not Marx)
,
and by the fundamentals of
Christianity. From these teachings, intertwined with his
own strong roots in Hinduism, evolved his high regard for
human labor as unquestionably possessing more value than
the machine. Also were formed the moral and political
foir sh iins3. (non~viol©nc©)
.
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Truth and Non-Viol©nc©
N©hru was oft©n impati©nt with Gandhi's id©alism of
th© villag© ©mbodi©d in truth and non-viol©nc©. N©hru
r©gard©d villag©s and th©ir inhabitants as backward both
culturally and intellectually and as such, on© could make
little progress with them in these areas. He often
viewed the poor as dishonest and prone to violence which
in his mind made Gandhi ' s ahimsa not practical in a
developmental context (Collins and LaPierre 1984)
.
For Gandhi, however, any dishonesty and violence had
its roots in hunger which was all the more incentive for
him to proceed with his Panchavat (direct democracy at
the village level) . To him any "marginal democratic"
changes were merely a perpetuation of a violent status
quo. The best attempts at land reform legislation to him
were a sham because the political influences of the
landlords were in no functional way altered. In
situations such as these there was no overt killing,
therefore they were not conceived of as violent
situations. Yet this:
"...stalemate and inaction lead to hunger and
deprivation of millions ... even though nobody pulls
the trigger of a machine gun, such an environment of
utter degradation, filth, and hopelessness is just
as violent ... one cannot deny that it is in such
environments that crime and violence flourish and
undermine the stability of a society." (21)
For the hungry, Gandhi told Nehru, "Liberty, God,
and all such words are merely letters put together
without the slightest meaning." (22)
Truth and Civil Disobedience
Emerson and Thoreau both read and borrowed from the
Bhagavad Gita and some of the Hindu Upanishads. In civil
Disobedience
,
Thoreau spoke of the prisoner's soul being
set free. Gandhi was impressed by this work for a number
of reasons, but one concept stood out and this was the
emphasis on truth as a basis for his actions. Truth to
Gandhi was God. To Gandhi, the truth would make you not
only free, but provide you with sound mental health as
well. Truth Gandhi set himself free to go to jail.
Some of Gandhi's major teachings were in the area of
self-assertion which was exemplified in the Indian
resistance movement using civil disobedience as a
tactic. Nehru once said that Gandhi had "straightened
our backs and stiffened our spines ... Power cannot ride on
an upright back." (23)
Gandhi was corresponding with Leo Tolstoy just prior
to his death in 1910. Truth to Tolstoy was:
"...standing up for your rights... as a rational and
free man, and defending them, not. . .with concessions
and promises ... but with moral and human dignity."
(24)
Tolstoy's comment on self-reliance is perhaps best
expressed in The Kingdom of God is Within You (1894)
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where he states that through non-violence, people can
resist evil and set themselves and the world free,
whether the government likes it or not. Operating from a
similar moral premise, Thoreau wrote in Civil Disobedi-
— (1849) that he had an obligation "to do at any time
what I think right." (25) At the time of this writing,
Thoreau was protesting slavery and the US invasion of
Mexico. In Which Way to Peace (1936), Bertrand Russell
advocated direct action through civil disobedience:
"...all great advances have involved illegality.
The early Christians broke the law? Galileo broke
the law; the French revolutionaries broke the law;
early trade unionists broke the law. The instances
are so numerous and so important that no one can
maintain as an absolute principle obedience to
constituted authority." (26)
Writing against the barbarity and legitimacy of
World War I, he wrote from prison, "As a lover of truth,
the national propaganda of all the belligerent nations
sickens me." (27) For Gandhi, Tolstoy, Thoreau, and
Russell, non-violence through civil disobedience was a
mechanism to express truth, a truth that ultimately leads
to justice. For Martin Luther King Jr.
,
the choice was
"clearly between non-violence and non-existence." (28)
Economic Justice
King's justice was economic without which, there
would never be political justice. Two centuries earlier.
Thomas Paine ( Agrarian Justice
^
put forth an indictment
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Of poverty based on the economic injustice he had
experienced in Europe and the US. He argued not for
charity, but rights; not bounty but justice. In the
Rights of Man (1791) he referred to the chains of
political superstition and how they must be broken
(Tagore's shackles) that degraded people must rise to
their proper rank. The French Revolution was influenced
by Paine and his contemporary, Jean Jacques Rousseau.
Like Paine, Rousseau was concerned with the inequalities
from political and economic dependency. Rousseau viewed
justice in terms of agrarian reform:
''...the only means of maintaining the external
independence of the state. With all the wealth in
the world, if you lack food, you will be dependent
on others. if you wish to be a free nation...
a
nation that is self-sufficient unto itself and
happy.
. .employ the masses of your population in
agriculture .
" (29)
Rousseau's self-reliant individual in a self-reliant
society is associated with equality derived from:
1) Control of production of basic needs and
2) Direct participation in political life.
Rousseau's conception of an egalitarian community was
"bands of peasants regulating the affairs of state under
an oak tree." (30) In his mind, poverty was caused by an
oppressive monarchy and malicious power relationships
forming around new technology and economic arrangements
of the industrial revolution.
Tickner uses a definition of self-reliance by
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Galtung (1980) which she feels is appropriate for
Rousseau's peasant. As such, s/he is viewed in terms of:
or a faith in one's own values,
culture, and civilization;
2) The ability to be self-sufficient to produce basic
needs; and 3) Fearlessness/Invulnerabil ity
^
a structure
of defense to withstand external coersive power. (31)
Political Economy Rousseau described an ideal
society that was static and non-progressive. He was:
"against social mobility. Progress brings a division
of labor which leads to ineguality and dependence:
social complexity, usually associated with urban
life, erodes the ties of equality that bind men
together and break down self-reliance." (32)
Gandhi and Mao echoed Rousseau's ideals of national
self- reliance and agricultural self-sufficiency, but Mao
did not envision a China in Rousseau's likeness that was
static and non-progressive. The Chinese communists were
forced into a system of agricultural self-reliance out of
necessity during the struggle against the Kuomintang.
Then and later, Mao talked about "building up our country
through diligence and frugality." (33) Many austere
years contributed to Mao's belief in a self-reliant
society with a strong agricultural base. Mao considered
self-reliance in food production essential for China to
build a strong industrial state, although:
"one in which industry would ideally be decentral-
ized to avoid large urban concentrations." (34)
Unlike Rousseau, Mao recognized the importance of
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scientific education and the practical utility of work.
Ch'en writes of Mao's reference to university students
"who do not see how workers work, how peasants plough,
and how business is done." (35) "Man's knowledge depends
mainly on his activity in material production." (35a)
In his Hunan Report of 1927, Mao articulated the
role of the peasantry as "the vanguard in overthrowing
the feudal forces" in Chinese society." Cumings writes:
Mao's belief in the creativity and spontaneity ofthe Chinese peasantry and his cooresponding distrust
of the pretensions of any elite (including the
Communist party) figures in his widespread adoption
of the practices of hsia-hsiang (to the villages)
Many would ascribe the entire Cultural Revolution
(1966-1968) to Mao's determination to prevent the
development of new elite values and to eradicate
persistent old ones in Chinese society." (36)
Education and Freedom
Like Mao, Gandhi was searching for an Indian
national identity to offset imperialism. A major
however, was Gandhi's educational framework
for doing this. Gandhi wanted adult education centers to
be consumer and producer co-ops, as well as to provide
training in village industries. He did not profess
educational notions such as "all powerful". Unlike Mao,
Gandhi's education for social change was rooted in non-
violence. He recognized human weakness in himself and
others and had no standards of perfection for anyone.
Freedom for Gandhi was a freedom to make mistakes:
reedom IS not worth having if it does not connotefreedom to err and even to sin. If God has giventhe humblest of His creatures the freedom to err, itpasses my comprehension how human beings, be they
ever so experienced and able, can delight indepriving other human beings of that precious
right." (37)
The right to err presupposes the right to
participate in legitimate ways. Before one can
legitimately participate, one must have right to access
Agriculturally speaking this means access and tenure to
arable land. In a political sense this means access to a
legitimate power to make decisions. In the economic
arena it is access to the labor force and to markets.
Effective participation means having access to legitimate
power. The Center for Self-Directed Learning sees
information as a critical source of power: "Information
gives you power .
" (38)
Access
Buijs defines access as:
"...the possibility of people to dispose of services
and goods intended for them which are not
distributed via the market system, but through
administrative institutions." (39)
Depending on the goods and services, this definition may
presuppose income or a method of payment, perhaps in
terms of labor. Similarly, Schaffer sees access as a set
of relationships "between the administrative allocation
of goods and services and the people who need them, and
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for whom they are intended," (40) in a distribution
system which is not based on purchasing power.
In addition to goods and services, access is
considered by Shadid, Prins, and Nas as:
To Palmer, access is "including the excluded," (42)
but Colebatch affirms that access encompasses much more
than mere inclusion, rather it is:
"the whole range of interactions, both of people and
of institutions, that govern the administrative
allocation of goods and services." (43)
All of these definitions/descriptions of access are
valid, but I am reluctant to exclude factors of income as
Schaffer suggests. Disposable income is generally, but
not always, a consequence of factual access to the labor
market. This income in turn provides access to the
consumer market which includes among other commodities,
nutritional, medical, legal, and educational services.
In a system based on maximization of profit and
simultaneous unemployment, we begin with an unequal
access to income which creates an unequal power structure
and inequitable distribution of resources which in turn
can generate and perpetuates problems with pragmatic
access to the system.
Buijs identifies two important dimensions which he
lables formal and factual access whereby one could have a
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legal right to entrance (formal) but be hindered by the
realities of social, economic, and political structures
(factual)
. Civil rights legislation is one example from
the Civil War amendments to the Voting Rights Act of 1964
to Reagan's attempts to rescind it; Women's Rights from
the Suffrage Amendment of 1920 to the defeat of the ERA;
Or an Ethiopian refugee's right to protection from the
Somali army, as well as food and water without a bribe.
These cases have long histories of circumstances which
illustrate that having formal access has the potential of
even greater risk than no formal access, when this right
to access is pursued.
Buijs refers to this conflict of interests as the
"access tension field," a result of incongruencies or
contradictions in practicing one's formal right to
access. This lack of harmony is created by different
methods of denial and exclusion not the least of which is
intimidation and co-optation by the system. Buijs
includes one other dimension to formal access, the abuse
of which leads to corruption. This occurs when an
individual or organization has no formal right to access,
yet assumes such out of self-interest. United States
military intervention in Central America comes to mind,
as well as the inscription of Ethiopian refugees into the
Somali army. This is power abuse.
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Access and Participation
Access does not mean participation. it is
considered by Buijs as a prerequisite to participation at
two levels: 1) Self- organization of the target or
subordinate group and 2) Action for the ultimate goal.
Dealing with two abstract concepts, it is difficult and
unnecessary to put them in a time sequence.
What is necessary is to regard access and
participation as educational processes. Education and
rebellion are related processes in human development
against oppressive conditions which restrict the self-
determination of people.
Paulo Freire's conciousness raising is a mechanism
for liberation within a social, economic, and political
context. He refers to oppression as dehumanizing,
stressing that the dehumanization affects "both the
oppressors and those whom they oppress." (44) It is the
responsibility of the oppressed to;
"wage for both the struggle for a fuller humanity.
The oppressor is himself dehumanized because he
dehumanizes others, and is therefore unable to lead
this struggle." (45)
Education and Liberation
Education to Freire is the practice of liberation
because it frees both the oppressor and the oppresed; the
teacher and the student from the;
"twin thraldom of silence and monologue as they
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learn of each other as beings of worth." (46)
To understand this silence, one must understand
dependence and its structural relationships. m a letter
to Freire, Jose Luis Fiori wrote:
not the dominator who constructs a cultureand imposes it on the dominated. This culture isthe result of the structural relations between thedominated and the dominators."
( 47 ).
Hence the relational phenomenon of dependence gives:
"rise to different forms of being, of thinkina of
those of the culture of silence 'andthose of the culture that has a voice." (48)
For Freire, the way to liberate oneself from this
silence, to "have a voice", is through political
literacy. Through new generative words, learners:
"expand both their vocabulary and their capacity for
expression by the development of their creativeimagination." (49)
Chomsky writes that creatively, the linguistic and
mental processes are virtually identical with:
"...language providing the primary means for free
expansion of thought and feeling, as well as for thefunctioning of creative imagination." (50)
This creative imagination Freire suggests, is lost
in an illiterate society where an educated elite does all
the thinking. In The Politics of Education , he states:
"As illiterate learners go on to organize a more
precise form of thinking through a problematical
vision of their world and a critical analysis of
their experience, they will be increasingly able to
act with more security in the world." (51)
This task of self-introspection, of inter-relationships
among people and the world based on social experiences.
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contributes to the ability of the oppressed to think in
terms of control as regards their own life functions.
This process of transformation Freire calls prawis .
Through praxis, one becomes the subject of his/her
life and uses the power of thought to work towards social
change. The praxis of political literacy allows the
learner to "understand the word". The word takes on new
power, and facilitates a process of self-discovery
through which the oppressed can "say their own word, to
name the world.” (52) By naming their world, people can
create as they become more confident, and simultaneously
overcome dehumanization. Carlos Fonseca once said to an
showing a recruit how to clean a rifle, "When
you're done with the rifle, teach him to read."
As dehumanization dissipates, dignity develops. As
subjects, the oppressed are makers of culture, makers of
history. Through praxis they have "a new instrument of
conduct" with which they can "overcome traditional
structures and enter the modern world." (53). In
conversation, Freire once said, "The knowledge already
exists. I'm there to help them order it." (54)
This "self-knowledge", writes Kubie, leads to
greater creativity, a less distorted perception of
reality, and a greater freedom." (55) Homey concurs
that self-knowledge facilitates the loosening of inner
bonds and thus allows a person to be "free for the
development of his best potentialities." (56)
Through cpncientizacao (conciousness raising)
,
Freire teaches that people can codify their:
"...total reality into symbols which can generate
conciousness and empower them to altertheir relations with nature and social forces." (57)
Critical conciousness is the key to cultural emancipa-
tion. In Education as the Practice of Freedom
^
Freire
argues that the oppressed must continually focus on the
slave conciousness which has been imposed on them by
elites. Freedom (and the foundation for self- reliance)
is the power to reject and throw off this imposed
unconciousness of inferiority. in U.S. culture, as well
as elsewhere, the great excess of power which exists has
^^^ipulsted and intimidated many people to submit to that
power, as well as encouraged others to be all powerful.
Schaull considers the impact of Freire 's methods of
teaching, as well as his impact on educators, to be
extraordinary in that it has made each group aware of
traditional lethargy and stagnancy in the educational
process. Its reality, Freire says is to put "the
educator as a knowing subject face to face with learners
who are knowing subjects." (58) The reality is also
prison and exile, both of which Freire has experienced.
"It is indispensable to be curious, critical, not to
be afraid of presenting feelings, not afraid of
being touched by fantasy, by intuition. .. Knowing is
not from guessing, but knowing allows you to guess.
This culture (U.S.) has a fear of freedom, a fear of
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controls which are
ed. An inability to
power." (59)
By overcoming fear, by arriving at a new awareness
of self and:
"...by looking critically at their social
situations, people take the initiative in acting to
Transforming society is another way of saying social
change. As an organized educational activity, this
transformation meets primary needs of local people and is
instrumental in facilitating the struggle of community
Gajanayake believes that as a developmental
approach, community development was introduced to
exploited countries by European and United Statesian
organizations in the fifties and sixties. He suggests:
"This approach stressed the importance of people's
participation, but was only another version of the
old diffusionist strategy." (61)
Defined by the U.S. International Cooperation Admin-
istration (USICA)
,
community development is a process:
"of social action in which people of a community
organize themselves for planning and action; define
their common and individual needs and problems; make
group and individual plans to meet their needs and
solve their problems, execute these plans with a
maximum of reliance upon community resources; and
supplement these resources when necessary with
service and material from governmental and non
governmental agencies outside the community." (62)
development (Vella 1979)
.
Community Development
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Theoretically, this definition is rooted in respect
for the human worth and dignity of individuals. However,
in Its practical application, community development has
often been used to promote western ideas and values or in
Uphoff s opinion, to encourage programs in countries
which "had some strategic importance to the west." (63)
Das argues that in India:
f
° ^ benefitted the most from communi-
and a growing disparity andinequality became visible in the rural areas." (64)
He suggests that the:
"...dominant land owners benefitted from the exten-sion work and other projects, rather than the major-ity of the poor peasants in the community." (65)
Personal experiences in South America and Africa
lead me to concur with Das that village level extension
workers were more often than not, representatives of the
government and agroindustry rather than agents for social
change. (66) These extension workers are, in Todaro's
viewpoint, hooked into:
"... institutional and structural economic rigidities
and caught up in a dependence/dominance relationship
to rich countries." (67)
It is a consequence of the uneven design of capitalism:
"... in which the world consists of center and
periphery nations, and each nation in turn has its
center and periphery." (68)
The "New International Economic Order" (NIEO)
introduced in 1974 by the Group of Seventy Seven,
stresses narrowing:
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"...the gap between developed and developina
-dressing
The implication of this is a rearranging of
socio-political structures and an overhauling of power
relationships as concerns political leadership and
economic control. The logical path for exploited
countries to follow is one of self-reliance emphasizing
human and material resources at the local level.
Goulet advocates a human needs based approach within
the community development model. A human needs approach
utilizing the energies of people is supported by Abdalla
as a method to:
"undo the ties of dependency ... correct the
distortions and achieve internal integration of
national development." (70)
This for him is self-reliance with naturally motivated
people believing "the fruits of their endeavors belong to
them." (71)
For community development to be sustaining, there
must be participation. Chambers believes that
participation increases communication and knowledge,
generates ideas, and facilitates problem solving, while
it encourages confidence and skill development through
cooperative working relationships.
Uphoff and Easmon concur;
"Participation in the decision making process can
reveal and tap previously unrecognized managerial
and leadership talents. . .enhance the legitimacy of
the institutions and also national government.
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prcpvides a ready outlet for the expression of
generate local cooperation andelf help activities for development." (72)
Participation
Participation is defined by Gajanayake as:
...the capacity to influence or to play a vital
role in the development of various economic andsocial processes." (73)
As defined by Shadid, Prins, and Nas it is:
"...taking part in the decision making andimplementation process of an organization." (74)
French refers to participation as:
...a process where two or more parties influence
each other in making plans, policies, and decisionsthat effect those making the decisions and on thosethey represent." (75)
To Arnstein participation:
"
... is the strategy by which the have nots co-decidehow information is spread, how ends and policies are
formulated." (76)
In its simplest, Meister concludes that participa-
tion means "to have a part of something." (77) To
Lammas, "an attempt to exert upward influence." (78)
Reed and Associates view participation as an empow-
ering process, reguiring that people are included in and
have access to power in decision making at all stages of
project development and management. It is seen as both:
"...a motivating force in learning and as an
empowering force through addressing the needs of
learners." (79)
Cohen and Uphoff see participation as on-going,
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including the "decision making, implementation, benefits,
and evaluation" (80) of development projects. To Vella,
this process:
"
: : :
i^^volves time
. . . comprehensive respect ... a
listen. Participation involves firstOf all an awareness of class distinctions...
comprehensive participation involves... a hardpragmatic comprehension of reality, admitting every-one s perspective and respecting it." (81)
On the lowest rung of the participation ladder are
manipulation, persuation, and therapy which do notpermit real participation in decision making." (82)
In reality, this is non-participation and deserves
no rung on any participation ladder, with the refugee
business in Somalia, participation is often expressed in
terms of coersion, and intimidation as well.
All of these descriptions of participation have a
common denominator in that they address a redistribution
of power and therefore a redistribution of control, or in
the abscence of this, an ensuing conflict. As Freire has
discussed education as political, the process of
participation is similarly not neutral. As an empowering
process, it addresses the roots of "human rights to
constructively change and improve one's quality of life"
(82a) and with it are included accompanying risks. The
alternative is as Gandhi has expressed, a continued
vulnerability to the violence of the status quo.
In a national development plan with a focus on
community development, participation means decentraliza-
tion. Writing in 1964, ten years before the coup in
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Ethiopia, Gabre Mariam (Haile Selassie Law School) con-
cluded that Ethiopia was at a stage of development that
was socially and economically hampered by a centralized
administrative system. He believed that harmonious growth
could only be expected and in people's interests through:
central government'sdministration and the participation of the peoplein such decentralized activities
... that the decisive
a?fairr^h''''?H^r^''-°'' administration of localf irs should be given to the people of that area
•
that means the establishment of an independent,local, self-governing system."
( 83 )
Self-Governing Systems and the Workplace
Humanization, dignity, and economic viability are as
important in the democratization of industry as they are
to Nyerere's principles of agrarian reform. A basic
premise of Drucker's (1954) is that job performance in
industry is tied to internal motivation and self-
satisfaction stemming from responsibility, a belief that
decisions should be made at all levels of the workplace
by those closest to the problem.
Simmons and Mares concur that workplace democracy
giving workers more control over their jobs boosts
production, and the democratic restructuring is the key
to economic recovery. The ultimate goal of workplace
democracy Hunnius believes, is self-management and social
change. He postulates:
"The right to control and manage a joint effort
rests with all the members of that group,"
stressing that:
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labor management is in conflict
capita??»^^84r^
control and management by
What Hunnius considers a person's moral and natural right
to individual self
-management and self-determination is
countered by the perceived right of capital to possession
and maximization of profits. This "capitalist property
system", writes Hunnius, "legalizes theft and tyranny in
the workplace." (85)
Wilson is concerned with worker alienation due to
fragmentation of their lives into little bits of
activity. The real objective, he argues is "direct
by workers, not indirect participation
resulting only in a temporary expedient." (86) Further,
he cautions of token participation where management,
often in collaboration with unions, manipulates workers
to decrease labor strength.
Aronowitz supports this argument by suggesting that
although unions are:
"...an elementary organ of struggle, they are also a
force for integrating workers into the corporate,
capitalist system." (87)
He argues that unions are often an appendage of the
corporations and in actuality serve corporate interests;
that although many unions in the U.S. have retained forms
of democracy, the content is no longer there. This is
another example of what was mentioned earlier concerning
fonnal and factual acc©ss
.
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Ken Blaylock, president of the American Federation
of Government Employees, strongly promotes the rights of
international trade unions. At the April 25th Mobiliza-
tion (1987) in Washington DC, he spoke forcefully against
Reagan's foreign policy in Central America and Southern
Africa and the violence that is perpetrated against
unions in those regions. At the 1985 AFL-CIO convention
in Anaheim, Blaylock criticized AFL-CIO collusion with
the Reagan administration and its CIA sponsored American
Institute for Free Labor Development (AIFLD)
:
When I look at Iran, I look at Vietnam, l look atNicaragua, I look at El Salvador and Guatemala I
government to be onthe side of the people, not on the side of richdictators living behind high walls. i think laborhas to stand for the principles of democracy, human
rights and trade union rights. We should rejectpolicies of terror against the people of CentralAmerica." (88)
At the NAACP's 78th annual convention. Rev. Jesse
Jackson attacked transnational corporations for runaway
shops that remove jobs from the US and put US labor into
exploitative competition with South Korean and Taiwanese
workers. Jackson appealed for:
"...enforceable international laws against global
union busting, racism, sexism, and sweatshops.
.
.
multinational labor exportation and exploitation
must end... After the South Korean and Taiwanese
workers start watching the television sets, in
addition to building them, they will start marching.
Then they will be called Communists and we'll be
asked to take up guns and shoot them and they'll die
and we'll die... We've been down that road before, we
must go another way." (89)
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In the Summer of 1987, South Koreans were in the
street. As of 1983, only 57% of Korean workers received
a salary above the poverty level. Among working women,
only 37% earn wages above the standard minimum
established by the government authorized federation of
Korean unions. A Boston Globe editorial asserts:
for democracy and spontaneousstrikes have demonstrated that neither the militarvofficers who monopolize political power nor the
^
corporate barons who wield economic power Ln
fo^Tshare in^^K^® P°Pular yearnings for freedom orr r a shar Korea's new prosperity.
ina who are now ask-
shfre independent unions and toS a in the nation's export-based prosperity, areseeking the most basic form of social justice." (90)
People concerned with workplace democracy address
issues of dignity and humanization; self-management and
self-determination; participation and access. None use
the term self-reliance, but their rhetoric incorporates
ideas of empowerment and in this they resemble Freire.
Know your word, know your world, know your workplace.
Genuine participation in the workplace, as in other
segments of society, requires a radical shift in power
and control among the privileged. In industry as well as
educational institutions, it depends upon a radical
change in management philosophy.
Simmons and Mares draw a distinction between
political democracy which is indirect and
representational and workplace democracy which:
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"...usually means direct involvement in dailyecisions through problem solving groups andconsensus decision making.
.. choosing fellow
employees to sit on committees or the board odirectors, or selecting one's own manager...
see the results of their efforts, while theydo not in political democracy." (91)
f
people
often
Mondragon
Perhaps the West's best example of a self-reliant
and self-sustaining system in both human and economic
terms, involving both self-management and worker
ownership are the Northern Spain cooperatives of
Mondragon. Mondragon has its physical and psychological
roots in the wretched devastation of the Basque country
by Franco during the Spanish Civil War.
Father Jose Maria Arizmendi arrived in Mondragon in
1941 equipped with his Bible and Mao's Little Red Book
and initiated an apprentice school for technical
education. Arizmendi 's committment to freedom and the
importance to him of work and technical skill were
parallel to Mao, but he was against Mao's belief in
compulsory productive work. Arizmendi described how:
"...students at the professional and polytechnical
school were able to cover their required contribu- tion
to school fees by taking part in productive work for the
market, but he insisted that they must be free not to do
that if they so desired." (92)
Simmons and Mares discuss two vital elements in
Mondragon's success. One is the:
"...sophisticated management and ownership structure
of the individual firms, which balances managerial
effectiveness and employee participation. The
ennl’nv
combination of profit sharing for the
reinvestment needs^of thf
Mondragon has solved one of the most acute problems of
cooperatives, the "reliable access to adequate capital,"
(94) by beginning a Cooperative Savings Bank called the
Caja Laboral Popular (The Bank of People's Labor).
The bank's assets are internal, its funds coming
from over 300,000 depositors in the cooperatives. This
IS consistent with the important Mondragon rule of no
outside ownership of any Mondragon enterprise. Ten
percent of all profits are invested in community
organizations and institutions such as schools and civic
associations. Twenty percent is reinvested in the
cooperatives and 70% in individual worker accounts which
is also money available to reinvest in the cooperatives.
When workers leave the company, they must take their
assets with them to ensure no outside ownership.
system, referred to by Simmons and Mares as
"pragmatic genius", balances individual needs with
company goals and is buttressed by four basic principles:
1) Insure democratic from—the—bottom—up self-government;
2) Contribution of capital by all working members;
3) Protection of job security and work behavior and
discipline that promotes inter-cooperative solidarity and
coordination;
4)
Open-door policies of maximum job creation and
acceptance of new members. (95)
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Women and Self-Reliance
Karla Jackson-Brewer
,
a member of the New York Women
Against Rape (NYWAR)
,
feels strongly that:
against women and children takes many
exile, forced sterilization,
apartheid, sexual terror and assault." (96)
Nina S.L. Martin, Volunteer Coordinator/Supervisor
at Necessities/Necessidades, an organization for battered
women and their children, asserts;
There are many similarities between US foreignpolicy and battering. Both are manipulative, they
victim, and they undermine self-esteem and
"determination
. Both use physical andpsychological violence as a means of control, a
control which is perpetuated through manipulated
economic relationships. Because of this violence
and dependency, a nation or a woman knows that ifthey attempt to pursue independence, they risk being
respectively destroyed or killed. Both US foreignpolicy and battering are carried out by insecureindividuals who have extreme needs for power and
control over others." (97)
In June 1987, Yanira Corea, an El Salvadoran woman
working with the Committee in Solidarity with the People
of El Salvador (CISPES)
,
was raped and tortured by three
men identifying themselves with the Death Squads in El
Salvador. Death threats were sent to 19 people in the
*^^9^^ization and several women were singled out with
warnings. Two weeks later, another woman was kidnapped
and terrorized. The FBI saw these incidents as isolated
and not requiring Federal investigation. If there are
degrees of rape, political rape to me is the most horrid.
Eritrean Women and Self-Determination
"Eritrean women are
country at the same time
liberating themselves and their
These words, spoken by keynote speaker Dr. Helen
Rodriguez, were the theme of "Women to Women: Towards
Self-Reliance," a conference sponsored by the NUEW in
October 1986.
The NUEW writes that Eritrean women have
historically been "blunted by ossified patriarchal
oppression and norms," structurally similar to what women
experience in any oppressive culture:
"The social status of Eritrean women, as in all
exploitative systems, is merely that of subservience
and they are confined to domestic work, deprived of
access to other socially productive work. Indeed,
Eritrean women were victims of class exploitation,
Patriarchal domination and feudalist myth and
reactionary scpcial norms in addition to the barbaric
crimes and injustices perpetrated on them by the
colonial enemy." (98)
One of the biggest challenges for the EPLF has been
to mobilize and incorporate women into the revolution.
Samuela Zerai, a nurse and member of the Eritrean Medical
Association sees Eritrean society in a process where
women and men are changing roles from a very traditional
patriarchal society to an egalitarian one, a society in
which women are exploring a new status, "a woman's bid
for freedom from traditional bondage."
This exploration, however, must be viewed within the
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reality that
-one out of four women die within six months
of childbirth.- Although disease and malnutrition are
evident in these deaths, the root cause, asserted Ms.
Zerai is a war that
-that subverts the economy." (99)
Before the revolution, women could not own property,
participate in legal transactions, or discuss political
and religious issues. The founding of the EPLF made
gender issues an important component of the revolution:
"Without the conscious participation of women, whoconstitute half of the population, the social
revolution cannot triumph and likewise women's
emancipation depends on the victory of this
revolution." (100)
Literacy and health education are priority issues in
this liberation process. According to Luul Ghebreab,
Chairwoman of the NUEW in Italy;
"We work with women on different levels, accordingto their level of conciousness. We raise issues
very slowly. As time goes by, the women from the
village take up new concepts themselves, and thenthey become those who are working for change." (101)
The EPLF outlawed arranged marriages as well as
child brides. Under EPLF law there is equal ownership of
property between husband and wife. In the words of one
Eritrean woman, social responsibilities:
"are shared, whether cooking supper or sharing the
danger of military attack." (102)
One must be careful not to romanticize the
revolution and the role of women within it. Eritrean
countryside has been ravaged by US and USSR bombing and
strafing for 27 years reeking a devastating horror and
52
terror throughout the country. To protect themselves and
avoid fleeing to the Sudan, much of Eritrean society has
literally gone underground. Underground there are
hospitals and clinics with women doctors and nurses;
there are businesses and factories with women workers and
managers; schools with women teachers. (103)
Above ground at night, women till the soil. Negisti
Hintsa, Geologist/Economist, and member of the EMA in
Canada explains:
"When the EPLF did land reform, the first action was
landless and this meant women."(104)
Above and below ground is the EPLF's army, 1/3 of whom
are women. "When women engage in armed struggle, they
learn their rights," professed Hintsa. (105)
Saba Issayas, Chairwoman of the NUEWNA in New York,
suggests that it is because of these austere conditions,
in which the EPLF has no superpower assistance, that has
made men and women realize they must work together for
everyone's liberation. She asserts:
"The liberation of Eritrea will not take place
without the liberation of Eritrean women. And the
liberation of Eritrean women will not take place
without the liberation of Eritrea." (106)
Babu and Social Economy
Abdul Rahman M. Babu, a noted Tanzanian
Journalist/Economist refers to the Eritrean struggle as
"the hope for Africa:"
53
wSh Eritrea, my first impression was Iish we had our people so well-rounded like thisbecause we could have utilized our resources in away that could have revolutionized our
think"'Eritraa*'i® a*'® greatest achievement that
'
n riK ea has made." (107)
Babu asserts that to achieve economic independence
and self-reliance, neo-colonies must pursue a socialist
approach to devel-opment. These strategies must deal with
contradictions between industry and agriculture, heavy
and light industry, large and small scale, urban and
rural, capital or labor intensive. To Babu, capitalist
controlled development, regardless of good intentions,
results in punishing the poor because they become:
"...a heavy burden on society. The contrast to thecaptalist and socialist approaches to this problemIS dramatically illustrated by the development
experience of China and India. in the one case thepeasantry IS a source of rapid development, in the
other it IS a heavy burden on the economy; in one itIS an asset, in the other a liability." (108)
Babu stresses that economic planning is
fundamentally, political action:
A Socialist planner plans for freedom; he makes a
concious effort to liberate the economy from the
realm of necessity to the realm of freedom.
Political leaders must have no illusions about the
political nature of these objectives; and they must
articulate them to the masses." (109)
To serve people in transition to a self-reliant and
democratic society, Babu's economic planner must be a
social economist who is a politically motivated
technician. The social economist:
"...begins from a premise which is fundamentally
political-freedom. The objective of a planned
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economy is freedom; to
move from the realm of
freedom." (110)
facilitate and hasten the
necessity to the realm of
The Political Economy of Chuch
'
e
When George Wold was in Amherst in April 1985 he
spoke briefly of self-reliance. m event of nuclear war,
he thought the two countries surviving the longest would
be the United States and North Korea. (Ill)
The US, he argued, has the largest accumulation of
resources of any country in the world, however these
resources are derived by oppressing other countries. it
is for this reason that Reagan requests $300 Billion war
budgets. As such, the US becomes a society economically
dependent on military intervention to exploit the
resources (human and natural) of other countries.
North Korea, he argued, is the best example of a
country's accountability for its people and resources in
terms of distribution of goods and services. Viewing
Chuch 'e as an ideological concept, he added that North
Korea has manifested a high degree of political
organization that is both nationalistic and self-reliant.
Chuch ' e ' s nationalism and centralization are
contrary to many of the principles of self-reliance and
village level participation discussed in this chapter.
Ideas were certainly generated at the village level for
Chuch 'e, but it is uncertain to what extent these ideas
were incorporated or co-opted with government
implementation of the economic development program.
Rooted in anti-imperialist thought, Chuch'e draws
from Kim Il-song's struggle in the thirties against the
Japanese, as well as present defense precautions against
the unreliabilty of the USSR as an ally and aid giver.
Politically this meant revolution, "an act of
destruction willed against a whole ruling class."
Cumings writes:
"North Korea's Communists turned to a highly
coercive, ideological approach in itsrevolutionary assault on the power of landedprivilege. Tight organization was the key toimplementing the land reform and success in thisendeavor doubtless reinforced Kim Il-song's emphasison 'fostering the core.' (112)
Fostering the core was Kim's concept of the 'mass
line', a theory of developing the potential of the masses
in agriculture and industry. Kim stated in 1948:
We must acquire the work method of explaining mat-ters to the masses, not commanding them, of goingdeep into the midst of the masses and knowing theirfeelings, teaching them and learning from them."
As relations deteriorated in the sixties with the
USSR, the economic implications of Chuch'e were expanded
to include economic self-sufficiency, particularly in
defense policy. An editorial in "Nodong Sinmun" (1963)
compared the USSR to the US:
"Economic enslavement, exploitation and plundering
of the backward agricultural countries by the
industrially developed countries and, on this basis,
political domination of the former by the latter -
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mutual relations between countries
world... it is impermissible forsuch phenomena to exist between socialist
countries .
"
The editorial criticized the USSR for:
about independence, equality and non-internal affairs, while disapprovinqindependent national construction and denying thesovereignty and equality of other countries." (114)
Similar to the language of Mao, Nyerere, and Ghandi,
Kim stresses the necessity of economic independence
before one can obtain political independence. In a
cultural context, Kim echoes Freire, Rodney, Fanon, and
Memmi when he speaks of psychological decolonization:
...an attempt to rid the conciousness of the Koreanpeople of the stunting influences of the Japanese
period... as it (Chuch'e) strengthens the culturalidentity of the North... it strengthens common bonds
with the South and thus eases the transition towards
eventual reunification."
( 115 )
Summary
The contributors to this chapter view self-reliance
as a process for emancipation from political, economic,
and social oppression in feudal, capitalist, colonial,
and imperial forms. This oppression includes cultural
and psychological dependency, racism, classism, and
violence against women.
Chapter One discusses self-reliance as a collective
process in which oppressed groups obtain legitimate
economic, political and social power to control their
lives. Viewing self-reliance as a socially integrated
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and interdependent process does not minimize the emphasis
on personal dignity and self-esteem and the importance of
personal power in this process.
Self-determination may be facilitated through voting
or mandate, but the struggle is strongest when people
internalize and are committed to personal and collective
notions of worth and power. And regardless of
interdependence, it may be necessary for an oppressed
group to work among themselves. Women working with women
at a battered woman's shelter is one example of this.
Acountry closing its borders is another.
People, organizations, and governments work at many
different levels of self-reliance and assuredly there are
many different definitions of community development. A
question to consider throughout this dissertation is what
community control means. What are its implications?
Does it conflict or create a tension with national
control when strong centralization is viewed as
necessary, as in the case with North Korea?
A village's or country's concept of self-reliance
most likely has everything to do with political and
economic circumstances. Are they at war? Who controls
the economy? And perhaps most importantly, who is
generating the notion of self-reliance. Is it from
within or being imposed by outsiders?
As an educational concept, self-reliance is viewed
a liberating force. This concept will now be examined
discussing self-determinant movements and the response
dominant forces in society to them.
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CHAPTER 3
POWER AND THE ORIGINS OF REFUGEES
"The outstanding lesson of the Vietnam war is that
arise°aaair"L'"" Vietnam-type L^uaU^n
extent
We were too late in recognizing theof the subversive threat. We appreciate nowthat every young emerging country must-be constantly
allowL those symptoms which, ifdevelop unrestrained, may eventually grow
Vie?nL w situation such as that in Southetnam. We have learned the need for a strongpolice force and a strong police intelligence
organization to assist in identifying early thesymptoms of an incipient subversive situation."General Maxwell Taylor (1)
National Security
Subversion, according to General Taylor, threatens
stability. Subversion, viewed in these terms, also
threatens US security. With reference to Vietnam, the
Pentagon Papers cite security as:
"...unthreatened control by the US client regime inSaigon. If Saigon controlled by sheer force and
violence, the people and hamlet were 'secure' ; ifthe NLF (National Liberation Forces) controlled
without force, the hamlet and its people were
' insecure
'
.
" (2
)
Black (1977) defines security in the US context as being:
".
. .all-encompassing, involving economic and
political hegemony, as well as strictly military
considerations." (3)
That which must be secured is determined by:
"...what a nation, class, institution, or other
social entity has or thinks it should have." (4)
The great irony, she continues, is:
"...that the nations, groups, and individuals whose
wealth and power would appear to make them the most
secure, are in fact, the most paranoid."
( 5 )
James Gregor of Berkeley, considered by NBC's
"Crossfire" as an expert foreign affairs analyst, argues
that security is a function of stability. a stable
country is one "with continued economic growth," and if a
military government is necessary to achieve this growth,
then a military government must be supported." (6)
A Natural Right to Power
What the US defines as "strategic interests", for
"national security," is invariably in conflict with what
was discussed as self-reliance and self-determination in
the preceding chapter. Recognizing and fearing movements
of self-determination, the US passed the National
Security Act of 1947 creating the Department of Defense
(War)
,
the CIA, and the National Security Council (NSC)
The language in this act:
"...officially introduced the catchall abstraction
national security' that has since served to justify
everything from the procurement of questionable
weapons to the invasion of Grenada." (7)
The predisposed assumption to a natural right to
power "legitimizes" US military intervention at a global
level to keep subordinates within the US empire in line.
This attitude was clearly evident in Ollie North's
testimony at the Iran-Contra Hearings, a built-in self-
justification that fascism in the name of capitalism is
necessary and honorable:
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"...Where domination is so taken for granted thathe hegemonic power intervenes by inevitable andunquestioned authority." (8)
North insisted he was acting under the authorization
of the President, that he was merely following orders to
execute Reagan's publicly stated foreign policy against
Central America, which I believe is true. To quote
Reagan:
"When the Commander-in-Chief of a nation finds itnecessary to order employees of the government oragencies of the government to do things that wouldtechnically break the law, he has to be able todeclare it legal for them to do that." ( 9 )
From 1960 to 1979 there was an average of one US
sponsored military takeover per year in Latin America.
During the 35 year period from 1898 to 1934 there were 33
US military interventions in the region. (lO) A "domino
effect", if you will, these invasions have resulted in
the death and displacement of millions of people, many
seeking asylum as refugees in foreign countries.
Who is a Refugee?
The UNHCR is quick to point out that not everyone on
the move is a refugee. This may appear to be trite, but
definitions not withstanding, the HCR and countries that
are recipients of people displaced from their homes are
discerning as to who deserves international protection
and who does not.
This is evident when comparing US and Canadaian
policy towards Central Americans. Canada grants asylum
to all Guatemalans and El Salvadorans fleeing political
persecution in their countries. The United States
recognizes both governments as models of democratic re-
form while it arms and trains their death squads. There-
fore the Reagan administration refers to these asylum
seekers as economic migrants and thus delegitimizes
refugee status for them. To do otherwise would contra
diet US military aid and intervention in the region.
Further, the international order of people
regulation distinguishes between the terms "refugee" and
"displaced person". The two major documents defining
these terms are the 1951 Convention Relating to the
Status of Refugees and the 1967 Protocol. Their
definitions will be used in this study.
Refugees, in a classical sense, are people fleeing
persecution and seeking asylum abroad. The Organization
of African Unity (OAU) Convention in 1969 defined
refugees as people who are:
...compelled to leave their homeland because ofhuman—created disasters, i.e. armed conflict, or
other political and social upheavals." (11)
Persecuted people are further defined by the Convention
as persons who leave their country of origin because:
"...their life, security or liberty is threatened
due to generalized violence, foreign aggression,
i^t®i^nal conflict, massive violation of human rights
or other events which seriously disturb the public
order." (12)
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This definition has been periodically supported by
numerous UN General Assembly resolutions. Most recently,
these resolutions have been endorsed by the Cartagena
Declaration (November 1984) for the specific protection
of Central American refugees.
The concept of asylum, as well as the word, origin-
ates in Greece. Orestes was a refugee. in the 13th
century B.C., a treaty between the Egyptians and the
Hittites sought the return of refugees to Egypt. The
Hugenots were refugees, as were people fleeing the Span-
ish Inquisition, Hitler, Stalin, Franco, and the terror-
ism of US proxy governments. it would be easy to fill a
chapter with a synopsis of people fleeing persecution.
The UN distinguishes displaced people from refugees
as
:
...persons fleeing natural disasters such asdrought or flood, if this is the only or principle
reason for their flight." (13)
An example of this are the Colombians displaced from
their homes after the eruption of the Nevada de Ruiz.
the UN identifies displaced people as being
internally displaced if they do not leave their country
of origin. An example of this are the El Salvadorans and
Guatemalans who have been removed from their homes and
relocated in camps or strategic hamlets by their
governments; also Native Americans and Japanese Americans
in the United States.
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Power Relationships
The concept of power must be understood when
discussing refugee populations. Refugees have left their
homes because they have lost the power to ensure their
security and survival. A prerequisite to working with
refugees is understanding these power dynamics at the
local, regional, and global levels.
It is critical to examine the belief systems,
behaviors, and attitudes that US citizens have learned,
how these beliefs assist the formulation of US foreign
policy, and the impact of this policy around the world.
Understanding this context, it will facilitate
comprehending that refugee populations, particularly
since World War II, have not happened in isolation. They
are the result of a consistent pattern, a planned design
resulting from political, economic, and military
intervention at a global level.
Power Abuse
In 1948, George Kennan in his position as advisor to
the US State Department Planning Commission, observed:
"We^ have about 50% of the world's wealth, but only
6.3% of its population ... In this situation, we
cannot fail to be the object of envy and
resentment. Our real task in the coming period is
to devise a pattern of relationships which will
permit us to maintain this position of disparity
without positive detriment to our national
security ... We should cease to talk about vague and
unreal obj ectives such as human rights, the raising
living standards, and democratization. The day
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9oing to have to deal inpower concepts. The less ”hampered by ideological slogans, the better." { 14 )
Power IS the deciding factor in society. it is the
ultimate determinant fundamental to relationships among
people. Refugees are people who have lost power.
The notion of power was not invented by Kennan, nor
by the us Government. His words, however, clearly
Illustrate the importance of political and economic
control, a control realized by either directly taking
over a government, setting up a proxy government, or more
indirectly by controlling the laws under which the
government operates.
Kennan 's contributions resulted in the Grand Area
Scheme, an action plan whereby the US would be able to
protect "its" sources of raw materials worldwide. in
essence, it was "protecting" these natural resources from
the very people who had a right to them. This economic
control necessitates political control. To manipulate
both of these successfully is a full time job, (if you do
it right) and more often than not, requires military
intervention (McMahan, 1985, Herman 1984, Sunshine 1985).
The Center for Defense Information (GDI) writes that
the Grand Area Scheme divided the world:
"...into military regions for purposes of military
planning, putting a four star general or admiral in
charge of each. No other country has divided the
world up in quite this way." (15)
To legtimize these interventions, a common enemy was
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needed. This was and still i s communism:
system whereby the government has direct
welfare^^f its
Communism and Refugees
Close examination is not required to realize that
the US government, and therefore usually the media, draws
a close link between communism and refugee populations
(also a parallel between communism and terrorism which
allegedly causes refugees)
. US foreign policy needs an
ominous Communist terror to act as a diversion to draw
attention away from its own terror network.
This anti-communist fixation is evident with
Reagan's support of South Africa; that and racism. In an
off the record interview, one of Reagan's top African
advisors commented:
"The problem with Reagan is that all he knows about
^17^^^^^^ is he's on the side of the whites."
Reagan is convinced that "the African problem is a
Russian weapon aimed at us." (18) In a Wall Street
Journal interview he stated:
"The Soviet Union underlies all the unrest that is
going on. If they weren't engaged in this game ofdominos there wouldn't be any hotspots in the
world." (19)
This simple-minded viewpoint is a naive reductionism
into good guys and bad guys. It names the problem as
Soviet communist expansion at a global level. It
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lently disregards
refugee origins,
causal to famine
any regional or root cause analysis of
So defined, it is communism that is
and fighting and this leads to refugees.
A good example of ideological subterfuge is ex-US
Ambassador to the UN Jeane Kirpatrick's distinction be
tween authoritarian and totalitarian states. She
contends
:
(i.e., authoritarians) leave
statis and^n^h"^
allocations of wealth, power.S u , ot er resources which in most tradition-al societies favor an affluent few and mLntainpoverty. But they do not disturb the
Dlaces^if^^^^^S^ leisure, habitual
persSal patterns of family andBecause the miseries of
ordina^''oLnt5® they are bearable topeople, who growing up in the society,learn to cope... Such societies create no refugees.
Precisely the opposite is true of revolutionaryCommunist regimes (i.e., total itarians ) . They^create refugees by the millions because they claim
whole life of the society andmake demands for change that so violate intern^ized
and habits that inhabitants flee by the tensof thousands.” (20)
This totalitarian/authoritarian paradigm was used by
Kirpatrick and ex-Secretary of State Alexander Haig when
defending allies with horrid human rights records. During
the last century, these apologetics have served to pro-
tect "free market" interests. In 1935, General Smedley
Butler described his work with the US Marine Corps:
"I spent 33 years and four months in active service
as a member of our country's most agile military
force-the Marine Corps.
. .And during that period I
spent most of my time being a high-class muscle man
for Big Business, for Wall Street, and for the
bankers. In short, I was a racketeer for
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capitalism.
. .Thus I helped make Mexico and
American oil interests
make Haiti and Cuba a decent
in T bin H
National City Bank to collect revenueshelped purify Nicaragua for the internationalbanking house of Brown Brothers in 1909-1912 I
Dominican Republic for American
1916-
.
I helped make Hondurasright for American fruit companies in 1903." (21)
Butler's account is an excellent example of the
intentional exploitation of people for profit. As an
imperial power, the US imposes this commercial domination
at a global level. i often feel this exploitation is
most abusive in its control of food.
Agribusiness
One form of exploitation is the plantation economy
supported by multinational corporations' (MNC)
agribusiness. Through political arrangements and sheer
economic power, agribusiness generally has access to a
country's best land. Within this capital intensive
system, profit maximization is incompatible with the
local human needs for food, shelter, and health care.
This policy results in landlessness, hunger, and
displacment
.
BUD Senegal is a good example of agribusiness.
During the famine of 73-74 when it was trendy to have
starving babies in the newspaper and on television, BUD
was sending 3 DC-lOs a week filled with produce to
Europe. (22) I was told it was common for BUD to destroy
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crop surplus to keep the market price up. ( 23 )
BUD'S case is not isolated. its policies are
similar to Del Monte, Unilever, Heinz, Nestle, Shell, BP,
and other food corporations operating plantation
economies in exploited countries.
The transition to colonialism realized that forced
labor in Africa was more profitable than slavery in the
western hemisphere. Accompanying this revelation was the
raping of the continent's resources. Cliffe writes:
"Opportunities for increased production and
often promptedthe buying up of land and the hiring of laborand thus trends in the direction of landless-'ness and proletarianization of others." ( 24 )
For agribusiness to profit, it must have a reliable
source of cheap labor. in countries like Kenya, colonial
policy was to replace traditional land tenure with
capitalist property relationships by providing for
private ownership of land. The purpose for private
ownership (Sorrenson 1967) was to create a market for
land and in the process concentrate land ownership among
an elite gentry utilizing the labor of a landless class.
Labor is obtained by separating farmers from their
land through a system of laws, taxation, and force.
Colonel Grogan, a Kenyan white settler, said of the
Kikuyu:
"We have stolen his land. Now we must steal his
limbs. Compulsory labor is the corollary of our
occupation of the country." (25)
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Changing societal relationships to land greatly
decreased food security. Traditional land tenure, writes
Cliffe:
tSif^om'^of^sSciarseLr^ty^h^^ cultivation, ands curity has disappeared.” (26)
It IS replaced with a moneyed property class dominated by
large-scale capital intensive agriculture.
"This policy bias is encouraged," writes Cliffe by:
Ints '^confr:,??'^ if**®-® P^taphernalia of consult-
Manufacturers
,
°and BerSants^nSr^^^lic”?^'?^^,^
severe ecological problems in their wake?*'thf
rather^than to^th^^^+^ corporate partners,the state or the peasants.”
( 27 )
As male labor was drawn to work on plantations and
mining concessions, women increasingly absorbed the
responsibility for growing food and caring for the
family. of the many socio-economic pressures stemming
from these conditions, one was the increasing difficulty
to grow food. An official report from Nyasaland in 1935
describes the consequences of migrant labor:
"The whole fabric of the old order of society is
undermined, when 30-60 per cent of the able-bodied
men are absent at one time.
. .Emigration (i.e. labour
migption)
,
which destroys the old, offers nothing
o take its place, and the family community isthreatened with complete dissolution.”
( 28 )
Farmers who are not disenfranchised are usually
coerced into growing cash crops for export. In many
cases, the monetary incentives are not enough to induce
farmers to grow cash crops. It is readily apparant to
them that it is
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one more step in critically reducing
their control over their food supply.
Along with the strategies of persuasion, the
government introduces high yield variety seeds (HYVs) to
encourage farmers to pursue a line favorable to corporate
investment. The consequence of these seeds is often
disastrous.
( 29 )
The immediate impact of plantation economy on rural
farmers is displacement from the best land. They are
forced to farm less fertile areas, and forced to compete
with agribusinesses that ignore local economic pressures
by reacting to international needs first. (30) These
arrangements place farmers in conflict with each other
and with pastoralists, for the same area of land. Land
tenure which was previously cooperative among farmers and
herders now becomes a competitive struggle for survival.
Berry describes this type of progress as community
killing. The high technology and "modernization" of the
Green Revolution; the miracle poisons of science, have:
"...involved the forcible displacement of millions
of people... It is the work of the institutions of
agriculture: the university experts, the bureau-
crats, and the 'agribusinessmen,' who have promoted
so-called efficiency at the expense of community(and of real efficiency)
,
and quantity at the
expense of quality." (31)
In Senegal, a family with four hectares of millet
was "encouraged" by the government to sow two hectares in
millet and two hectares in cotton or groundnuts. Farmers
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are not stupid. They know it is not in their interest to
cut their food supply in half, but many see themselves as
too weak to resist a government's and corporation's
economic and military control.
HYVs can, under controlled conditions, produce
greater yields than traditional seeds. Controlled
conditions mean fertilizers, pesticides (to wit. the
petro-chemical control of seed processing)
,
and a
reliable source of water. Farmers are given a loan to
buy the chemicals, the assumption being that the loan
will be repaid with the selling of the harvest. The
problem is rainfall. The Sine-Saloum region of Senegal
receives 20-25 inches a year, but it may fall in an
unpredictable manner. The rain can come early, in the
middle, or late in the season, and this is too sporadic
for HYVs.
Farmers begin in debt by taking the loan. With
poorly spaced rainfall, high yield seeds become low yield
seeds and farmers fall back on food reserves, which after
a couple bad harvests, are depleted. In the 1930s,
Grogan commented on the sophisticated storage facilities
of African villagers which kept harvests stockpiled for
as many as three years (Rodney, 1982). This appropriate
technology has disappeared because there is nothing left
to stockpile which results, during lean years, in a
shortage of food. The traditional seeds have also
disappeared which has created a dependency on government
controlled HYVs.
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Connell writes:
Crops, African states can onlvrespond by increasing acreage despite the fact
the^ Trll rortlLtr Pa^-trio^^SLf
available for local food prodSctioA and^drive°small‘*
destruction of the fragile environment." (32)
Previous to these conditions, farm families in
Africa may have been poor, but were generally self-
sufficient. At the end of WWII, Africa was able to feed
itself. Now it services those who control and exploit the
land to feed others. During the 80 s, food exports have
increased yearly from Africa to Europe and the US while
food availability within Africa has decreased. (33)
Fanon writes:
The relations of man with matter, with the worldoutside, and with history are in the colonial periodsimply relations with food." (34)
"Colonial exploitation, poverty, and endemic faminedrive the native more and more to open, organized
revolt." ( 35 )
^o^ty thousand Kenyans were killed during the
Mau-Mau resistance, but only one hundred whites. Fanon
writes that armed resistance is a natural and necessary
response to violence:
"Colonialism is not a thinking machine, nor a body
endowed with reasoning faculties. It is violence in
its natural state, and it will only yield when
confronted with greater violence." ( 36 )
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Violent Responses
In 1967, Packard and Packard wrote:
In fifteen years, famines will be
revolutions and social turmoil and
upheavals will sweep areas of Asia
-Latin America." (37)
catastrophic
economic
Africa, and
and
us militarily intervention to maintain elite and
corporate control of land is violent. These systemic
relationships between rich and poor are violent.
Terrorism becomes both a strategy and a consequence of
the status quo and is causal to the greatest number of
refugees in the world today. A logical response of
exploited people is to liberate themselves from this
control. This was the case with Nicaragua and Grenada,
as well as the struggles in El Salvador and Guatemala,
Eritrea and Ethiopia, South Korea, The Philippines, and
many countries in between.
The Reagan administration legitimizes war in
Central America as self-defense against the Soviet
Union. The real issue is that local people want to
control their own resources. This is the point. Who is
going to control the land? who is going to control
production and the benefits of developing local
resources? For this reason, local people are the major
enemy of US corporations in Central America and around
the world.
People are the enemy in Eritrea's liberation
struggle and with the resistance movements among
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Ethiopians against the army of Mengistu Haile Mariam.
This is why they are relocated by force, their crops
burned and their homes destroyed. This situation will be
discussed more specifically in Chapter Four.
Kibreab concurs that to understand the refugee
problem, one must understand political economy. He cites
that up to the mid 1970s the highest number of refugees
in Africa emanated from the Portuguese colonies of Guinea
Bissau, Angola, and Mozambique where fierce struggles for
liberation were taking place:
"Colonial exploitation in the forms oftaxation, labour service, monopoly pricing, and
oppression manifested in the denial
of the right to self-determination forced theAfricans into organized resistance.” (38)
O'Brien attributes the success of these revolutions to
the work of leaders like Amilcar Cabral and Samora
Machel
.
At the 1986 Non-Aligned Summit, Machel stated:
"The roots of violence in southern Africa are to befound in foreign occupation.
.
.
Imperialism would have it believed that violence
stems from the struggle of peoples for their freedom
and that imperialist shellings, invasions and
massacres are peaceful acts. When we look for the
causes of violence, we find domination over peoples.
Domination, colonialism, racial discrimination, and
dictatorship are imposed with brutality and nurtured
on violence, encouraging war... The People's Republic
of Mozambique as a frontline state is viewed by
South Africa as a model that must be smashed." (39)
The US Committee for Refugees estimates that 400,000
Angolans have fled their country due to the military
intervention of the US, South Africa, the Soviet Union,
and Cuba
:
footpLhs"tLf C?ipp!afsoSe li?SoolJ;g:?LsThe economy of Angola has been decimated ^hepopulation devastated, and peace and unity in thecountry remain well beyond reach." (40)
Presidents Nixon and Ford were alarmed by the
independence of these colonies and precipitated a sharp
increase in anti-communist remarks condemning Soviet
intervention in the area. However, the CIA was the first
to intervene in 1975 with financing and weapons for the
armies of the FNLA and UNITA. (41) In terms of class
struggle, the objectives of the liberation fronts against
Portugal were a political and economic response to
colonization, a desire to control their respective
countries from foreign domination, no different from the
Vietnamese struggle.
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Two decades after independence, the mercenary armies
of UNITA and the MLA (RENAMO) are supported by South
^f^ica and the United States to terrorize Angola and
Mozambique, two countries rich in human and natural
resources. Refugees from these countries are not caused
by drought as is often advertised, but from the fighting
and intentional destabilization of their societies.
Their famine is caused by war.
South Africa is an extraordinary condition of
displaced people, but the official line does not call
them refugees. South Africans are displaced by state
sponsored racism. They are exploited by
institutionalized, capital intensive slavery.
The interest of us corporations in cooperating with
south Africa and in so doing supporting Apartheid, has
always been to go with the profit margin, even though the
amount of investment in South Africa is relatively small.
War contractors are concerned with access to the
strategic minerals (chromium, manganese, platinum,
vanadium, cobalt) that are prevalent in South Africa.
(42) Only since November of 1986 have corporations like
GM and IBM begun to pull out because the quality of life
index for investment was not stable (and therefore not
profitable) enough to warrant staying.
John Stockwell, CIA agent in charge of Angolan
operations in 1975, suggests that Kissinger was obsessed
with the notion of Soviet competition. His obsession was
fueled by the humiliation of Vietnam and the independence
of Portuguese colonies. The ensuing Angola conflict was
an opportunity for him "to challenge the Soviets" ( 43 ) by
putting it into a global perspective of anti-communism.
Kissinger authorized CIA operations in cooperation with
South Africa and Zaire to prevent the MPLA from taking
power. In so doing he sponsored terrorism against the
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people Of Angola by financing what was to beoone the
mercenary army of Jonas Savimbi.
in an interview with "Africa Report," Dr. Julius
Nyerere strongly criticized Reagan
-s policy in South
Africa:
sonrh°zf the idea that racist
tion’ *And°th^^
® defender of Western oiviliza-. e nonsense that they are ficrhi-ir.rT
irA?rLa?"“Se"r' f oom„unistIW have 51 African states, how many
communist? This blessed idea that^
aaain^f^o , ^^^ts to protect Africa
in communists
i
^ mention Angola.
. .but refuse to
first olLe^^ Angola in thep ace and why now they must remain
tion“of accept the implementa-
in J®=°l“tion 435... The Cubans went there1975 because South Africa invaded Angola,because the U.S. panicked, they thought\he
itll t party of Portugal was taking
Wii-h
linked that communist partyw t the MPLA, they thought they'd jump in^
^ickly and prevent communism from taking over
A
joined the South Africans.And that s how the Cubans got there." ( 44 )
For such a racist, anti-communist policy to proceed
in a "democratic" society, us citizenry must be
appropriately conditioned. Conditioning in the US is a
primary responsibility of the media and presupposes the
use of fear.
Refugees are a primary consequence of this fear, a
condi- tioning that condones US privilege. In East
Timor, Indonesia, and Burundi, refugees were a by-product
of a brutal genocide, a systematic and selected US
sponsored murder of what were labled opposition groups in
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countries. in the us media, they were classic cases of
misinformation and no information.
East Timor
In East Timor, 20 to 25 % of the population was
killed so that the US could maintain the unquestioned
privilege of using East Timor sealanes for US nuclear
submarines, as well as oil exploration. The newly
independent government of East Timor had never restricted
US access, but Fretelin was a reformist government with a
focus on education, health, ecology, and food self-
reliance. Ford and Kissinger planned the final details
of invasion with Indonesian President Suharto on the
morning of 7 December 1975
. Before leaving Jakarta,
Kissinger commented:
The United States will not recognize theindependent petelin government of East Timor andthe United States understands Indonesia's positionon the question." (45) ^
Indonesia's annexation of East Timor followed a
precedent well-established by the US and was similar to
military intervention in Eritrea in 1961 (see Chapter
Four)
. There was virtually no coverage in the US media
of a genocide that displaced over half of the East Timor
population. East Timor refugees arriving in Portugal
gave repeated accounts of Timorese refugees in Indonesia
as prisoners of war, many of them dying in Indonesian
camps, but the US press was silent on the issue.
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While the Australian press was describing a 20th
century carnage sponsored by the Pentagon, the US
reported only Indonesian government statements naming a
communist conspiracy attempting to overthrow Suharto.
Five Australian journalists were murdered by the Indone-
sian army for being communists. Impatient with the fuss
over five dead commie correspondents, Indonesian Foreign
Minister Malick told an Australian press crew, "Let's
forget them and we will erect a monument to them." (46)
Congressman J. Herbert Burke, ranking minority
member of the US House Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific
Affairs, shared Malick 's sentiments that the untidiness
of murder should be covered up. Burke argued in Congress
that the East Timor problem was "virulent Marxism". in a
letter dealing with the East Timor Hearings, he wrote:
"I have my own suspicions respecting what might bebehind the testimony of Dunn's, and I agree with youthat It IS in all of our interests to bury the Timorissue quickly and completely."
( 47 )
Congress buried the truth of East Timor in a common grave
with 100,000 to 200,000 dead Timorese and five dead
Australian journalists. In 1987 "African Confidential"
listed the population of East Timor at 167,000, down from
600.000 in 1975. (48)
Indonesia was experienced with mass extermination.
Between 1965-1969 an anti-communist pogrom killed from
750.000 to over 1,000,000 people. 750,000 were arrested,
thousands of whom died in prison. (49) The US establish-
ment approved of this consolidation of authority, the
press generally regarded the politioal ramifications as
positive, and this combined well with the enthusiasm of
US political leaders. (50)
Duj. una.
Burundi had no sealanes, nc
"communists.” it had Hutus and
with US lies and deception for 2
during the Spring and Summer of
oil deposits, and no
coffee which combined
50,000-350,000 dead Hutus
1972. (51)
The state Department began to use the word genocide
in June 1982. Senators Kennedy and Tunney briefly
mentioned the killing in Congress, but the general mood
was that the minority Tutsi government was stabilizing a
violent uprising by Hutus and discussion ceased.
Stability meant continued US control of 80% of the
Burundi coffee crop.
During this same month, the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee confirmed Ambassador Robert Yost to Burundi
with no discussion of the massacre of Hutus. A year
later, articles such as Charles Mohr's in the New York
Times (52) implicated Hutu exiles for inciting violence
against the Tutsi government, maintaining media support
for the Tutsi.
The Carnegie Endowment for World Peace study of the
Burundi massacre was appalled that:
public word^to describe^the^i^^ uttered a single
against humanity in Burundi LnLsnIl ?f
fore?grpoUc“?r„Sch lhe®os?ens?b^fhf
disaster had
relationship with Pakistan 5u ”®®hington'sdiplomacy with Peking. tangled secret
pSli^ic^if'^a^civil^war'^ bSt'^Il "°h
re?aSSnfw??h'?L"'""'"^ “""^ood
there appeared to be^no^c ^®^®tal Nigeria. Yet
Burundi tr^llg^aglinst ?h^^H®‘’^® interests inj-gn again t e human factor."
( 53 )
us policy was not to intervene in what was
considered to be an internal Burundi affair. The
conviction of the African Bureau was that this policy
would avoid any:
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legal issues in Burundi." (54)
us Ambassador to Burundi Thomas Melady praised the
US for not intervening, m a New York Times interview he
stated that the role of the us as a world enforcer "had
faded," that it was inappropriate for the us "to
interfere in the affairs of small states
... wrong to
boycott trade." (55) He praised the US for promptly
sending food assistance during the first two weeks of the
crisis without acknowledging that the food was being
adminis-tered by the same people who were doing the
killing. Melady's capacity for ignorance or self-
deception or both is alarming.
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Blaming the Victim
People who are most victimized by state sponsored
violence are often blamed for being violent. A popular
explanation of underdevelopment blames the victim as
well, for living in poverty, famine, or as refugees due
to the inferiority of their cultures."
Harrison writes:
Obstacle to Latin American progress isnot Yankee imperialism, but Latin culture". (56)
He purports that the Latin mind is responsible for
poverty, chaos and tyranny among Caribbean, Central, and
South American people.
Harrison asserts that "mistrust permeates Latin
society", that "the absence of trust and identification"
lead to a "fragility and impermanence of many community
organizations and cooperatives" reflecting "this cultural
impediment"; that "corruption is so deeply ingrained in
the society that acts of justice and honesty are often
viewed with incredulity." (57)
Tanner and Kidwell (1987) blame the violence
directed at Black people in South Africa on Black people:
"When the nature and causes of unrest-related deaths
are examined, it becomes clear that violence among
conflicting individual groups is the primary
underlying factor." (58)
Using figures from the South African State of
Emergency during August and September of 1986, Tanner and
Kidwell illustrate that 82% of Black deaths were caused
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by other Blacks. The remaining 18% of the
deaths due to security force intervention
Marxists'.
( 59 )
killings were
against 'Black
Blaming the victim is Reagan's refusal to recognize
apartheid as causal to the violence in South Africa.
Nyerere says that Reagan is incapable of naming apartheid
as the problem, rather he insists on "seeing it purely in
terms of the East-West conflict."
( 60 )
Myths and Stereotypes
Victim blaming is supported by the creation of
myths. Myths suggest that poor farm management, drought,
and overpopulation are primary causes to famine and
refugee populations.
One popular tactic for blaming the victims is to
rationalize that there are too many of "them", that a
lack of self-control and birth control is causal to
famines and refugees.
Thomas Malthus was one of the first economists to
summarize the relationship between population and
agriculture whereby population increases in a geometric
progression (1,2,4,8,16) and food availability increases
arithmetically (1,2, 3, 4, 5). This mind set has been used,
misused, and overused to explain hunger in the world.
During Lyndon Johnson's "War on Hunger", Paddock and
Paddock presented a triage approach to dealing with the
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hungry in oppressed countries. The first of three groups
of countries were those whose population growth had
already passed their assumed agricultural potential and
were labled
-can't be saved." "To send food to them is
to throw sand in the ocean." (61)
Similar to this attitude is Garrett Hardin's
"Lifeboat Ethics". His premise is that a lifeboat can
only hold so many people. To let more people in to
"lifeboat earth" is to ultimately drown everyone.
Hardin transposes this theory to Africa arguing that an
excessive birth rate is responsible for hunger. As such.
It is better to let people die rather than provide them
with food and by so doing, exacerbate the situation.
In the Spring 1985 issue of The Amicus Journal, Hardin
blames pastoral society for environmental devastation.
Herders, he argues, increase their herds, reaping:
...almost all the benefit, but paying verylittle of the costs of overgrazing, which
spread among all users The pasture
deteriorates, and everyone's cows starve. Each
man is locked into a system that compels him toincrease his herd without limit in a world that
IS limited." (62)
Hardin fails to recognize that the real overgrazers are
not pastoral ists, but rather corporations and the global
arms supermarket. His "quid pro quo mutualism" (63)
among countries for purposes of trade and foreign aid is
monopoly capitalism.
Hardin's notion of sanctity of life is a reduction
of fertility "to let the population fall by attrition."
Eritrea and Guatemala have each had over 100,000 people
murdered in the last 2 1/2 decades as well as 1/3 of
their populations displaced by war. Over 20% of El
Salvador's population is displaced including 65,000
deaths since 1979
. include Burundi, East Timor,
Southeast Asia and rapidly one may conclude that Hardin'
use of the words 'sanctity of life' under these
ciiTcuinstancGs is indscent.
Lester Brown is another who recognizes
overpopulation as the essential factor leading to
environmental destruction and hunger. He writes;
"One consequence of the continuous growth inpopulation is the spread of agriculture to landwith thin mantles of topsoil that will not
sustain continuous and intensive cultivation "
(64)
Brown (1985) stresses the ecological devastation in
Ethiopia emphasizing the annual loss of over one billion
tons of top soil without ever mentioning the war, the
longest running current war in Africa. Deforestation in
Ethiopia is the result of low intensity conflict; of
white phosphorous used as part of an agrarian reform
®^^®ssing high tech slash and burn of the environment.
Brown raises three questions which reflect a white,
upper class mentality:
1. "Why is the world no longer able to sustain the
economic and social gains of the century's third
quarter?"
track?"^’' the world back on
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It is necessary to consider who the recipients were
of those gains, it certainly was not the farmers in
Africa nor the farmers in the us who now make up only
three percent of the US population. It was not single
mothers, the poor, and people of color who still have to
for the right to vote.
It was not the dead and displaced in Southeast
Asia. It was not US workers left unemployed when
management ran away to non-union shops and cheap labor in
Taiwan and South Korea.
It was not Salvador Allende and the disappeared in
Chile and elsewhere in Central and South America. it was
not the victims of apartheid in South Africa. And it
was not 1 1/2 million Eritreans and Ethiopians displaced
from their homes. it is a long list of who it is not.
At no place do these writers and policy makers
mention land tenure, control of seeds, and control of
production. Neither is there reference to war. Their
argument is essentially that lowering the birth rate is
the key to having enough to eat. Lloyd disagrees with
this analysis, arguing that regardless of the amount of
population decrease, a slower growth rate;
"...would not alter the structure of society in the
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industrialized West?"^^66p^^^ ^relationship with the
Lappe and Collins feel strongly that:
world is a hopeless
SSributiLf°°t67r'^“'"^^°" ®'3Uitabir
Thomas (1984, 1986) stresses that:
"The root cause of population growth andenvironmental destruction is poverty."
progress as r-an?dV,^ sustainable economic and social
Saols possible... jobs and better
edScfiior ^ nutrition, betterucat on, emancipation of women acce<?4 i
S tes^?Iil“:rharh“" conditlSns^^rehich faSii^
oountrfesS' (^8?
"" the developed
Lloyd, Lappe, and Collins do not reject population
growth as a concern. Unlike Hardin and Brown, they
recognize the reasons for having large families. In labor
intensive agrarian societies, children are considered an
asset to farm maintenance and production. A child can
produce more than s/he consumes. (69)
Poor people with inadequate nutrition and
sanitation, and little or no health care have high death
rates. These conditions are not rooted in ignorance,
rather are a result of exploitation. The poor protect
themselves by investing in children.
The less control people have over their basic needs.
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the more
-risk- is involved in their survival, m these
terms, as Individual control over survival decreases, the
power to reproduce becomes increasingly vital. Further,
the power of reproduction is one power the poor can
control, unless taken away from them through forced
sterilization.
Lapps and Collins assert that shifting resources to
the poor is a much better assurance of a lowered birth
rate, rather than a direct birth control program. In
short, ignorance does not breed babies, but powerlessness
often does.
Victim blaming in Africa does not acknowledge that
African countries were stripped of human resources
through four centuries of slavery. m a very real sense,
this represents the root of African underdevelopment. A
conservative estimate is a loss of 20 million people.
More realistic estimates cite 100-200 million political
leaders, skilled artisans, teachers, and farmers on whom
was built the infrastructure of African society. (70)
The class in power controls the dissemination of
information. I have experienced this in my work on the
Ethiopian border with the UNHCR, as well as elsewhere in
Africa, South America, and the United States.
Misinformation, distortion, and omission of facts
perpetuate the violence of hunger and legitimize the
^^^tality of military intervention against oppressed
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people. Depriving people of the benefits from their
labor while oppressing them socially, politically, and
economically, continues the haves and the have-nots on a
collision course. The consequences of this injustice are
lions of dead, dying, and displaced people, as well as
the continuation of oppressive social policies,
exploitative laws, and military interventions, all of
Which are on the increase in the 1980s.
Summary
It IS always alarming how quickly United Statesians
accept the myths and US definitions of international
issues, particularly the concept of terrorism. What the
Reagan administration defines as terrorism is, for the
most part, resistance of people in other countries to US
economic and political violence. To understand this
oppression, one must understand the power relationships
that institutionalize it.
This chapter has documented several examples of
abusive power relationships and their connections to
refugees. The behaviors and attitudes of these
oppressive relationships are perpetuated by the racist,
classist, and sexist structures of our society. They are
manifested in violence against women, people of color,
the poor, and other oppressed groups.
The importance of Chapter Two is understanding the
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global connections between refugee populations and US
economic and military hegemony. The refugee program in
Somalia is a case study of a global issue. In Somalia
many development workers see refugee circumstances as
isolated from any greater global or even regional
context. Chapter Two addresses political and economic
considerations that relate to refugee origins worldwide.
The global dimensions of US foreign policy, its assumed
power and privilege, must be understood before working in
another country. Chapter Four will discuss this hegemony
as it specifically relates to the Horn of Africa,
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CHAPTER 4
THE FEASIBILTY OF SELF-RELIANCE AS A DEVELOPMENTAL
OBJECTIVE IN SOMALI REFUGEE CAMPS
Food Aid
In January 1984, Senator John Danforth (R Missouri),
came to the Northwest to get pictures of starving refugee
children. There was no food shortage. There were no
starving children. Neither was there a serious
malnutrition problem. But the Senator came for photos
and attempts were made to please him.
I was the only US citizen working with the HCR in
the Northwest, yet I was not allowed to meet with a US
Senate delegation visiting camps for which I was
responsible. Confidential accounts from UN and State
Department sources state that US Ambassador Robert Oakley
contacted a high-ranking UN official in the Northwest
region (not from HCR) and asked him to fabricate a
starving refugee setting in Saba 'ad camp. The UN
official refused to cooperate with the scheme.
Working in conjunction with the HCR and RRC, a
scenario of 6 or 8 sick children were gathered for the
Senator to witness. He is quoted as saying, "This is
what I came to see," took his pictures and left, (l)
One AID colleague told me he was sure Danforth knew
he had been "duped" by the time he left Somalia. But
returning to the US
,
Danforth showed pictures of starving
104
105
refugees from Mozambique and Somalia to the President and
to members of Congress. (2)
Discussion of the "starving in Africa crisis" was
brought to the Senate floor by Senators Boschwitz (R
Minnesota) and Boren (D Oklahoma) who introduced the
"Food Aid and Export Market Promotion Act" in February
1984 which authorized another 1/2 billion dollars of food
under Title II Public Law (PL) 480 to be sent to Africa.
Similar to previous food assistance bills, this one
outlined the importance of food aid in establishing
international markets for US agricultural products:
"S. 2304. A bill to enhance US food aid, restorecompetitive position of the United States inagricultural export markets, and for otherpurposes
. .
.
The purpose of this legislation is twofold: First
exports through existingcredit and food aid programs; and second, provide
Agriculture with additional exportredit tools aimed at developing markets for US
agricultural exports in economies that are strongenough so that they can start phasing out of PL-480yet not strong enough to move completely to GSM- 102 !
Our ability to effectively compete in agricultural
decade ahead will greatly depend on ourability to provide more creative financing for
customers. The export credit initiatives includedin this bill will provide the Secretary of Agricul-ture with the tools necessary to expand US agricul-
^^^sl exports in a number of key markets." ( 3 )
In March 1985 I wrote Senator Danforth and requested
information from his tournee in Africa, particularly his
impressions from Somali camps. l received everything but
information on the Somali visit. Several months later.
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While in Washington, I called his office and requested
his report on Somalia which I received. Although it
included an overview of his Somali visit, there was no
mention of his experience in Saba
-ad camp. Neither was
there mention of hunger and starvation in the camps, yet
according to his news release of 19 January 1984, he
Showed President Reagan and Congress slides giving the
impression that there were starving refugees in Somalia.
I am not passing judgement on Danforth's ability to
tell the truth, but there are gross errors in his report
dated 30 January 1984. He refers to 1983 as "a year of
exceptionally dry weather." (4) I was there. In
Hargeisa, it was so wet, there was hardly a dry period
between the two rainy seasons. His analyses of other
Sahelian countries defines hunger as either a result of
communism or technological backwardness.
Danforth reports that he was told a decade ago there
were lions in northern Senegal. His belief system is
accommodating. I was there, the lions weren't. Perhaps
they had us confused.
Danforth was correct in his report when stating,
"The focus of my trip was food, not refugees, yet the two
problems are related." (5) His newsletters to his
constituents are filled with self-rightous imagery of
Missouri farmers saving the world with the food they
grow. ( 6 ) He also spells it out in clear, albeit
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misrepresented, economic terms:
providing nore d;nand!" ll^u^taneSSsiy! VotTkr'
act as"^a damner*'^
huge commodity inventories that
deficiency payment^ to
Pood For Peace, viewed by Danforth as a moral
imperative, serves to push US agricultural exports with
the ultimate purpose of controlling what people eat in
other countries. Coming from a grain belt state, this is
politically expedient for him to support. Quoting from a
USDA Food For Peace document:
hereby declares it to be the policy of
expand international trade; todevelop and expand export markets for US
agricultural commodities...
It (FFP) paved the way for the transition of manydeveloping countries into important dollar customersfor all sorts of US products...
Big increases in yields (grain) and the abscence ofacreage restrictions produced a succession of hugegrain crops, far in excess of US needs.
these grains was costly. The obvious
solution was in exports. However, many of the
countries that could use US grains lacked theforeign exchange to buy them.
PL 480 was proposed as a way out of this dilemma.
Basically, it permitted the United States to sellits
^
surplus agricultural commodities to friendly
nations abroad and accept those nations' local
currency in payment. .
.
Under the sub-heading What the United States Gains .
the USDA document includes these benefits:
prodSIts^^'f
market demand for US farm
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established trade relationshipsdeveloping countries, setting the
of commercial markets over time
with a number of
stage for growth
enjoyed balance of payments benefits from PL 480
^r^m^Se'b -re'than^S
present.
eginning of the program to the
^
^
^
chiefly from principal andinterest payments on PL 480 loans and from foreiancurrencies used by US agencies abroad.
government was allowed to sell
currencies to US businessmen and
u°
abroad, improving the US payment positionby cutting down on the outflow of US dollars
overseas." (8)
Food as a Weapon
"No country is free that imports food." Mao
"Grain is the currency of currencies." Lenin
"If we can get everyone in China to eat a donut aday, we'll have a market for our wheat surplus." Ex-Agriculture Secretary, John Block (1985)
In Somalia, the food aid is considered by many as
just part of the military aid package in exchange for US
military access. Food aid becomes a vital cog in
creating and perpetuating the dependency relationship of
Somalia on the US.
Unlike Somalia, throughout the 80s there has been a
critical incidence of hunger in Ethiopia. Haile Selassie
covered up the hunger in 73-74 which was one of the
reasons he was overthrown. Contrary to Selassie,
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Mengistu has been very public about the hunger even
though it is his violence that is responsible for it. He
has requested food aid from the US since 1978, but US
policy was not to send food to what was identified as a
"Communist" or "Marxist-Leninist" country, m March
1984, two AID Officials reported that there was evidence
Of the Ethiopians selling food aid to the Soviets and
therefore no food should be sent, one official stated
that "In the area controlled by the government, there is
no food shortage right now." (9) The implication, of
course, is that the hunger and killing in Tigray,
Eritrea, and other areas of fighting didn't matter.
Dr. Charles Elliot, former Director of Christian Aid
in Great Britain, accused his country and the US of
intentionally withholding food from Ethiopia in order to
weaken the regime and see it toppled. In October 1984,
he told "The Observer"
:
"They took the view that if there was another
serve the Ethiopian government
rignt, that they had it coming to them." (lo)
Jack Shepherd concurs that a Government Accounting
Office (GAO) investigation revealed:
initial US response to Ethiopia had beendelayed because of strained relations between thetwo governments' and that the Reagan Administrationhad in 1983-84 expressed 'major concerns' about
supplying food aid to a Marxist nation with closeSoviet ties. There was a feeling that if Ethiopians
were in trouble, the Soviets should get them out.
But that feeling, which persisted through the first
ten months of 1984, fell before the preelection
outpouring of public concern for Africa, and
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Ethiopia in particular." (ii)
The US alleged wide-spread misuse of food assistance
in Ethiopia until us policy changed and then it was
viewed as "politically appropriate" to send food. My
interviews with State, AID, and FFP suggest that all the
US food was monitored sucoesfully to its destination.
"It was other countries- food that was diverted, not
our's," said AID officials:
Ethiopia was controlled by volaas
in saved millions of^lives^and
thiS people will remember the US. iink we can be proud of what we did." (12)
Reagan still views food aid as an area ripe for
budget cuts. Politically, in 1984, it was rationalized
this way:
of^tS not form a noticeable segmentPresident's constituency, and conservative(and sometimes anti-Afrioan) white Americans did.Who would notice cuts in this area? Or, more to thepoint. Who would complain, and who would listen'’Ethiopia, like Mozambique, could be ignored safely.Where were the voices among the President's ^
constituency
,
or staff, who would speak out loudlyand publicly in favor of foreign aid to a Marxist
nation? The budget could quietly and safely be cutback for all of sub-Saharan Africa, and cut to zerofor Ethiopia." (13)
This policy, strongly formulated by Haig and
Kirpatrick, is fervently maintained by Senators Helms,
Stennis, and Hatch. It is opposed by grainbelt senators
like Boren, Boschwitz, and Danforth because their
constituents grow the grain. It is also opposed by the
USDA, the government representatives of agribusiness, who
Ill
desire foreign markets for their agricultural products.
sending food to Ethiopia is supported by that
faction in the administration that views food as a
strategy to wean Mengistu from the USSR. Five of the
State, AID, and FPP people interviewed denied knowledge
of this policy or adamantly said it wasn't the case. One
employee commented that maybe there was a policy. One
person said the policy had failed. Two people said it
was too early to tell what the outcome would be.
Everyone else declined to comment on this policy.
The other faction in Washington who approves of food
assistance is the group who views the matter as one of
siaply feeding people to keep them alive. Many are very
genuine and sincere in their concern. Many are self-
rightous. Most are not able or willing to put the social
and political issues of the Horn into an historical
context to recognize and understand the valid grievances
of people fighting against oppressive regimes. In two
interviews, the roles were switched to where I became
recipient to questions about the Horn, mostly Somali
specific. One official confided that he didn't know who
or what to believe, "even in this building."
Two people with significantly high US government
positions in Ethiopia and Somalia respectively, had
alarming analyses for solutions in the Horn. The US
official in Ethiopia told me:
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°verpopulation.
drough^Sro^rpeople^ve^toe
agriSiturarpofLy^fls'b^d^f^^^f"--
are no incentives for farmers ll gro^^ood;
™hiopS^haf?he®Last°‘’^°"®^? practices,
in the world ^ scientific based agriculture
ther» lo modern seeds, fertilizers
s»
'
There was no mention of forced relocation or war. Her
attitude was essentially that the Ethiopian people and
Communism were causal to the famine, that there was no
intentional starvation.
The AID official from Somalia compared the Somali
situation to the "American west 120 years ago," when
there was conflict between ranchers and nestors. He told
me that the Somali situation could be understood by
watching the western movies "Pale Rider" and "Shane." He
quoted Shane, "We tamed this range," as an example of
Somali landowners not wanting to offer land for refugee
settlement. He suggested that in ten years, the
situation would sort itself out by itself, and again
quoted one of the westerns, "Thems Sioux lands out
there," meaning that thems Somali lands and the Somalis
will take care of them.
Not being a fan of Clint Eastwood westerns, I have
yet to see these movies, even knowing that within their
scripts may be the answer to durable solutions for
refugees in Somalia.
The UN
UN policy must change. The Cairo Resolution of 1964
was a deliberate move by leaders in newly independent
African countries to protect their colonial boundaries.
Selassie was the primary mover in formulating this policy
and it is no coincidence that the headquarters for the
OAU was based in Addis Ababa.
The evolution of international law has provided a
legal framework through which people can pursue the right
to self-determination. The struggles of Eritrea and the
Ogaden can both be settled within this framework. B.H.
Selassie argues that few countries in the UN question the
"justice of their (EPLF) cause on moral or legal grounds.
And justice, like peace, is indivisible."
( 15 ) But the
OAU does not recognize liberation struggles in the Horn
as having any connection to the continent's liberation
movements. Writing in defense of Eritrea, Harnet argues:
The underlying reason is that many African states
are so fearful of their own precarious make-up that
they prefer to ignore the issue... The OAU respects
the boundaries of African states inherited from
colonialism. Be that as it may, many of those who
advocate respect for colonial boundaries fail to
take into consideration the fact that Eritrea has
well-defined territorial boundaries inherited from
colonialism.
.
.
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and Its'oSn^SL?er resolutions
Namibian peonle's 5 ^ advocates for the
is unbecoming of its^raison^d^ft‘^®’^^""-"®^^°'’'
outrageous crimes being pernetuatL’^»
ignore the
Eritrean people for no ^ against the
The US and USSR have considerable influence in the
UN and both are responsible for the UN's avoidance of
liberation issues in the Horn. Postponing legitimate
claims to self-determination and independence seriously
questions the integrity of the UN.
In "Africa Now" Dr. Julius Nyerere is quoted:
"There is an exaggerated respect for soveriontv and
other point is - and again we are
look 55 7 first stone? Weat ourselves and, to be honest, we sav 't amnot going to be the first one to cast the first
stonl'at Sr °"® to caS the firstS e the upcoming OAU meeting." (i?)
In terms of food aid and refugee assistance the UN
is slow, and usually unwilling, to publicly criticize
either Ethiopia or Somalia. As one UN official put it:
rSticTLSh ®°™®.P’^i''3te agencies are reluctant tocrit ize the Addis government openly, for fear ofjeopardizing existing relief shipments andprograms." (18)
In a similar vein, I was nonchalantly told by a
colleague my first week in Somalia:
You have to watch what you say. Everybody is inthe same boat and it is better not to stick your
neck out. There is no sense shouting about what
everyone already knows. Once you learn the system.
It s not so bad, and you can still do your job."
The Boston Globe (26 November 1984) wrote:
"Agencies, mandated to work onlv ^
neither act independently Lthey make any public staLments tS contr;dict°"'government descriptions of the crisis ..
they wish to avoid ^ ^ Plaining
govLnment side?" °P®tations on thi
The following week (2 December 1984), The Globe
Similarly reported on Ethiopia:
• •maintain thatsecrecy is necessary because if the central
??b?l"c?Sr???er *^heir involvement in
country alt?ge?^e?^' "he
on two occasions, I heard CARE officials confront UN
officials in Somalia with the comment, "The HCR has no
backbone. The CARE argument was that the HCR would
neither take the initiative in confronting inappropriate
Somali government practices nor in supporting the
community development initiatives of voluntary agencies.
The HCR reply in each instance was a standard response in
these circumstances:
We are an apolitical organization. We are here athe invitation of the Somali government to help themas they feel it is necessary. To do this in all the
which we work we must remain neutral."
The Myth of Neutrality
Neutral is a gear in my truck, also my motorcycle.
If I turn on the engine and the truck is in neutral, I go
nowhere. If i am on a hill and the truck begins to
coast, I am in less control of it than if l were in gear.
am in
The faster the truck rolls in neutral the less I
control and the n.ore dangerous is the cirounstance to me
and those along my path.
A basic educational supposition of Paulo Freire is
that nothing is neutral. The non-neutrality of the
refugee business is quite evident in the Horn, it is
Clearly illustrated in the extent to which Ethiopia and
Somalia have manipulated displaced people to their own
political and economic advantage. It is evident in the
design and implementation of projects, as well as the
types of programming that are not allowed.
The self-serving nature of both the Ethiopian and
Somali governments is understandable considering their
exploited positions in the international economic order,
as well as when considering how they have each been
manipulated in other ways by the US, Europe, and the
Soviet Union. These self-serving behaviors, however,
have resulted in short-sighted policies with intended
immediate gratification which in the long run have only
compounded economic and political problems.
Volags and the UNHCR are "guests" of the country in
which they work. The volags are not neutral because they
operate under the coordinating umbrella of the HCR and
the HCR adheres to government policy. in the words of
one RRC official, "The HCR does what it is told and
everything is all right."
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One AID official in Washington told me:
"Somalia makes very oolitioai
put refugees and wLL^not to-^whi where to
who is not. The hcr i ^ refugee and
is high?/politic?zed^ ? ^he HCR
tive) Blavo left Heahonin^ glad when (Representa-
considering htf^prevtous^eipern^L’^^lif^Sn"*'"""
the"poii?i^s of?hrs;:
The editors of "Horn of Afrioa" take the myth of
neutrality seriously. The origins of the refugee crisis,
they assert:
sharply and honestly traced. The past
aginlies havr^rf ";i Political organizations ^nf
inlerisis ofai? analyzed, and thej-iiueresr f all involved parties must be cleai-wunderstood. m short, the mask of
-neutraUtyf^
ofsis hL^?o\*'^f participants in thilcri as t be torn off to reveal the actual
Sfefof noffiitical
J 5 refugee crisis must be explodedtruth examined in full and clLrebate. refugees are the products of politics
often designed wi?h politicalends and genuine, lasting humanitarian solutions
come hand in hand with political solutions tothe underlying conflicts in the region." (23)
I am always suspicious of voluntary agencies and
individuals who profess independence in their work with
refugees. If these agencies are truly independent, why
are they not working where the need is greatest, in
Tigray and Eritrea? it is ironic that the two most
successful refugee-based agencies in the Horn, REST
(Relief Society of Tigray) and ERA (Eritrea Relief
Association) receive the least amount of international
assistance when they have clearly demonstrated the
ability and committment to provide for the welfare of
their people. Resource for resource, there is evidence
that these agencies have made significant achievements in
promoting self-reliant initiatives.
REST
The choice of agencies not to work with the ERA,
and ORA (Oromo Relief Association) is political.
One FFP officer in Washington commented in a
regretful and frustrated way:
seemingly
cLperation^wi?h°th assistance and indirectoperation wit these organizations, it's toosensitive an issue." (24)
It says that working under the jurisdiction of oppressive
govern-ments has more benefits than working with
grassroots movements fighting for liberation.
In Ethiopia, the continuation of "relief" operations
that use food assistance to depopulate opposition groups
and destroy their liberation movements is a disaster.
Many writers assert that Western aid is used to fill the
financial vacuum created by Ethiopia's inflated military
budget to support armies on as many as four fronts. This
economic assistance also serves to pay off arms debts to
the USSR. (25) Food assistance and other relief
commodities are similarly used in Somalia. (26)
The Feasibility of Self-Reliance
For self-reliance to be a feasible strategy, people
must become empowered to exercise democratic control over
their human and material resources. For this development
119
to occur, there must first be a conciousness towards
personal and societal liberation. Slaves do not become
self-reliant on the plantation. If the system allows for
change to occur through legitimate access to power, the
process may be relatively peaceful or perhaps better put,
non-violent. When this access is not provided, the
liberating process of self-reliance may take on the
proportions of armed struggle. The Barre government has
offered no such power access to his people much less to
refugees
.
Self-reliance implies a democratic structure that
gives people a voice allowing actual access to both
political and economic opportunities. A first step for
Barre is to allow other political parties to exist, a
Somali colleague laughs that this is tantamount to Barre
tending his resignation. Mohamoud writes:
"A democratic multi-party system is compatible with
f
political tradition of organizing rival
coalitions. Direct presidential elections
will help stabilize political parties and encourageprospective presidential candidates to seek broad
national constituencies." (27)
Consistent with this notion of pluralism would be a
decentralization of the government bureaucracy.
Theoretically, the organization of the Somali
Revolutionary Socialist Party (SRSP) calls for
decentralized and shared power within the body politic.
Disregarding the rhetoric, Samatar ( 1986 ) writes;
"It is no secret that, despite the appearance.
- s-r Sfor the Central Committee notion? i(Somali Revolutionarv Commi+-?^ have all SRC
secretary General of thf ^y^the
iyS"E£L€iri3'- i-taL^rsLi?r
l??ocat-°^
leadership choices?®budgeSrr^'’
all ions, and programmatic dire^tionT"
( 28 )
The state Department concurs that claims of power
decen- tralization are unsubstantiated. US Country
Reports of Human Rights prartjror annually repeat that
economic and political power are concentrated in the
Somali elite, resulting in a growing gap between classes
and ethnic groups while adding to the growing list of
human rights violations. The 1986 report states:
Section 1 c.
Solv ro„2h^r®"‘'r that Somali police authoritiespply ug treatment in order to obtain confessions
oSon^’'"''^i suspects. Living conditiSn^Jnprisons can be harsh.
Section 1 d.
3arr?nn’"’”r! frequently makes arrests withoutants and detains indefinitely persons whom itviews as a threat to national security. In sLf
prisoners are held incommunicado
charged
access to lawyers prior to being formally
350-500 political prisoners arebeing held without charge, including 6 highgovernment officials arrested in June 1982.
Section 1 f.
The National Security Service (NSS) has the
private citizens anH ond detain subjects without charge.
Section 2 a.
by the governnen;. S^oEer^o^"''
acEEp?^E?E'EE and"EE?E!En"?hat isdoce raoie to the government.
Section 2 b.
organizations and public
KpeEEiEiEn^’'%a??^®°^ ^“''^^^nt^onEEol or
r^oi?r^ Rallies or meetings of a direct
organized only by thegovernment, usually to promote its^owE pEEgrams.
Section 3 a.
pEElic'^EriEicilf -° g°vernment, andPUWXJ.C criticism of its policies is forbidden.
Section 4 a.
The Somali Government has refused requests bv
viEit^Eo?ft^‘'''?^® rights organizations to
Somali
SEEs ^ ® actively address human rights
tonesty International, in its 1985 report expressed
hEd°beEE
°''®’^.P'^is°ners of conscience, some Ef whoma en detained without trial for more than 6
other ' detention without trial ofprisoners or their conviction after
Free " ^29^^^*
House rated Somalia "Not
Refugees must adhere to the Somali political and
legal structure. Survival considerations for refugees
are increased because they have no power base and the HCR
has no policy that confronts Somali authority. Refugees
are not interested in imposed "self-reliance" initiatives
when political action is subject to reprisal and there is
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no form of protection, when refugees are conscripted by
the army, they prefer to pay their way out rather than go
through HCR. As one refugee put it:
us? bSt"do not!^ ^hey will help
us, HCR says ok and dr.o=^™^
says they do not have
makes promised but ^ Protection Officer (HCR)
cards. I? i? 4afe^ on “= identification-Lt IS s r our own." (30)
Somali recruitment is not done in a discriminating
way. in May 1984 a colleague of mine at HCR/Mogadisho
was conscripted, had his head shaved and was in the army
for about a week. The Nigerian Counsel and a US citizen
working with a voluntary agency have also been
conscripted and released.
To promote self-reliance, it would behoove relief
workers in Somalia to come up with a working definition
of what is meant by self-reliance. The only time I was
present for a discussion about self-reliance and
participation was the community development meeting
described in Chapter Four when Suleiman Gulaid told us
participation was telling people what to do.
Self-reliance to many at the State Department means
Somalia has enough foreign exchange to purchase US
products:
Somalia is our best example of success becauseSomalia no longer picks up farmers products at thelowest price... Our policy reform there is one of the
most successful. Changing the Market Board is a
result of US influence. .. Devaluing the currency was
facLriirarr^rby^'loLirelLes!® business and
The time is not riqht vet fn-rSomalia must be clear ac? i-o investment,
agribusiness corporations bni-^
I’nles.
. .There are no
corporations bu^^a^fsen ' looai
vegetables, particularly melons lei?®'macro concept in terms of hi? e' ®®l 'teliance is a
trading. Selflrei??^ ^ survive through
political motives for having rellglll lle?l??®(3i)
self-reliance means different things to people and
great harm can come to refugees who are encouraged to
become politioal-ly active in planning and decision
making in a system that prohibits this activity. Great
misunderstanding and frustration can come to relief
workers who lable refugees lazy because (aware of the
risks) they refuse to participate in such programs.
At the level of planning and implementation,
refugees are notably excluded in Somalia. When in
attendance at meetings, their comments, if heard at all,
are often disregarded. The AFSC and MCC were the
organizations most committed to small-scaled, refugee-
controlled projects. Yet HCR so Head Langschwert
continually discredited both agencies as doing nothing.
The world has entered a period of severe political
and economic crisis. Somalia, being one of the poorer
countries, is most critically affected by its links to
the global market system and to the militarization that
protects this system. In conjunction with this
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oppression are the intensification of ethnic and class
inequities. The unfulfilled social, economic, and
political expectations of Somali people have translated
into militant protest, as it has in Ethiopia and Eritrea,
a protest that will increase as the oppression becomes
more severe.
KO amount of refugee assistance is going to provide
for self-reliance. An internationally supervised cease
fire and cessation of military aid to both countries is a
ep in the right direction. Somalia and Ethiopia (with
the assistance of Italy and the USSR) have been
negotiating a peace settlement over the Ogaden. The
country that is blocking these negotiations is the US.
By not supporting the peace initiatives in the Horn, the
US becomes its greatest obstacle.
At the world Food Conference in 1981, the US was the
only country to oppose a resolution condemning the
practice of using food as a weapon. Reagan was quite
clear as to what his food policy would be. Through the
80s, he has supported three military governments in the
Horn (Somalia, Sudan, and Ethiopia) through the callous
use of food assistance to manipulate dependent people for
self-serving political ends.
The UN and OAU are guilty of obstructing peace by
refusing to assume the responsibility of mediation in
internatonal conflicts. The UN and OAU support the
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political boundaries of neo-colonial Africa. Both
organizations fear a perceived loss of power from
negotiations with legitimate liberation movements.
Militarization
The rapid and on-going militarization in the Horn
and the Indian Ocean by the superpowers must be opposed.
UN General Assembly Resolution 28 32 (XXVI) declared "the
Indian Ocean as a zone of peace."
( 32 ) Co-sponsored by
Sri Lanka and Tanzania, the resolution called:
aid installations, nuclearweaponfn weapons of mass destruction and any manifesta-
">ilitary prescence conceived inthe context of great power rivalry." (33)
This resolution specifically refers to Soviet
facilities in Ethiopia and Eritrea, US bases in Kenya,
Somalia, and the Sudan. It calls for the return of the
island bases of Diego Garcia and Mayotte to Mauritius and
the Comoros, as well as Glorieuses, Juan de Nova, Europe,
and Bassaa De India to Malagasy. Unfortunately, as with
the World Court decision condemning the US war against
Nicaragua, and resolutions against apartheid in South
Africa, there is no enforcement of these decisions.
The US and the USSR are requested to freeze the arms
build up in the Horn. After the cessation of military
aid, they must then dismantle their bases. US and USSR
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military advisors and Cuban troops should go home.
( 34 )
The productive sectors of Somali economy have been
Slighted in favor of military investment and what is
called
-General Public Services-
- funds for the secret
police and elite expense accounts. (35) Ahmed Samatar
refers to this police as a:
"...pervasive security network, The National
afthfLnnnrsr""> est;blilhS"^r?inction
unlimitL power to s2Lc™ dfta'^®
and kill sLpIcted dSs?d4nts?-^ (36r
The Pervasive Security Network
The culture of silence that allows development
agencies in Somalia to collude with oppression has been
briefly described. Somali author Nuruddin Farah counters
this silence by articulately opposing the debilitating
developments in his country. Farah conceives that his
novels offer:
...an alternative to the propaganda that the statemediocracy in Somalia produces and puts on the
shelves, an alternative and true record of history."
Okonkwo concurs
:
One significant aspect of the General's (Barre's)
regime is its censorship and monopoly ofinformation. It practices selectiveness,
distortion, and, often, fabrication of information
which it feeds the public." (38)
This hardly comes as an aberration, however, to people in
the United States who daily experience the same
manipulation.
I" §i!ae^.and.^2HrJiiik, of Farah's characters
Soyaan believes that Somalia needs:
sr:rKS‘“-,
pregnant letters such as KGB^
hiding behind
alphabet of mysteries." (39^' wicked
Coercing individuals into conformity is a theme in
Legson Kayira-s
are bribed or intimidated into complicity with the
system. Where everyone chooses words carefully in an
atmosphere of fear and suspicion:
reinterpreted according to the code of clan ior grouD interfbc:-*- <-000 r , class,
light? ^otofnl e^capes
security system whosfplanLfears^Sfve",^every homestead." (40) ^ sprouted in
Okonkwo describes Somalia under Barre as "nothing
but a modern torture chamber, a concentration camp, a
Gulag."
( 41 )
With reference to Solzhenitsyn
-s Gulag, Farah draws this
analogy:
SecSritv the prisoners; theu y
,
the Green Guards, are the iailers* anH -t-HmGeneral, the Grand Warder of them all." (42)
Farah 's Somalia of mystification and misinformation
parallels US media manipulation. My friend Jeanine was
watching the news one evening with her eight year old
daughter Molly. irate with the reporting, she yelled at
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the newscaster:
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"Liar, liar."
Molly thought a moment about the contradictions and
asked,
-Mommy, how am I to know who to believe, him
(pointing to the tv) or you?"
Jeanine responded,
-That, Molly, is going to be a
struggle you will always have to deal with, seeking out
the truth."
In a country run by Abrams, Casey, Meese, and Deaver
It IS often hard to get a handle on the truth. Lies
become a norm in government, not an aberration.
-Horn of
Africa" writes:
is suppressed or ignored at one
Se other^ withheld ol distorted atT:ne . And power over all our lives is
resou?cef-'^a^ control of information and
1 inked f
^ center, leaving whole peoples
vast sums'^of
global merry-go-round while
transferred g°°<iSr and arms are mysteriously
tel^ fr r iittle actual mys-this. The truth is right out^in
mation fnd^mier"d^^ obscured by layers of misinfor-^ assumptions. it remains forUS to dig for it. And then to act upon it." (43)
f~Rsl iance and Development
Babu suggests that self-reliant development and
liberation are part of the same process. One will not
occur without the other. The issue is justice. Self-
reliance and liberation are connected to democratic
participation in development. Where dialogue and
legitimate freedom of expression do not exist:
of political violence
with those in power orlLfeKf.in^ion.??'^^"^’^^"^
ofnSionarSeve?opm4n^r^that''‘'''°“^r ^<==°onts
regimes challengrrmaf i f 5 “n^ust, repressive
desire for iustice anH a woman's) inherent
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Self-reliance as a feasible objective for human
development is always appropriate when viewed in terms of
liberation. Meeting the self-reliant needs of a
politically concious people in Somalia will be pursued by
establishing a new government in Mogadisho that shares
political and economic power with its people. This
government must struggle for self-determination be it
autonomy within or liberation from the US empire.
Summary
The history of us foreign aid has been to channel it
through private and governmental elite structures. Steve
Hellinger of the Development Gap asserts:
^
working through elite channels that
^ facilitate the well-being of the poor, butenhance the well-being of the rich, your aid issurely going to be counterproductive." (45)
Counterproductive for the poor, that is, but US foreign
aid is generally concerned with the well-being
(stability) of the rich. Many development workers are
concerned with doing good deeds, but to many of them,
doing good is associated with spending and giving more
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Development (aka selt-neliance in many circles) is not
something you buy with money. Development happens when
people have access to economic and political power.
A simple solution to this conflict is for the us to
Side with the world's poor. This is a highly unconven-
tional approach to foreign aid, but it could be a very
popular one.
self-reliance is not a feasible development
objective in Somali refugee camps because it is an
imposed policy on which limits have already been placed
restricting what refugees can and cannot do. Self-
reliance is not viewed by the power structure either in
terms of empowerment or liberation.
As long as food aid is used to create and perpetuate
refugees in Somalia, there will be a harmful and
unnecessary dependency, quite contrary to the SDR's HCR's
publicity advocating self-reliance. One AID official in
Washington asserts:
HCR s self-reliance promos and the Somaligovernment's promos are a wash.
. .Refugee self-reliance IS a band-aid approach and is ending
irth^ref Forestry was supposid to ben t e refugees interest, but it was a governmentpro:ject and qualifies as self-reliance only byname... Food For Work is another way of givinq^peoole
what the government wants... Land tLureIS not clear. There will never be self-reliancebecause the Somali government doesn't want it." ( 46 )
Eleven of thirteen Washington interviewees said that
self-reliance among refugees in Somalia was not feasible.
Six people stressed there was no available land suitable
131for fanning to support this number of people. Three
that Barre's political manipulation did not allow
for self-reliant activities, one blamed poor economic
policies. Another exclaimed:
no place l\ave^ever^seen^and'’^^‘ 3^*’® Place is likehuman habitation." (47) conducive to
Six of these respondents were adament that refugee
assistance was creating dependency and that the food
Should be cut back. Two people said the food wasn't
creating dependency, it was creating markets. Three
people said the food was nece«;«?ar-Tfd cessary to support the hungry
and the Somali economy. Two didn't know.
Expatriate development workers in Somalia argue
there are too many camp and local residents actively
colluding with the refugee business power structure for
the accrued benefits and rewards the system offers.
Between the collusion and the contrived population in the
camps, there is no sense of a camp community with a
desire to work together. Rather, there are special
interest groups. To quote one AID official:
"Self-reliance is a grand idea, but it doesn't workwell in most places due to self-interest."
( 48 )
Competition and independent operation among refugee
agencies removes even a basic amount of coordinated
support for self-reliance initiatives. The HCR and NRC
offer no system for the self-reliance process to exist.
To quote from a censored report requested by Geneva,
)ut: covered up in Somalia:
worri^loL"lia^:rtr^^ Sfref?o^a°rf
^
-cha^fsrto'^cMevfs^??!
intro&?“^"y development was to be
which
-promotes the participation of
® Phenomenon
th
entit?erto^fac?ular‘^ two
it in the field t
successful incorporation of
nnHe^ i" ^tea of development was Aeitter
RRC in lhe'No??hwes??"^'( 49r ^y HCR and
Footnotes
I was the only United Statesian working with the hcr
greet\"SI"s:L%"' allowed^rHCR^to
infn^Tii^^y
fact-finding team wantingformation on the camps for which I was
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TTM H^TTC
include refugees, Somalis, volags^UN, and US State Department people. ^ '
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CHAPTER 5
SELF-RELIANCE AND SELF-DETERMINATION IN THE HORN OF AFRICA
From the point of view of iustir-o +-v.«
Ne^ertoellss cinsider^^ion?
Basin
cnat: the country be linVoH wi'-f-u -i -, ^‘c'-tissary
(1)
^ i xed with our ally Ethiopia."
Strategic Interests
Elliott Abrams has stated that Somalia satisfies US
interests by cooperating "closely with the US in several
ways," primarily by providing the States with military
access to Somali ports and airfields. Early in his
testimony to a US Joint Hearing on Human Rights and
African Affairs (1984), he stressed that US interests are
served if the Horn is "...stable, peaceful, and
prosperous." He accused Ethiopia of attempting to
destabilize Sudan and Somalia by arming guerillas from
these respective countries. He disparaged the military
buildup of Ethiopia without mentioning that the largest
per capita recipients of US military aid in Africa are
those countries surrounding Ethiopia. (2)
As suggested in Chapter Two, the perceived strategic
interests of the US have legitimized US economic
manipulation and military intervention at a global level.
Events in the Horn since World War II have followed this
same global pattern. War and famine in the Horn of
Africa are rooted in this manipulation. The violence of
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and
hunger and human displacement is perpetuated by
superpower rivalry, as well as inept, aggressive,
foolish decisions on behalf of the leaders of all
governmsnts concerned. The result has been millions of
dead and displaced people.
'Strategically, the
primarily pursued for its
Horn is not a region that is
raw materials, although there
are significant natural resources available including the
fertile highlands of Eritrea and Ethiopia, potential oil
wealth in the Ogaden, and useful agricultural land in the
river valleys of the Wabishabele and Ganale, the
headwaters of both systems rising in the Ogaden.
The Horn's major importance in the geopolitical
scheme of world politics is its geographical position.
Within Ethiopia are the headwaters of the Nile. The
Horn's juxtaposition borders the Arab world and Black
Africa. To the east (Eritrea) lies the oil lanes of the
Red Sea and the Indian Ocean (Somalia, Kenya). Deep
water ports in these countries offer attractive military
bases for the US, the USSR, or anyone desiring an attempt
at hegemony in the Indian Ocean. At 15 degrees North and
40 degrees East, Eritrea's low magnetic atmosphere make
it an excellent location for a listening post in an
international communications system. Whatever prospects
there may have been for post WWII economic development in
these countries were greatly impeded by internal
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conflicts centered in nationalist issues, us and USSR
intervention has virtually extinguished this generation's
hopes for such development by promoting and manipulating
these conflicts into devastating wars that have reduced
standard of living to relationships of dependency.
For millions, the quality of life has been reduced even
further to a matter of survival for hungry and homeless
people ravaged by warfare.
Within the US state Department are two primary
policies to achieve the same end. Wolpe (1982) refers to
these perspectives as the globalist and regionalist views
to control events in the Horn. The globalist stresses an
accelarated military presence to attain a military
solution. The regionalist is concerned with self-
identified development or humanitarian aid, the purpose
of Which is to ultimately create stability through
dependency.
My experience, as well as views expressed in the
literature, suggest that both of these approaches
minimize and usually ignore the importance of local and
national social and political forces in the region. Both
views overemphasiz-e and fantasize the power of external
factors (e.g. USSR intervention) as being the moving
force behind social movements in these countries.
To explore durable solutions of peace and justice in
the region, the conflicts must be understood within the
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context of indigenous social and political forces. To do
otherwise is to perpetuate the
serving behavior characteristic
and in Central America.
same disastorous and self-
of US policy in Vietnam
Eritrea
Ethiopia and Italy colonized Eritrea. During WWII
the British made a deal with Eritrea guarantying them
independence if they would fight against the Italians.
The Eritreans consented to the offer. Eritrea, however,
has two deep water ports on the Red Sea. This maritime
access, combined with Ethiopia's land and natural
resources, was too profitable a package for the US to let
free-thinking issues of self-determination confront US
power and privilege in the region.
The Atlantic Charter's Four Freedoms, promoting
independence for countries like Vietnam, were similarly
ignored in Eritrea as national sovereignty was usurped.
The consequence was a US manipulated federation of
Eritrea with Ethiopia in 1952. Ten years later, Eritrea
was annexed to Ethiopia with US military backing. in
1952, Emperor Haile Selassie began an economic, social,
and political destabilization of Eritrea. Eritrean armed
resistance against the Selassie government and its U.S.
sponsors commenced shortly after annexation in 1962.
Similar to other liberation movements around the
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world, Eritreans desire sovereignty for their country.
Similar to other independence struggles, armed resistance
began only after Eritreans were denied their voices, a
loss Of dialogue to the point where peaceful resistlrs
were ignored or punished for speaking out. similar to
other liberation struggles, brutal suppression by U.S.
end USSR trained and sponsored armies has resulted in
massive human and environmental destruction in Eritrea
and throughout Ethiopia.
Unique to the Eritrean struggle is that they have
fought against both the United States support of Selassie
and the Dergue (1962-1977) and the Soviet Union support
of the Dergue and Mengistu (1974 to the present).
Fighting for 26 years, it is the war of longest duration
on the continent.
Eritrea's right to independence is easily defended
and well-argued in international law. (3) The legal
framework for the rights of people to pursue self-
determination is stipulated in Articles 1 and 55 of the
UN Charter, as well as in several supportive documents
and resolutions.
Resolutions 1514 and 1541 in 1960, and 2526 in 1970leave no room for doubt but that the international
community (and its legal expression, the UN) hold nofor even entertaining any denial to thequest of peoples under colonial rule or aliendomination, for self-determination up toindependence .
" ( 4 )
Medhanie (1986) writes;
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Self-determination has been a princinle ofinternational law ever sinc^^ ok ^
United Nations camllntl efieo? on ^’2"October, 1945 ." ( 5 )
^ 24th of
The 1960 Declaration on the Granting of Independence
to colonial countries and Peoples, General Assembly
Resolution 1514 (XV) states:
by^virtue^S that ®®lf-<ietermination:
social, and cultural development."
( 6 )
®t°nomio.
Arguments against independence are rooted in the
colonial and imperial desire for foreign control in the
region:
"In hostile hands it (Eritrea) may block our seacommunications through the Red Sea to various parts
if >^sed as a silppinr
ti?Ste a Sre^''to^?h^"
mountains bastion, may Ions-r ru threat to t e whole of Eastern Africa."
( 7 ;
The British conclusion was suppported in a letter
from US War Secretary James Forrestal to US Secretary of
State Dean Acheson in 1948. Forrestal wrote:
strategic and logistical
onsiderations it would be of value to the UnitedStates to have refineries, capable of supplying asubstantial portion of our aviation needs, locatedclose to a crude supply and also close to areas
task forces would be operating and whereairfields would be located, yet far enough removedto be reasonably safe from effective enemy bombing.
With respect to the Middle East, refineries locatedin Italien Somaliland and Eritrea would meet theforegoing conditions.
.. therefore, as a long range
P^oyision of potential military value, it isbelieved that concessions on rights should be soughtfor United States interests to construct and operate
refineries in Italien Somaliland and Eritrea. These
rights should include necessary transportation andport concessions, together with air and naval base
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rights and communication facilities." (8)
In his correspondence to the U.S., Haile Selassie
was Clear that the U.s. request for military facilities
would be granted if Eritrea were ceded to Ethiopia, m
its most simple terms, U.S. policy was based on giving
Selassie what he wanted (Eritrea, as well as the assumed
military strength one accrues from accommodating U.S.
military bases), in exchange for the U.S. desire for
military installations and a listening post for the CIA.
in none of these communications is there evidence of any
consideration for the rights and welfare of the Eritrean,
Ethiopian, or Somali people. The language suggests only
a geo-political concern for U.S. strategic interests in
the Horn, as well as an acquiescence to Ethiopian
colonial aspirations.
With an election approaching, Harry Truman was
prepared to return Eritrea to its Italian colonizers on
the grounds that it would appeal to voters of Italian
ancestry in the u.s. But in 1950, when Selassie agreed
to send Ethiopian soldiers to fight for the US in Korea,
Truman decided to firmly endorse Ethiopian territorial
soverignty over Eritrea." ( 9 )
At the United Nations, the U.S. guided Resolution
390 A V through the General Assembly, but not without
strong disagreement from some delegates. The Soviet
delegate argued that:
people without its^conLnt^and\e^ the Eritrean
of the fundamental princinle nfdetermination of peop^e^ Th» r, right of self-take a decision which wiii‘Ltisfv'^tL'^?'^^°"®the Eritrean people for inden^ia longing of
fedeLtion of iSrea wi^h^’^n^tr^
without the partioipation*^o? State adopted
that is, without the participatlorofEritrea!" ai)
A local referendum with Eritrean participation was
out Of the question for the U.s. m a confidential
telegram of 19 August 1949, The U.s. Embassy in Addis
Ababa stated that .. 75 % of the Eritrean people supported
the independence Bloc Party." (ii) Knowing this
information, u.s. policy was a concious decision to deny
Eritrean people their right (as stipulated in the United
Nations Charter) to political self-determination.
The Czechoslovakian delegate addressed the General
Assembly with these words:
ChartS’^^t^e p*’® f“"'?®”>®"tal purposes of the UNResolution would deny the people of
nn self-determination and imposeo them a federation with Ethiopia which the areatmajority oppose. instead of maintaining peLHfthat part of the world, the Resolution loulTfostercivil war and discord. Instead of assisting an
and^^Tn^
exploited people to achieve freedomindependence, it would attempt to cover up theannexation of a small state by a larger state!^-%)
With a small change in vocabularly (annexation,
federation) these words could be superimposed in
Southeast Asia, Central America, Southern Africa, and
elsewhere, as characteristic of U.S. foreign policy
against self-determination in these
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regions
.
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Ethiopia
To George Shepherd (1985) Ethiopia became:
b;;iusfofits"stratLic"l =tate status
and its ruling CopUc clasr^wh?rh°"Muslim and non-Arab Th! ?' ^"ti-
and the Amharic ariii-nr->- was pro-Western
and European values The'^^^
were trained in English
willing lo provide the ePPeared stable anddeploy^ts f^rlefaS^oun^efS gr:„?L""i?^of Abdel Nasser south of SueL" (13^
The U.S immediately established its foreign policy
for Ethiopia with two agreements effective 23 May 1953
.
The first was the Mutual Military Assistance Agreement
Which provided for the equipping and training of
Ethiopian military forces. From 1951 to 1976, Ethiopia
received more economic aid ($350 million) and military
aid ($279 million) from the US than any other country in
Africa. During this period, 3,552 Ethiopian military
personnel were trained in the USA.
The second agreement pertained to defense
installations, particularly the CIA listening post at
Kagnew in Asmara, Eritrea. Ideally situated, far from
the magnetic fields of the northern and southern poles,
Kagnew became the communications center for monitoring
nuclear submarines in the Indian Ocean. (14) Kagnew
therefore became an integral part of the US global
circuit running from Arlington, Va., through US military
bases in Morroco, Eritrea, Australia, and the
Philippines
.
144
At senate Foreign Relations Hearings in 1976, us
Aznbassador to Ethiopia, Ed Korry, desoribed US polioy
Short-sighted:
as
GovlrnLnt*'defined"iras°the The
Kagnew station' The use of
•strategically vital? to n then to be
such military installation i States, the only
1/800 officeL men anrt ?? n Black Africa. We had
plus 800 dependents* a working there,
well advanSrduSn; L k plans
with the Ethiopians*^ wasn't much we could do
cadSlac^ •=
way!'" (ll) ' h®''® it that
In 1960, the US and Ethiopia signed a new military
agreement paving the way for US military intervention in
the region. Although the US left the main counter-
insurgency work to the Israelis (Ottoway, 1982), by 1966
there were over 100 US counter-insurgency advisors in the
country operating under the code name "Plan Delta." (16)
The CIA counter-insurgency people were called 'civic
action teams
'
.
The other component of this agreement was the
Emperor's insistence that the US refuse to give any
military aid to the Somali government, despite the fact
that Somalia had a generally pro-western orientation. As
a consequence, the Somali government received their arms
145primarily from the Soviets.
Military interests, of course, followed the
historical precedent of protecting the business
interests
:
S'-
Coffee - Ethiopian-American Coffee Company
Timber - infl Industrial Development Consultant Inc
Cotton - Mitchell Cotts
Cattle - International Packers
Sugar - HVA (Dutch)
Fruits and Vegetables - Del Monte, American Can
Potash & Copper - Parsons & co.
Tea - Brooke Bond
This IS an abbreviated list. Ethiopia is one of
those countries with the dual World Bank lable of
"underdeveloped and minerally rich." Although not
'prized' for its natural resources, Ethiopia posseses
mineral wealth. it is also a country totally capable of
feeding itself (as is all of Africa)
,
but we have to
examine who controls the land and who wields the guns
that support the landowners. Robert Zwarthruis, Director
of American Food Shares Co. articulates these
relationships well:
"Our greatest stake is in Ethiopia.
. .We don't go to
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sLu?fheirtSK‘'coSn2r7 that wego to Ethi^pif in"^?S:r"^o he^opoor thinas '
-i <5 tt •
lp those
Wo go to an underdeveloped oountr^l ^his.
ITctly ttfsLe^^ooS°"" " strong°^?oduc^^\f
through a state o^.pany"Inrse?rits"o™1rlc^I!"^
^L''Iamrpr?cr"ond?tTins '‘° on
supply and this we get if ‘we go'’to'^o^
continuous
Ethiopia and Egypt ^ ^ countries like
PiiiiW-
havrneverrIgarderirar‘'®'’''H°'’
an underdevel^pefco;nt^.""lfl^;;^?^"
frankly-you cannot trust them?
We take home our investments every year Whf^n +-hoseason is over, the money is at hLI???lhe ^nor^aLhas been enoraous. We double every year in
real nrnhi ^ product and the onlyp oblem is that the Eritrean resistance qr^o
abo:nt^?r^Ll?S.?°"
We are now searching for the ideal country inAfrica... The political risks imply that once youbuilding up an organization^for
whS^f^'
^ ^ay be nationalized. There is no country
''^bere you can be safe today.”
( 17 )
^
The response to this oppression has been the
formation and organization of several liberation groups,
first against Selassie and more overtly against
Mengistu. The liberation forces are local people who
want to control their resources. This is the point of
the exercise. Who is going to control the land? Who is
going to control production and the benefits thereof?
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As stated in Chapter Two, local people become the
This is called resistance in most vocabularies.
enemy.
The
White House calls it communism, also terrorism.
Revolution
The overthrow of the monarchy by army officers in
1975 did not Change Ethiopia's foreign policy towards
Eritrea. For a brief period there was a lessening in
hostilities as both countries explored possibilities for
cooperation, but the self-proclaimed socialist government
Of the Dergue (Committee) continued a brutal war against
Eritrea which rapidly spread to Tigray, Wollo, and other
areas. The revolution had changed governments, but not
the colonial policies of the monarchy.
Neither did US policy change significantly. One
reason was Ethiopia was still dependent on the US for
weapons. Secondly, the US State Department assumed that
the Dergue 's military officers were professed 'anti-
communists' (anti-Soviet), many of the officers having
been trained in the US, including their emergent leader.
Colonel Mengistu Haile Mariam. The Ford administration
did not want an independent Eritrea and neither did the
Dergue. US military aid reached its peak during the Ford
administration in 1976 to over $142 million. (17a)
Farer (1976) writes:
"The US did not intervene to save the Lion of Judah,
who had been such a close ally, because he was
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bSrworked our:i?f tributary relations had
to the North While Sadat
'officer's revoV?. ^ initial phase of the
threat to the feudal^svst'” anti-Western or a
a^atrund^r^h^Sfl^cror
mSlS?Ls?"”'al)^"" long oppressed
The US was uncomfortable, however, with the
independent nature of the Dergue that was formulating
social and political reforms within the country while
simultaneously developing ties with the USSR. Secretary
of State Kissinger was concerned with these events, but
still encouraged aid to Ethiopia as long as the country
retained some pro-western orientation, it was feared
that without continued US aid, Ethiopia might join an
emerging African block of nations that was critical of US
foreign policy, thus reducing US control on the
continent. Additionally, Kissinger was afraid of
competition from Soviet aid to Ethiopia, as well as
concerned about the well-trained and well-equipped army
in Somalia aligned with the USSR. (18a)
Consistent with previous decisions, US policy was
guided not by an understanding of social conditions in
the Horn, rather by a fear and loathing of the Soviet
Union cutting in on a piece of the US empire. As
Ethiopian ties with the USSR grew, the US began to menace
the Dergue with threats of cutting off aid. (18b)
In February 1977, Mengistu Haile Mariam emerged from
the "Palace Shootout" as the Dergue 's leader. He
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proceeded to eliminate those in opposition to hi. to the
point Of massacring select groups who protested his
policies. President Carter saw this as an opportune time
to intimidate Mengistu by announcing the cancellation of
all US aid to Ethiopia due to massive violations of human
rights. Human rights, however, were not the central
issue as much as the growing pressure within Carter’s
administration (from Brzezinski) to confront the Soviet
presence. To Carter's surprise, Mengistu responded in
April by closing all US installations, except for the
embassy and AID office.
While this "diplomacy" was playing out in Ethiopia,
Somalia was becoming alarmed at the growing contact
between the Dergue and the Soviets. Aware of this
concern, the us tried weaning Somalia from the Soviets by
announcing that the US would consider selling weapons to
the Somalis. At this point, US interests converged with
the Saudi interests of luring Somalia away from the USSR
and in the Saudi case, into its Islamic fold. Mengistu 's
policies hastened the organization of liberation fronts
in Ethiopia among the Tigray, Oromo, and Afar.
Ethiopia's army was poorly trained and short of weapons
due to US cancellation of arms shipments. in Eritrea,
the EPLF had Ethiopian forces under siege. To the US and
Somali president Siad Barre, it seemed opportune to start
a war on another front, the Ogaden, referred to and
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claimed by the Somalis as Western Somalia.
Somalia
After World War II, the Somali territories
(including the Ogaden) were placed under a UN trusteeship
with independence as an eventual goal. Britain favored
this arrangement, but the US sided with Haile Selassie's
wishes to annex the Ogaden, control of which was turned
over to Ethiopia in 1948. Quoting Lewis:
natura?! aggression, Ethiopia hadrally every right to the most considerate andgenerous treatment. But it was unfor?unatf?hat inthe process of satisfying her claims t^reparation
protesting Somalis
e®
sacrificed and the collective Somali
5°^^ national self-determination be cast asidemost as soon as it had achieved an articulateexpression." (18c) ^xi^uiac
Somalia received independence in 1960, refusing to
acknowledge the borders it had been relegated by the UN,
insisting that the Ogaden, the Northern Frontier District
(NFD) of Kenya, and Djibouti were all legitimate
components of a greater Somalia.
Somalia's post independence government was
democratically elected and filled with corruption and
disorganization. It was overthrown in 1969 by a military
coup under the leadership of Colonel Siad Barre.
There were two Ethiopian policies with which the US
had historically cooperated fully and these concerned
Eritrea and Somalia. Ethiopia feared Somali claims to
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the ogaden. As such, the us denied any Somali requests
for arms after the country achieved independence in i960.
Furthermore, us support of the 1964 Cairo Resolution to
the OAU accepted the inviolability of colonial
boundaries, reinforcing Ethiopian territorial claims.
US Ambassador Donald Petterson acknowledged in his
notes that the US:
" seek to minimize the disruDtivf^
th^Hor?; orA?rio™"^^^ preserve the detente in
the view being that:
dlfficultle^Lf significant
East Afrlc^'. (Lr " ""terests in the Horn and
For the US, priority was always on the more "lucrative-
interests in Ethiopia. The Soviets would agree that
Ethiopia with a colonized Eritrea is a greater prize than
Somalia.
Following this self-serving policy, on 27 April
1977, the State Department submitted a report to Congress
Identifying Somalia, together with Libya, Iraq, and South
Yemen, as countries actively supporting international
terrorism. An infuriated response from Mogadisho claimed
that:
"The rightous struggle of movements fighting
against oppression and colonialism was justified and
could not be described as terrorism." (20)
During this same month. President Carter, alarmed at
the violent excesses of Mengistu, told his aides to "do
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everything possible to get the Somalis to be our
friends."
( 21 ) one of the first steps was a state
Department announcement to the Somalis saying: "„e think
It is desirable that Somalia knows it does not have to
depend on the Soviet Union." (22)
Many of my Somali and Ethiopian colleagues assert
that the US not only promised to replace the USSR as
Somalia's arms dealer, but implied as well that the US
would not stand in the way of Somalia pursuing its
irredentist claims in the Ogaden. There is good
indication that support for this initiative came from the
Brzezinski faction at the White House.
The US openly contacted several allies around the
world (England, France, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Pakistan,
Iran, and others) to discuss the desirability of
supplying weapons to Somalia. Ethiopia reasonably
alleged that this consortium was a network for channeling
US weapons through conservative Islamic states to arm
Somalia (Legum and Lee 1980)
.
While these discussions were circulating among
embassy missions and arms dealers, Somalia acted on its
initial cues from the US and attacked the Ogaden.
Officially, the White House stated that the US would
only sell defensive weapons to the Somalis to protect
them from foreign attack. As early as July, however, the
British withdrew their offer as arms supplier. On 1 and
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2 September the US announced that they were withdrawing
their Offer as well. Receiving US weapons now became
contingent on a cease fire and the return of Somali
military forces to Somalia.
President Daniel Arap Moi of Kenya was probably the
most influential person in determining this policy. He
was uneasy with the success of the Somalis in the Ogaden
and frightened at the notion that they would attack Kenya
to reclaim the Northern Frontier District (NFD) upon
successful completion of the Ogaden war. Neither the
British nor the US wanted to strain relationships with
Kenya so both countries complied with Moi's demands and
cancelled their official arms agreements with Somalia
until the latter withdrew from the Ogaden.
The US had no vested interest in Somalia winning the
Ogaden war. it was a ploy to weaken the Mengistu regime,
as well as create and institutionalize Somali dependency
on the US. When Somali weapons were exhausted, the
Somali army was easily driven from Ethiopia in Spring
1978 by a combined effort of well-trained and well-armed
Ethiopian, Cuban, and Soviet military forces. An esti-
mated 1/4 of the Somali army was killed (Legum and Lee)
.
The US never expected or desired that Somalia
reclaim the Ogaden as this would have confronted the
colonial demarcations sponsored by the Cairo Resolution
to the OAU. It would further encourage other legitimate
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attempts towards self-determination and independent
economic development, and in so doing confront colonial
and imperial power structures world wide.
"For a fleeting moment," writes ex-US Ambassador
Petterson, "the plight of the refugees caught the
attention of a fairly large segment of the American
public. (23) But for the Carter administration there
was greater urgency in securing military access. For
Siad Barre, it was pushing to the extreme the amount of
US economic and military assistance he desired in
exchange for US access to Somali ports and airfields.
Barre knew that US military and economic aid would
facilitate the WSLF's presence in the Ogaden while
warding off political dissent at home. The deep water
port in Berbera helped satisfy US notions of "missle
envy" (Caldicott) in the region.
In 1985, Somalia, Sudan, and Kenya were the three
largest per capita recipients of US military aid in
Africa, receiving respectively, 76, 38, and 24 dollars
per person. Somewhere, cash registers ring.
The Politics of Refugees in Somalia
Siad Barre, defeated in a costly war that may or may
not have been of his own making, now faced internal
political turmoil at home. The 1969 military coup which
brought him to power had as a central focus the
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reunification of Sonali homelands in Kenya, Ethiopia, and
Djibouti. It was also rooted in the theoretical tenants
of self-reliant development through scientific socialism.
Not only had he failed to reunify the homelands, but the
war brought Djibouti and Kenya closer to Ethiopia based
on their interdependent economic and territorial
interests. This made Barre unpopular among many factions
within his country.
in February 1978, his army was decimated and he had
no superpower that he could rely on for economic and
military aid. Faced with growing civil insurrection in
the North (the Somali National Movement, SNM) and the
Somali Democratic Salvation Front (SDSF) in the South,
the way was readied for the military access agreement
with the US.
Nine of Somali's 15 regions share boundaries with
Ethiopia and large segments of the Somali population
supported these insurgent groups (Mohamoud 1983) . us
security and economic assistance escalated counter-
insurgency, particularly the arrest of political
activists advocating reforms. Mohamoud argues that it
was this suppression that:
"...effectively shifted the leadership of the
opposition from within the Somali government to
Ethiopian-backed insurgency movements." (24)
As a result of the war, there was a movement of
people from the Ogaden seeking refuge in Somalia. Most
156Of these people were loyal to Barre. The President
realised that thousands of loyal Ogadenis in his oountry
would help him resist opposition from rival clans,
discontented military groups, and the Muslim clergy.
Barre also calculated that sheltering
--refugees"
would serve as a propaganda tool to illustrate Mengistu-s
brutality. He began trucking food to the border while
simultaneously publicizing in the Ogaden that there was
food and Shelter in Somalia. Some accounts attest that
the government used army trucks to round up people and
bring them to the feeding centers.
( 25 )
News of shelter and free food travels quickly in
^ society, particularly one experiencing the
aftermath of war. while women and children collected the
rations, men were freed up to fight with the WSLF or
continued with their herds, as they now no longer had the
responsibility of feeding their families.
Unfortunately for Barre and the refugees, while he
was calling around the world about his refugee crisis, no
one much listened. The UN took six months to give it the
Official stamp.
What began as a need among an undetermined number of
refugees was soon exacerbated into an emergency
situation. As the population of the camps grew, the
circumstances of the refugees and of the natural
environment became desperate
.
The
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surrounding savannah was stripped of vegetation
to provide for firewood and building materials. Camps
with inadequate water for drinking and washing had poor
hygiene and sanitation contributing to a rapid spread of
disease.
Mohamed Dahir, CHW Supervisor of the Refugee Health
Unit (RHU) in Hargeisa told me that due to the sparse
distribution of people in pastoral society, when living
in close proximity to others, resistance to disease and
infection is lowered. In overcrowded Somali camps,
people began dying in alarming numbers.
In 1980, the UNHCR estimated the cost of the refugee
program in Somalia to be $120 million, in that year,
Somalia received 226 million pounds of food from the US.
Included in the food package were corn, bulgar, wheat
flour, sorghum, dried skim milk (DSM)
,
corn-soya meal
(CSM)
,
vegetable oil, rice, sugar, meat, dried fruit and
beans.
Tucker adds that:
"There were thousands of durable items as well, some
of them never before seen in Somalia: clothes,
cloth, blankets, tents, tarpaulins, radios,
refrigerators, generators, well-drilling rigs,
prefab houses, tractors, trucks, and dozens of new
cars, although primarily for the use of the
expatriates .
" (26)
Some of these items may not have been part of some
Somalis' experience, but it is chauvinistic for people to
read this quote and categorically assume backwardness or
a people uncivilized.
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The point Tucker makes is that one of the poorest
countries in the world was suddenly recipient to over
$100 million in food aid with no adequate infrastructure
to provide for its appropriate distribution. Tucker, a
CARE employee in Somalia, asserts that "as much as of
the relief aid was stolen before it could reach the
refugees. (27) The "London Observor" had a lower
estimate of 60<; The Philadelphia Enquirer quoted 50%.
During my work in Somalia, I found it difficult to
estimate how much aid was being diverted, and didn't
preoccupy myself with the task, although I did keep
records of expenditures as indicated in Chapter Five.
Development workers in Somalia often joked that the
refugee business was the best business in town. World
Bank statistics support this with figures showing that in
1980, dealing in food aid commodities was the largest
industry in the country, increasing the Gross National
Product (GNP) by 40%. My first reaction to the
"corruption" was that it was stealing, and had little
respect for those connected with it. However, I argue
that the international community brought this situation
on themselves by dumping $126 million dollars worth of
food into a circumstance they did not understand and into
a "food moving operation," (according to one USAID Food
Monitor)
:
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even filing^cabinlts°^\nvthin^ without
States would have been^ n o done with computers." (28)
UNHCR Representative to Somalia Otto Hagebuchle,
although exasperated with the
-headache- of Somalia,
admitted;
honest. If „e were
exploit this liLSlon'f"® ‘’® tempted to
huLnitaSan puwoser °T "th-
ere geared to national political aiml';‘"^'( 29 ^
One Somali colleague, Nuruddin explained it not in
national, political terms, rather in terms of clan:
'Each Somali has a clan. it ic; f , .family is hungry, i must feed it. You wSuld^dS^th^someone arrested me for feeding mv clan
( at IS called stealing) my clan would kill hiiriForeigners do not underhand ou? systel If yo^
tribar" Barrf
“"'^®tstand our polices which are
hf feeds his clan with refugee food ore loses respect and power." (30)
Nuruddin added that foreigners do not understand the
clan pressures that Somali officials work under; that if
they took the time to understand, they would know how the
power and hence the food moves among the family.
Not all Somalis agree with this opinion. One
colleague said Nuruddin overstates the issue by using the
clan as an excuse for profiteering. "it is corrupt
individuals, not our clans who are responsible for the
diversion." (30a)
Somalia was promoting a figure of 1,500,000 refugees
in their camps, with some figures as high as two million.
The National Refugee Commission (NRC) cited that most all
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Of these refugees were from the Ogaden. The World Atlas
census for the Ogaden is 600,000. The highest figure 1
have seen is 800,000 - one million of whom the authors
estimate 500,000 went to Somalia. (31) The Ogaden was by
no means depopulated and one need not be a mathematician
to realize there was considerable disparity between the
figures of the NRC and the Atlas Census figures.
By mid-1981, the emergency situation was over.
Copious rains had returned and development agencies were
beginning to think in terms of development rather than
basic issues of survival. Donor countries, particularly
in Europe, were upset at the inflated figures and gross
diversion of food. The blatant deception, in the words
of one CARE employee, made a mockery and a sham out of an
alleged crisis situation.
It is not an unreasonable request for planning
purposes to have an accurate count of the target
population, partioulary when the service being offered is
reputedly to keep people breathing. However, the Somali
government has to the present never permitted a
legitimate census of camp populations to happen.
The first UNHCR idea for census taking was to do an
aerial photographic survey of the camps. Expensive
photographic equipment was brought in, but the government
refused to cooperate with an aerial
"national security".
survey for reasons of
census in
The plan that was pursued was a national
the camps on ll November 1981. Expatriates working in
the country were quick to recognize that the immediate
goal of the government was to keep the refugee figures as
high as possible to ensure a surplus of aid. Somali
leadership was organized from the national level down to
camp officials and the refugees themselves to achieve
this end. There was no way a count could be taken that
would not be fraudulent. UNHCR went ahead as planned.
ome agency people, like Caraher with Community Aid
Abroad were openly threatened by Somali officials and
police to "stay off the streets" during the Census. (32)
The strategy for counting was for each camp resident
to dip their finger in a purple dye. The cleaning
antidote for the dye was a chlorine solution. Frank
Jantzen, Food Monitor with the HCR, said that all the
bottles of the chlorine solution were confiscated by the
Somali government well ahead of the census, to be
distributed in the camps for the counting, cleaning,
counting, cleaning, counting, cleaning etc. On the day
of the census, expatriate observers estimated that some
people came back as many as 10 to 15 times. When the
chlorine solution ran out, some people scraped the dye
off their fingernails to the point where their fingers
were bleeding, and returned to the census line. Somali
were fully aware of what was happening reported
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Chris Bentley, (SCF)
,
but none i:„peded the fraud.
I arrived in Somalia a year and a half later. Many
development workers were insulted and frustrated with
What they described as daily lies and deceit of the NRC,
the incompetence of the HCR, and the lack of resource
accountability of both. «,en I left in 1984 these same
ill-feelings remained.
common knowledge among most everyone I knew in the
refugee business in Somalia was that inflated numbers
were an opportune measure to attain greater amounts of
refugee assistance as well as greater sympathy and wider
news coverage in the international political arena. No
one knows the exact number of legitimate refugees in the
camps, and during my time in Somalia, no one took the
initiative to pursue it because it would have resulted in
punishment. A negotiated figure of 700,000 was agreed
to. After all, writes Miller, "when there is profit in
uncertainty, it is expedient to remain vague." ( 33 )
A refugee friend, Omer once said to me:
country has no friends. Your country onlyuses other countries for its own interests. Th^ is
fioht Somalia's friend. You want us tog Ethiopia because the Russians are there,do not matter. We know this.”
The permanent interest for the US, he explained, was to
keep Barre in power and have access to the ports and
Omer commented matter-of-factly
;
"For us, it has always been this way, whether athome with Selassie and Mengistu or here in Somalia.
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-n't. It „m
The state Department was well-aware that refugee
food was feeding Barre's army, sustaining the „SLF, soldto Kenya for a stronger ourrency, and otherwise helping
to reduce the Somali government. s Balance of payments
dofecrt. This conceivably made Barre-s government
Stronger.
It is true as well that the refugee business had an
enormous impact on economic activity in the country by
providing employment for thousands of people. Many jobs
were in the camps as logistics officers, storekeepers,
interpreters, and porters. UN, government, and NGO-s
utilized drivers, office personnel, assistants, inter-
preters, watchmen, and housekeepers. Port activities
require a number of logistical and labor positions to get
the ships Off-loaded and the food headed to its destina-
tion. Roads were built and repaired. Several others
Offered services to expatriates in hotels, restaurants,
clubs, communications, and transportation. Tucker
writes
:
2thin^he%"oma^res'L\uS:l^t^nL"°^
p^peuie'openf" ntr"
My experiences in the Horn in Kenya and Somalia lead
me to believe that US aid, be it Peace Corps in the
former or food for refugees in the latter, is tied to US
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"strategic considerations" in the region. From my
conversations with state Department and AID officials
these motives seem to be:
1 ) Maintaining access to Somali's military bases, which
in the summer of 1986 included access by South Africa to
these facilities, as well;
2) Stabilizing" Somalia's economy so that it
accommodates the west's market oriented system and;
3) Pushing US wheat surpluses with the intention of
creating a Somali dependency on US wheat.
( 35 )
Insurgency
Barre's survival strategies abetted by US security
and economic assistance may not be providing the
stability that either he or the US desires. Mohamoud
argues that massive military aid and the dumping of
economic assistance:
"...can be neither a basis for political stabilityin Somalia nor an alternative to a comprehensive USpolicy for the region." ( 37 )
This policy did not have favorable results for the US in
Ethiopia under Selassie or with the Shah in Iran.
Somalia's military based autocratic rule has no
place within its stucture for political dialogue or an
opposition party. Detention of anyone is arbitrary and
is solely designed to prevent political dissent. Power
and authority in the system is derived from loyalty to
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the leader,
having a:
Ahmed Samatar (1986) describes Somalia as
ecSnlmir^ln!Seing1s'Ss"g IS disastrously neglected.”
( 38 )
samatar asserts that Barre has lost legitimacy by
reinstituting historical rivalries among clans:
new lease of life to centrifugal ambitions.!.
thi lomaU connection forne b maii state elite was, and is. the ea<?vaccessibility to more military supplies tostrengthen their capabilities to figh? of?insurgents, and assure themselves of thedomestication of the rest of society.” ( 39 )
Okonkwo refers to this manipulation of family ties
as "clan based nepotism.” (40) Furthermore, he asserts:
"History demonstrates through its accounts ofnational developments, that unjust, repressive
regimes challenge a man's inherent desire for
and equity. Consequently such regimes asthe General's (Barre) invariably encounter
opposition from dedicated and determined
nationalists.” (41)
To my knowledge, the State Department has not
recognized that either of the two insurgent groups has a
strong following. The two groups do not cooperate with
each other. They are different factions composed of
166different clans from different parts of the country
Somali and „s authorities generally disavowed that the
SSDF had much backing among Somalis, rather that its
support came from Ethiopia, other sources say the SSDF
is strongly supported by Somali people in the South.
In the North there seemed to be significant support
for the SNM among Somalis, predominantly among the Issag
end issas. Popular support facilitated such major
undertakings as the succesful attacks on Handera prison
end the routing of a Somali army camp near Burao during
1984. There seemed to be general opposition as well to
Barre's recruitment and maintenance of Ogadeni people in
the Northwest.
us military and economic manipulation of their
country is a condition both of these groups are against.
The SNM resents the exploitation of the refugee program
to their exclusion and advocates ending the dependency
they say has been created.
African Confidential" (AC) views the SNM and SSDF
as proxy forces that Mengistu can utilize to fight
against Somalia's proxy army, the WSLF. AC regards the
DF as weak and of little mili- tary significance. The
SNM, IS seen as much stronger, evidenced by their
military achievements against Barre's army. Mengistu
gives tacit support to both groups because they
(particularly the SNM) are strong bargaining chips
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towards an Ogaden settlement.
some colleagues and writers say Barre is afraid of
growing SNM strength that will lead to a separatist
movement in the Northwest.
"African Confidential"
writes
:
EttlSpianfm?ght°fllof?he^;®“^°P^®'? ^he
extend control over local SNM to
the Ogaden and Eastern Haud ^^such^^^^°^at the expense of thfOgadeAi beSuL"of%hrx^dominance in the SNM Rn+- i-h t e Issaq
widespread Issag s^ira^^^r to a
Somalia. A senarate afar
^ movement in northern
Somalia and eS?ern E?h?nnla°”^°^K'^ northern
most." (42)
®®®te t iopia is what Barre fears
in a paper for the Wilson Center, ex-CIA analyst
Henze (1982) describes how the militarization of Somali's
economy (similar to the us economy) has come at the
expense of investing in Somalia's general public
services. He states:
taxino\r?i^ “ilitary expenditure was so
?an
economy that it was consuming morethan 150 percent of the export revenues andaccounted for nearly 70% of all imports.'" ( 43 )
Hunger, writes Abdi Samatar (1986)
:
manifestation of
a
^ significant degree the result of
The staS policies and practices...structure and state authorities are a dir-immediate impediment to economic growth, eco-omic development, and the assault on poverty.” ( 44 )
In 1983, I was told by an AID official that the
entire infrastructure of the refugee business operated at
an annual cost of $300 million. Just before leaving
Somalia in 1984, l asked an NRC official what would
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happen to the refugees if the food stopped coming. He
shrugged as if the answer were obvious, and not worth
discussing, "They all have places to go."
More Food
But the food kept coining as did more refugees in
1985. As people (mostly Oromo) fled to Somalia, other
ethnic groups (mostly from Tigray and Eritrea) were
leaving Ethiopia for the Sudan. They were fleeing
"villagization", the forced relocation program of the
Mengistu government. This movement of people was brought
to the attention of Europeans and United Statesians.
During the Spring of that year, "Live Aid" began to
rock and roll for the starving in Ethiopia; for the
refugees that were leaving their homes because they had
no food. The quotes from musicians such as Stills,
Ritchey, Geldorf, et.al. indicated no knowledge of the
fighting, burning of crops, and forced relocation; no
awareness of the dynamics of power and how millions of
dollars of food aid would be a violent weapon in the
hands of Mengistu Haile Mariam. (45)
Live Aid??? Aid sent to Ethiopia (food, trucks
etc.) is controlled by the Ethiopian government and they
are not going to feed the people they have been
intentionally starving, unless there is an ulterior
motive, like media coverage and relocation.
Seven, armed, anti-government groups are documented
as fighting within Ethiopia. The WSLF and EPLF make
nine. The strongest forces are among the Tigray and the
Eritreans in the north. It was Mengistu's plan to take
people from the north and relocate them elsewhere. The
objective was clear. By depopulating the war zone, he
would remove infrastructural support for the liberation
armies. By no means a new idea, the US had defoliated
and depopulated in VietNam and is presently performing
the same operation in Guatemala and El Salvador.
A high ranking AID official in the Ethiopian food
program is assured that Mengistu's intentions are good.
She told me:
people there. Of course noone wants to leave their home, but under the
?o’^brdone?""(4 6? "--thing had
A high ranking AID official in the Somali refugee
program doubts that crops were burned or that the
relocation was necessarily violent:
"It is not that easy to
came to Somalia because
Marxist-Leninist state,
•pull factor,
' the fact
waiting for them across
There is good evidence,
contention that Mengistu has
burn crops. These people
they don't want to live in a
That and what I call the
that food and water were
the border." (47)
however, that supports the
attempted to create a free
fire zone (scorched earth) in the north; that there has
been forced relocation of Tigrean and Oromo to facilitate
this, quite often at harvest time when crops were left in
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the fields. (47a)
I mentioned the scorched earth policy in Chapter
TWO. The comparison is striking with Operation Pheonix in
El Salvador. The US free fire zone in El Salvador has
resulted in 65,000 dead and over 20% of the population
displaced from their homes during the last 7 years. No
Live Aid concert for these people.
The greatest devastation in the Horn is in Eritrea
and Tigray, but in any area where there is resistance to
Mengistu, the consequence of hunger is a reality. The
hunger is not from drought, over-population, and poor
farm management as is often advertised. it is from
aerial bombing, burning of crops, forced relocation, and
an attempt by the Ethiopian government to otherwise
systematically destroy the infrastructure of any
opposition to Mengistu.
The only voluntary agency (to my knowledge) to speak
out against this policy has been the Belgian group,
Medecins Sans Frontiers (MSF or Doctors Without Borders)
.
They were expelled from Ethiopia in late 1985 for
publicly reporting that:
"100,000 had already been killed in the relocationprogram which aims to shift 1 1/2 million people in
uxX* (48)
Rony Brauman, president of MSF stated:
"The food donated by European countries and by theUSA IS instrumental in helping the regime's counter-insurgency strategy to concentrate the rural
population in relocation villages where they can be
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yutiiTxxias are severed." (49)
Hancock
( 1985 ) writes:
aid ItTtill ?h4 lelTlrltLllT^^ convenientsecurity problem posed by the
- Tigre and Wollo - should aic:o serious
scheduled to provide 4.^® the provinces
fodder for the resettlem^n? supplies of human
starved half L deaJh First
communities all over southern scattered
contumacious northeL^?^ ^
position to oppose the goveriLi?.
State Department, AID, and Food For Peace officials
Who I interviewed in Washington DC were almost unanimous
in their pride of having saved five or six million people
from starvation. Five people interviewed chose not to
comment on the political implications of food aid. six
said they saw no connection between Ethiopia's
villagization/resettlement policy and food assistance.
The bottom line for all but two State officials was that
the food went to the people it was intended for.
one economic advisor felt that the Ethiopians should
not have been given any food;
agfiriSr ’'anS themg ate , and then again later on. if thevnow, we won't have to do that." (51) ^ ®
The other official's bottom line was that food aid was
fighting communism.
Jason Clay of Cultural Survival strongly argues;
humanitarian assistance
attempted to systematically
ir I
causes of the present famine. Whilethe assistance, they claim, feeds the hungry, they
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as1i.L°ncf Whether their
conditions that led to tho°'^ exacerbate theWest is willing to fLd sta?^ino"rt^®”'^"®'asking how they came to Ho • -i-u without
evaluate whetter Welte^n condition or
alleviate those cnnHi-ni ssistance programs
monumental task in thi= a
Ethiopia is eltabUsMnf
system that will nr-oHur^^
a social and economic
generations ?o coni?»“(S2f
Clays analysis is consistent with US planning for
the region. The US does not want to see Mengistu
overthrown. Rather, the US wants to merely replace the
USSR as his primary benefactor, a process of weaning the
Dergue from their Soviet patrons. Mengistu is a military
dictator in the genre of other proxy rulers the US
maintains in exploited countries, and the State
Department feels they can work with him. According to
Jean Szymanski, Desk Officer for Ethiopia at the state
Department:
Ethion'i'a'^
*^° our relationship with
them?" tstr
continually making that known to
Turner and Clay both assert that it is this policy
that makes the US:
"...tacit accomplice in the Dergue's ruthless
the north, which are mainly
p nsible for the famine's persistence." (54)
Gebremichael writes:
The Soviet Union's military aid and the West's
relief aid to Ethiopia ... have helped Ethiopia tocarry out its war policy in Eritrea and to createmore social and political unrest in the country andregion as a whole." (55) ^
Chris Carter, Africa Program Coordinator for
Grassroots International concurs:
contrasting t!
also causing addItISSII^S«SaSfer"1Si"Sr"
'
Offers logistical backuo tn pin ^
campaigns."
( 55 )
^ Ethiopia s military
us food policy to Ethiopia is consistent with US
cooperation with Mengistu. There are well-established
relief agencies organized by and working among the
Eritreans, Tigray, and Oromo, but US support of their
work conflicts with US "strategic interests" in the
region. The HCR and most NGOs follow the same policy.
From 1984 to 86 the us sent more food to Ethiopia
than to any other country in Africa. Several writers and
Ethiopians, Somalis, and Eritreans with whom I have
spoken suggest that Mengistu would have been overthrown
by now if it were not for the food aid. The Somali and
Ethiopian Embassies in Washington have declined to
comment, state Department and AID officials who I have
interviewed disagree (if they comment on the subject)
that the food has had that much significance on the
longevity or strength of the Mengistu regime.
Most of the 3,500 tons of food per month that the
Relief Society for Tigray (REST) moves at night from the
Sudan into Tigray comes unofficially from the US. During
the summer of 1986 a shipment of 75 Mercedes trucks
increased the cross-border capacity by an estimated 60%.
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"African Confidential" writes
:
s;sg«-
League of Ticrr ?»\7 a.- t ( “^^^^^^“Leninist
1 j / irifluential with thp t^pt p^ -t-K *.would now seem out of the question.” (57^
The similarities between Mengistu and Barre in
manipulating food assistance are striking. m many
respects, Mengistu replayed in 1985 a scenario remini-
scent of Somalia in 1979. The USDA is always a willing
food donor because they face storage costs of us wheat
surpluses in the US of $25 billion. (58) They know it is
cheaper to send food to other countries. And the State
Department has long agreed with ex-Agriculture Secretary
Earl Butz that, "We can use food as a weapon."
( 59 )
Summary
US foreign policy has repeatedly illustrated an
inability to understand and accept the social and
political legitimacy behind liberation struggles
worldwide. US militarization in the Horn is no exception
to this naivete.
Chapter Three provides a brief an recent historical
perspective of Somalia, Ethiopia, and Eritrea. In order
to discuss and work towards durable solutions for
refugees in Somali camps it is necessary to understand
the regional and national policies that created the
refugees in the first place, and keep them (the ones that
exist) in the camps.
The notion of "durable solutions" is a key theme to
the community development program that is discussed in
the following chapter. The regional political dynamics
explained in Chapter Four may be easily superimposed on
those involved in the refugee business to better
understand the realities of the work.
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CHAPTER SIX
COMMUNITY development FOR SELF-RELIANCE
"Iskaa—Wax—u Qabso rspi -f—Vioi t
socialist principles of closely related to
resourcpc^ collective ownership of
and dSribCtion®"^ prodLtion
believe that the'strengtrof\hI >^evolution
on the strength of ^ government depends
natp in ^ ^ people who actively partici-
espeSi“%”^-^r:nd^
nformation and National Guidance, SDR (i)
^
"We have ways of
Suleiman Gulaid
making our people work forNRC 1984 (2)
us II
The UNHCR charter states that the organization
provides assistance and protection to refugees. Working
within this assistance component is an HCR Program
Officer for Education through whom funds are channeled
for school construction and the acquisition of materials
such as tables, chairs, books, and pencils. This is
formal education in a primary school setting.
Available in the area of nonformal education (NFE)
are millions of dollars for a community development
program. Community development programs theoretically
facilitate their participants in their quest for self-
reliance. Although self-reliance and community
development are regarded by many as educational process,
HCR/Somalia and the Somali government view these concepts
as having nothing at all to do with education, especially
in an empowering sense. (3)
As a developmental goal for refugees, the language
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of self-reliance and community development seems to have
originated with the NRC, although some in HCR say it was
decided upon by HCR/Geneva, presented to the NRC and then
given to the refugees.
Popular among benefactors in International
Development are catch words like self-help, income
generation, self-reliance, participation, and food for
work, all developmental approaches by definition in the
interest of refugees. However, if these concepts are not
well-understood and accepted, they can be used by people
in power to Increase their authority and control over a
selected population, in this case, refugees.
Why Community Development
The development slogan for Somalia since the
military coup in 1969 has been self-reliance. The
Ministry of Information has much publicity concerning
self-reliance "projects" through agriculture, literacy,
employment, and education, such that when the community
development package arrived, the rhetoric was consistent
with what already existed in the Somali Ministry of Local
Government and Rural Development;
Fundamental to rural development efforts envisaged
coming decade is the increased participation
of the rural population, including women and youth,through rural organizations and institutions at the
various levels. Increased rural participation willbe fostered in the decision making process toinfluence the nature, process, sequence, and imple-
mentation of natural rural development programs and
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rural development projects at various levels."
( 4 )
The Somali Ministry of Information and National Guidance
writes that self-reliance:
in active particinat i nn ***^fj? revolution believes
confidence!" • -achieved through mutual
Community development became the means to an end
called self-reliance which would be evident in the dur-
able solutions to refugee circumstances. No one in Soma-
lia ever provided me with a non-amorphous definition of
solutions. To some it meant sending the refugees
all back to Where they came from. To others it meant
finding a place for them to live within Somalia. To
others there would be no durable solutions until the USSR
and US ceased their military intervention in the region.
Understanding Community Development
There was confusion and disagreement over the
concept of self-reliance, as well. Helmut Langschwert
Head of the Sub Office (SO) HCR/Hargeisa
,
believed that
refugees did not have the intelligence to be self-
reliant. To many people in the State Department and AID,
self-reliance for Somalia or for refugees means having
cash on hand to buy US products. (6)
Refugees understood self-reliance in a functional
sense and attempted self-reliant initiatives when not
subjected to the authority of the SDR or the HCR. To
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self-reliance was a project designed by an
agency
.non Hunope,
.ustnaUa,
.sia, on
.ontn ;n„enica an.presented one day in a nefugee camp.
( 7 )
hen discussing the community development prognam
at IS impontant to emphasize that self-neliance is a
process, not a project. The newands of self-neliance aneintrinsic, not quantitative or something tangible which
can be measured, it is not the full stomach that implies
self-reliance, rather the power ofP a community to control
an adequate food supply for all fn inPPi- r to keep the stomach full.
Self-neliance is a condition, an attitude.
The hieranchial stnucture and autocnatic natune of
the HCR and the SOP stifle this pnocess. Pon nefugees to
take initiative in any sont of sel
.-determinant way is to
take a nisk. They may be threatened, beaten, annested,
drafted, lose thein nations, on in a few cases disappean.
(7a) The same may be said fon those who work with
refugees, although in the case of expatriates, they ane
usually either intimidated, transferred, lose their jobs,
or asked to leave the country.
Maslow built his pyramid with physiological and
safety needs at its base. He didn't use the term self-
reliance, but if he had, it would have been towards the
top of the structure.
Community development is impontant to HCR and the
SDR because in 1983 they received 38 million dollars for
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it, but only spent 23 million. To quote Langschwert:
yea?^Cl984)^wra;e going to spenrall o^-i^*not going to give any of it bLk this ?Le!" (”®
His idea (with Which I refused to cooperate) was for me
to write as many community development projects as
possible, the larger the better, to show that the money
was being spent. it would look very good on his record,
he told me, and local people would like him. From this
position perhaps a definition of community development as
perceived by the HCR can be extracted:
enha°SL°^"n^t^^,:°,^^n^,-ney an^^ so doing,
and control over the reci;iInS"^f
There is a slight contradiction between this
definition and Gajanayake's cited earlier. In fairness
to HCR, the preceding definition is presumption on my
part. When Langschwert asked about community development
I explained it to him in terms similar to Gajanayake-s.
His response was,
-You can't give people control who know
nothing." He once greeted three MCC community
development workers with a challenging "i don't believe
in this community development of yours.” ( 9 )
To understand the community development program in
Somalia one must understand power relationships within
the country. it is important to address how attitudes
are subordinate to and often shaped by the system. in
HCR, these attitudes are aristocratic with a persistent
184theme of top down planning. The basic theory of this
system is hierarchial or control by position. Decisions
are made by
-superiors., and are generally not guestionedhy people Who implement them and people who are recipient
of the consequences.
Neither is information readily shared. A degree of
power is assumed by those who are privilege to
information, as well as by those who exercise control
over important resources:
(10)
omeone to make a decision and do it."
For this reason perhaps, there was not one staff meeting
during my year's contract at the Hargeisa office.
A basic premise of the community development program
for self-reliance and durable solutions was that no
permanent structures were to be built in the camps, yet
one by one, the nine Northwest camps received permanent
cinder block schools and community development centers.
The plans for building the latter went from my office to
the camps without my knowledge. When I went to monitor
their construction in the nine camps, I discovered that
none of the camp commanders and certainly none of the
refugees knew the purpose of the buildings, one
colleague from a voluntary agency suggested that as long
as construction materials were coming into the camp it
meant financial gain and power for the camp commanders
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and there was
being built.
no need therefore to question why they were
Communities
In order for community development to function, one
must first have a community. As previously discussed, an
essential molecule of the community development formula
is that the community be a unit, that the focus not be on
select individuals or groups to the neglect of others.
In Somalia this is not the case. Camp residents
have diverse needs and wants based on their ethnicity,
national origin, gender, and class position. As
explained in Chapter Three, many people identified as
refugees in the camps are not refugees. Many are local
people, as well as the families of Somali herders who are
there as a consequence of manipulation.
The legitimate refugees from Ethiopia are primarily
concerned with security issues: protection from the
Somali army and fair rationing from section leaders.
USAID and the NRC estimate that 80% of the Somali camp
residents are herders. The men tend the herds following
traditional grazing patterns while the women and children
set up homes in the camps. The Ethiopians are
predominantly farmers and students.
A good example of this diversity of needs was a
scheduled youth meeting in Dari Ma'an camp on 26 August
1861983.
.hat
.orning the So.ali a™, had entered the ca.p
nd had removed at gun point 350 young men whom they
declared were all an„. deserters tahing the™ away in a
CARE truck. Later that morning when I arrived, the young
men (who otherwise would have been at th^o e organizational
meeting) were missing.
we had co»e to talh about income generation projects
for the unemployed, but everyone in attendence was
-Ployed as either a health worker, teacher, or adminis-
tratrvely with the government. Local Somalis from Boroma
attended and wanted guitars and other instruments for a
band. Refugees, on the other hand, wanted protection
from the army, although this was not spoken openly in
front of the camp commander who, armed with a rifle, had
assisted the army in the morning's recruitment.
My report was based on information from Chris and
Clare Rolfe, AFSC Representatives living in the camp, as
well as interviews with refugees and camp authorities.
When HCR received my report of the illegal seizure, they
took no action rather legitimized the army's behavior.
As it was explained to me by Deputy Representative
Onesima Silveira, "After all, it's their country. They
have a right to enter the camps." (H)
Aside from forced conscription, the greatest
discrimination against refugees in the Northwest was the
ethnocentrism against Oromo people, particularly those in
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section 22 in saba'ad oa.p „bo repeatedly were denied
their food rations on distribution day for six weeks
When 1 was told of this diversion, i reported it to HCK
hut HCK policy was that it was an internal affair and
'
Should be bandied by ca„p administration. (Sounds like
policy with the Burundi genocide. Chapter Two.)
Food distribution was every ten days. The diversion
continued, Oromo people complained, and HCR ignored them.
In early September, Regional Refugee Commissioner Botan
wrote a letter to the camp ordering the camp commander to
appoint a new section leader for the Oromos in Section
22. This was not done. On 7 October, Langschwert went
to the camp "to solve the problem," but there was no
Oromo interpreter present, which ultimately didn-t matter
because no Oromos or social workers were allowed to
participate. Langschwert told me that my presence was
not required either and afterwards said that camp
authorities would handle the problem. Later in the day I
went to section 22. Refugees told me that the next time
they were denied food they would march to the HCR office,
which they did two days later.
On 9 October 1983, 79 women and children and six
aged men, protested at HCR/Hargeisa. Questioned
separately, their stories were consistent, particularly
in relating that six lactating mothers had been separated
from their babies for confronting camp officials who in
188their words, »were stealing refugee food... The wo.en
were arrested and threatened with rape. That day i was
in charge of the office because Langschwert and Program
Officer Tayeb El Tayeb were out of town. On authority
from commissioner Botan and with a truck from blu/cake we
transported the refugees back to the camp. Eogistics
Officer Bashir went with us and participated in an open
forum for Section 22 in which residents decided to split
into two sub-sections. People who wanted to stay with
the present section leader did so. Those who were being
discriminated against elected a new section leader. A
problem festering for six weeks was settled in less than
an hour. Returning to the camp commander. s office, we
were greeted by about 60 representatives from other
sections of the camp. They reported intimidation and
threats from camp authorities, describing the withholding
Of food as terrorism. They called the camp commander a
criminal, explaining that refugees were forced to pay a
bribe for what was supposed to be free food.
The only camp with a sense of community is Darbi
Xore, the northern most camp in the country. It is a
community of Issas people, all local residents who were
assembled for their strategic, military position on the
Ethiopian border. The camp has a village aura to it with
herds of sheep and goats. Camp Commander Jeeh is the
local mayor making sure his community gets their piece of
189the refugee pie. According to
Monitors and other colleagues,
receives its alloted share from
conversations with Food
the local military base
every refugee food
distribut ion
.
^participation
in December 1983
, i „as asked to attend a meeting at
the Regional Ministry for Agriculture in Hargeisa to
discuss an upcoming training program for refugee farm
managers. Those in attendance were trying to decide on
the needs of farm managers so they could be taught
accordingly. Dan Gilrein, a community development worker
with MCC, and I each suggested that the question be put
to the farm managers so that they could tell us what
their needs were and by so doing help design their own
training. m front of three farm managers present at the
meeting, RAU Regional Director, Galbedi responded:
"If the farm managers could design their ownraining, then they didn't need a training." (12)
In the same vein was the meeting at HCR/Hargeisa
when Langschwert requested as many proposals as possible
as soon as possible to allocate community development
money. when I suggested that the proposals be done with
refugee participation since they knew better than we what
they needed, he responded that it would take too long to
do that, and besides, "Refugees are all beggars and
they'll take anything we give them."
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hen there were legitimate attempts at participation
for small-scale projects, they were often undercut by the
HCR. In January 1984 a refugee representative from
Saba. ad camp came to my office to explain a literacy
P g m they were beginning in four sections of the camp
(Saba
-ad had 24 sections), camp residents in these
sections had organized and collected money for a local
teacher to instruct their children. They were now
submitting a request for notebooks and pencils.
I considered this request reasonable, but when
presented to the community development committee, the
self-reliant component was removed entirely by agreeing
to pay the local teacher an increased salary out of HCR
community development money. This idea was put forth by
Langschwert and agreed to by Commissioner Botan and NRC
Planning Director Suleiman Gulai(i.
Arguments against this policy came from Bob Koepp
the Regional Representative for the World Food Program
(WFP) and me on the grounds that to pay the teacher's
salary was to undercut local initiative and create
dependency on the HCR bankroll, m this instance,
"democratic" procedures were conveniently used with a
resulting vote of 3-2.
None of the community development proposals of which
I was aware had any refugee input. One of the "official"
reasons for my removal from the Hargeisa office was my
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refusal to sit in a noo„ and write proposals for people(Langsohwerfs beggars, who knew nothing at all about the
projects. The water tank and poultry farm in Damka and
Blavo's road are cases in point.
At this same meeting mentioned above, I argued that
If the water tank were indeed a self-help, community
development project (as it was so labled,
, then that
meant that the camp residents had identified the water
tank as a need and were pursuing it as a viable project.
This was not the case, but Gulaid from the NRC made it
clear at this meeting, as he did in others that:
Again democracy prevailed in a 3-2 vote.
The most illustrative example of attitudes towards
refugee participation in community development was
revealed with HCR/Somalia Representative Blavo's road.
Langschwert returned to Hargeisa in January from a
meeting with Representative Blavo in Mogadisho and told
me that he was going to build a road for Blavo along the
border because:
wixi oe very pleased with me." (14)
Shortly after this conversation, "Blavo's Road" was
presented to the community development committee as a
self-help project.
Koepp (WFP) asked Langschwert what the refugees'
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in this pcn self-help project was. The reply
was that they would build the troad. Langschwert spoke
matter-of-factly
:
one ?or^im''?o®lSl’'®onr? shovels.
other for him tris4 Ihfr^ai! ^hemat m kes sense." (15)
I suggested that the refugees would not cotunit
themselves to donating free labor to a project that was
not in their interest.
Langschwert 's response to this was to pay them.
Koepp and I again both clarified that labor on a self-
help project is voluntary because the people who plan the
project see it as in their interest to work on it.
At this point, RRC Botan told Koepp that he didn't
know anything about Somalis. At least this is what
Gulaid's translation was. My Somali is not fluent, but I
don't think Botan said exactly that. Gulaid was more to
the point in his own words, "We have ways of making our
people work."
Koepp was furious over these remarks and was adamant
in saying, "Forcing people to work is not community
development," and read a short definition of self-reliant
development, a combination of Nyerere and Ghandi.
Gulaid held a lot of power at this meeting through
his fluency in both languages. I didn't completely
understand the translation he gave Botan, but after
Gulaid finished it, both men rose and left the meeting, a
193
democratic signal for adjournment.
Autocratic top-down delegation of authority is a
pervasive theme with HCR and the Somali government and is
typical Of Planning and decision making. if ft occurs
that a subordinate or refugee is asked an opinion, they
are often reluctant to give it for fear of ridicule or
ostracism and/or punishment as a troublemaker.
Self-Help Projects
As briefly mentioned above, self-help projects were
promoted as one strategy to "achieve" self-reliance.
Self-help, as earlier defined is directly linked to
participation with its concern for human worth and
dignity, as well as economic and political self-
determination; that people have control over decisions
affecting their lives and have the basic right of
realizing their potential as human beings.
A typical "self-help" project was realized through
the Food For Work (FFW) program. Food For Work is a
concept where people do community self-help projects and
receive food (sugar) as an incentive in lieu of cash
payments for their work. Food For Work didn't work if
one considers it as part of a self-reliance process,
because none of the projects were generated by refugees
who worked on them. Food For Work did work according to
Cohan (HCR Head of Sub Office) because. "It allowed us to
194do projects that otherwise would never have been done ••
U6, Koepp concurred, n don-t lihe using food all
but it can work ai- 4- • j-<^n . At least it worked till we
ran out of sugar." (17)
Both statements are true, but in their truthfulness
they are contrary to the process of self-reliance because
all Of the FFW projects were planned and administered By
the NRC. Three examples of FFW projects speak for
themselves
:
Latrines: There was a critical sanitation problem
in the camps due to refuse from garbage and excrement.
Public latrines were identified by the FFW committee
composed of United Nations and Somali government
employees as an important project. Camp residents dug
the latrines in exchange for sugar, after which the
latrines were either not used or misused. Pastoralists
found the latrines culturally unacceptable as it was
contrary for them to squat where someone else had
squatted before them.
So 1) the latrines were not used or 2 ) camp
residents would use the entire floor surface of the
latrine leaving it covered with excrement, 3) no one took
the responsibility for cleaning this excrement, and 4)
often the latrines were not dug deeply enough as their
purpose was not understood in the first place.
Camp residents who wanted latrines, dug their own at
their own expense.
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SEges: As the refugee program turned into a
business, the impact of people on the environment was
severe. Deforestation was a problem and rightly
identified as such by the FFW committee, but it was not
as important an issue to camp residents who thought they
were only doing temporary duty in Somalia. Local people
Planted the trees and received sugar for their work.
However, there was no sugar allocated to take care of the
trees. Administrators assumed that the trees would be
taken care of.
To Social worker Omer Abdulahi, the refugees were
only interested in sugar for their tea, not in the trees:
Food For Work projects are imposed projectsRefugees do not see the need for food s?orL
run“out' everything. if the 4ugar
that ™v*t
building stops. The way they think is
n?ant L ? i">P°rtant than a tree. I'u
Lkfcarl orit!° ^ have to
small, less than a meter tall trees are a long range
investment. To residents who see their stay as
temporary, a long term investment in a tree did not
receive priority.
There were frequent instances where construction of
a "self-help" school, community center, or feeding center
would come to a halt because of a lack of sugar. in Ary
Addys camp, the RHU food for work garden never got in the
ground. Said one CHW, "No sugar, no garden." (19) As
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ashir of IITT would often quip, "Refugees are treated
ants. Put a little sugar in front of them and you
can make them work for you." (20)
The Airstrip
: The classic example of the "self-
help" process as administered by HCR was the airstrip in
Darbi Xore. According to camp commander Jeeh,
Langschwert had asked him to build an airstrip because
Langschwert was getting his own plane. Jeeh was proud of
the airstrip as his was the only camp that had one. He
also saw it as a real self-help project because no sugar
used. When I asked him what the refugee motivation
was to build an airstrip for Helmut, he said he had told
his people it was important, and smiling, mentioned that
Langschwert had promised him a ride in his airplane.
Langschwert promised a number of people rides in an
airplane that never got off the ground.
Income Generation
In August of 1983, I was informed that the Hargeisa
office had 60,000 Somali Shillings (/=) available for
income generation projects that had to be spent by the
end of September. I was told by Langschwert to find
refugees who needed money for small businesses and give
It to them. In so many words, this is what the directive
said from Mogadisho. The goal appeared to be "to spend
There were no objectives or considerationsthe money .
"
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or small business assistance such as training in
management, marketing, bookkeeping, etc. There was no
monitoring procedure or evaluation component.
Neither was there much of an educative process to
determine the recipients. If one shoemaker was honest
and said there was no market, he was liable to be
considered lazy and not be considered for the money, if
the next shoemaker said there was a market, he would
as an applicant.
The social workers and I suggested to Langsohwert
that the grants be converted to a revolving loan fund
with no interest to pay back. As the money from one
business was repaid, it would be available for another
business in the community. He agreed even though he
considered the small loans a waste of time:
really hardworking, they wouldn't
without^!? startIt and make whatever it is they make." (21)
There was little cooperation from the camp
commanders in interviewing applicants, as they all had
their favorite small business entrepreneurs. in some
camps like Agabar and Las Dhure camp commanders
encouraged residents to create bogus businesses with
money requests in millions of Somali Shillings.
We decided on nine small businesses which received
between 6,000-7,000 /= each. The businesses included
bakers, blacksmiths, barbers, a chicken cooperative, and
198one sandlemaker
, albeii- a.
.
he competition from the plastic
Batas was fierce. (21a) The social workers and I
attempted to assist the loanees with some basic record
ceaping which included cost of materials, transportation
selling price, etc. to help organize to devise a
repayment schedule. This training program was abruptly
stopped When HCR/Mogadisho reiterated that the money be
given to the camp residents with no follow up activities.
Langschwert was never supportive of small scale
income generation activities, particularly in
agriculture. He felt that the refugee cooperative farm
in Tug wajale should be heavily mechanized or ceased to
exist. He suggested that the way to go would be to start
light industry in the camps:
^her^f^filrar^^b ^ here.
TheJ are i°r factory work.
unIL?fL hut they could do
about this." (22^"^^
cheaply. Someone should think
When Langschwert wasn’t dreaming in the corporate
world Of exploitation his ideas of appropriate community
development projects for the frontier outpost of Hargeisa
included:
popular"here''®^?n^rhr because television isn . in the next six months, we have to trainrefugees to put up tv antennas." ''''
2) "We have to get a color photo studio. it is onlv a
tToTai°VrU the Japanese mfrk^i"^
"
taken!
Somalis like to have their picture
3) "There is no place to get cheese. We can bring in an
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f^om the Swiss Aln*^ 4.
Holsteins, and train a"^f^LeTtna^°
=h:^L!°"t^ 3
,
I told Langschwart that Somalis generally did not
eat Cheese and there were practical reasons as to why
they did not. without breaking his train of thought, he
reasoned;
see"’?hem^el? It^^nd'^thev
and their families becauL Jhe foLigne?s
4) We could manufacture
get carbon dioxide fromhave a lot there."
mineral water here.
Europe or Saudi Arabia
We could
. They must
5) "There is no place
lenses and frames
optometrist .
" (24)
to get spectacles here,
and train someone to be
We need to
an
HCR.s obsession with bigness resulted in discrimi-
natory remarks by the organization against the small
scale projects of Action Aid, IDE, AFSC, and MCC. A
popular project in the Northwest camps was Action Aid's
mud stove program, i participated in the evaluation of
these stoves with VITA Director, Hank Cauley. Many women
commented favorably about their efficiency, reporting
that on the average, they now went for wood every ten
days instead of four. Yet Langschwert referred to the
stoves as "monuments to development that nobody used."
One volag worker believed HCR disliked these
organizations because they did not bring in large sums of
money for capital intensive projects that looked good in
HCR's monthly reports. Another colleague commented that
HCR viewed volag control over small scale projects as an
affront to their power.
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Refugee Health Unit (RHU)
When I arrived in Hargeisa, there was .uch disagree-
ment over the extent of malnutrition in the camps. The
RHU was arguing there was a malnutrition rate among
children of 13% and that more supplementary food assist-
ance was necessary, particularly dried whole milk (DWM)
.
Brigette Kohan, Head of the HCR Sub office was
adamant that there was no such malnutrition and that the
real reason for requesting DWM was for its value in the
marketplace. Spreading the camouflage of hunger was also
compatible with fact finding senators like John Danforth
who would make an appearance six months later with a
camera for snapshots of malnutrition and hunger for
Capitol hill.
The social workers and I were asked to check the
camps for evidence of malnutrition. with the exception
of a very few cases of Kwashiorkor (RHU identified maybe
3 cases to me) not only was there little sign of
malnutrition, there were no RHU records indicating
malnutrition in any of the camps. Record ledgers that I
saw were incomplete, inconsistent, contrived, and some
didn't exist. After the survey report was submitted,
there was no further suggestion of malnutrition.
The report increased the suspicion between Kohan and
201Mohamed Ali, Head of rhu in the Northwest. As I came to
Moha^ed AU better, I doubted that he had tried to
deceive the Interagency Council with false information
There was ample evidence in the report that suggested
that local community health workers (CHWs, were following
someone else's direction.
At the November 1983 Regional rhu meeting, Ali
Stressed:
wrmSirhLra%o"^d'|^^eiKanL°" collecting data,
with poor records indicates poor work®^ ‘(25°°'^
He also indicated that only half the camps had measuring
boards and many CHWs did not know how to use then
correctly.
The importance of relating this incident is that it
is a good illustration of the competitive and unharmonius
working relationships among agencies. Earlier in the
year the NRC had complained that the RHU had diverted a
significant quantity of drugs and cement. The HCR
obediently followed the NRC lead by accusing the RHU of
general mismanagement.
While the NRC was always pushing for more drugs and
rations, the RHU was thinking of nutrition in
preventative terms:
"The nutrition problem is one of education, not
rations. Parents must be told to feed their
children the same food as they eat... There is apositive relationship between the presence of amother at the supplementary feedings and her child'shealth. .. Skim milk is in the food basket and is
accompanied by sugar and oil to add to it." (26)
RHU was frequently critical of NRC and HCR inaction
or What they referred to as lack of policy concerning the
gees. on one occasion Mohamed Dahir (CHW Supervisor)
said to the NRC:
refugees, then\ou^should^let^th^^^^ theseyou snould let them go home." (27)
one RHU Official told me that there were no good
relationships between camp commanders and medical
officers
:
"The
^
camp commanders
use it for their own
the food, but we are
One CHW commented:
want more medicine so they canpurposes. They can easily takein charge of the medicine.
" (28)
Sicir^ofJ?cers^is®bar" ?he^ <=°™>”anders andpeople need medicine. The med?Sl omcefLyf^
aaed
food. if the supplementary food Lr theg , pregnant, and lactating is diverted bv theStorekeeper and the Medical Officer, Ihty slilTcomplain because they didn't get their share."
( 29 )
Two camp commanders spoke with similar disdain for the
RHU, particularly over the issue of cement:
600 sacks of cement from Xamar in a housein Hargeisa under control of RHU. it is
it?"''^t 3 o}^^
latrines, but they won't let us use
Refugee Agriculture Unit (RAU)
Similar to my RHU briefing, I was told the RAU could
not be trusted. As with my initial "assignment" with the
RHU, I was asked to do a similar survey of RAU farms in
the Northwest. Playing detective was not the „ost
ingratiating way of introducing myself to a community,
particularly when the evidence suggested that tools, Ind
other materials were at destinations other than what was
indicated on their travel vouchers.
in the competitive world of refugee business, the
RAU reported 23 hectares under cultivation in Ary Addys
camp When there were only 1 1/ 2 ; between 2 0-3 0 hectares
in Saba
-ad camp when there was less than one. Northwest
Regional RAU Director Galbedi often referred to refugee
farmers as lazy, particularly those in Saba
-ad. Abdirah-
man, a farm manager from another camp wrote a letter to
Galbedi requesting his alloted money for the refugee farm
project. He told me Galbedi threatened to fire him and
reduced his position to Assistant Farm Manager.
I was upset at the distortion and manipulation, but
what was more distressing was the system that fueled and
encouraged the competitiveness, defensiveness, and
misrepresentation among the agencies. Refugees in the
Northwest were tolerated by local Somalis to the extent
that local residents could gain from the refugee
business. In terms of settlement, Somalis did not want
to share their land with them.
Agriculture was to be the fulcrum for refugee
settlement in Somalia. RAU's projects were (with the
exception of the Tug Wajale farm) small scale and labor
203
204intensive
.
Settlement was to follow a small-scale
agricultural scheme of one hectare per
organization that favored large scale,
heavily mechanized farms was the HCR.
family
. The only
privately run, and
(31)
i^ettlement
In 1983, HCR/Somalia received 13 million dollars for
refugee settlement, on 1 October 1983 the Settlement
Committee met at the Agriculture Ministry in the
Northwest. Regional Agriculture Director Hassan held a
letter from the Assistant Minister for Agriculture
indicating that the government had "set aside land for
settlement." More specifically, Hassan said:
j;S£r;
Moqadisho^" ^ National Committee from
thi reolon ° ® committee to survey
niiT-oha^ Innds available to
unoccupLd?"
( 32
° surveyed must be
Dan Gilrein of MCC asked the appropriate question,
"Should there be refugees on the committee?" Hassan
replied:
"The Committee must be well-informed and haveknowledge of soil, therefore a refugee with noknowledge of agriculture would only mislead the
committee. We need a technical committee to
allocate the areas." (33)
If I were a refugee, I would want a refugee farmer
looking at the land I was going to be given. Ceres
writes
:
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officials and^agriSlturalist™^"^
understand tL
» <3.,
It was Clear that this land survey exercise was to
be an in-house affair with no intention of settling
refugees as a primary objective. w>en Gilrein suggested
that the Northwest Agricultural Development Project
(NWADP) be included on the committee, along with their
surveys, Hassan gave the idea little consideration saying
the surveys were incomplete. To my knowledge, NWADP was
never contacted.
The next committee meeting was 3 October. The
agenda included two items:
1) setting up a training program for farm managers geared
for refugee settlement. It was at this meeting that I
asked if it would be appropriate for the farm managers to
help with the training design. Galbedi replied smiling,
"If they can design their own training, then they don't
need the training," spoken in front of three farm
managers. Throughout the discussion, the farm managers
were referred to in the third person.
2) deciding whose vehicles would be used on what days and
Who would supply the petrol.
Musadaq Mohamed Mohamoud, Manager of the Northwest
Refugee Water Supply Unit (NWRWSU) was concerned about
the roles of the committee members. He identified his
role as
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urveying for water. Hassan added that "the NRC
and HCR are the political side of the co^ittee and the
Ministry of Agriculture will find the land." ( 35 , i did
not ask Hassan what
"political side of the coBunittee"
naant. it was understood that NRC and HCR would validate
the survey and all recommendations of the committee.
Half way through the meeting, Musadaq said he didn't
understand the obiectivec? o-f +-k« -j.oj otives of the committee, which was
logical because no objectives had been discussed.
Galbedi returned the conversation to the vehicles and
Objectives were not heard of again.
Hassan began the 8 October meeting by describing
five possible areas to settle 250,000 refugees. Everyone
in the room knew that 250,000 was a grossly fraudulent
figure. I posed that maybe not all of the refugees
wanted to settle; that maybe we should do a quick survey
of the camps to see what the number was. As soon as I
said this, I realized what a foolish remark it was To
do a survey in the camps was to set up a repeat
performance of the census fiasco of 1982.
Hassan replied, "If we know the area, then we can do
anything we like." (36)
El Tayeb of HCR commented "If we ask refugees before
we have the land, maybe they won't want it." ( 37 )
This is a possibility, i thought to myself. it was
also true that refugees may not want the land after you
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have it if it is poor or inaccessible land.
AS Hassan described the Damal area, he commented
that there was lots of room for settlement because no one
was there. m the Waxen and Bichi Valleys, he said there
were only Nomads grazing.
One need not be an agronomist to realize that the
reason there were no people in Damal was that there was
no water. Regardless of how many available hectares
there were in Waxen and Bichi, good grazing land does not
necessarily mean good farmland. Ali Jama was impatient
with these descriptions:
dLp ^ The sni? ? ^ ^ater. It is 300 meters
300^ of rain per year. We know this. Going therewill not change it... Tug Wajale has no water. We
climat^^^*
valleys have soil and water, * but the
til feasible. The handicaps there
moni-ho
arid no roads. it is very hot fourt s a year." (38)
This was the last settlement meeting I attended.
Seven months later at an Interagency meeting in Mogadisho
no apparent progress had been made. Hank Cauley of VITA
was concerned that no guidelines had been drawn up for
refugee input. Bashir, Director of IITT, questioned the
whole settlement policy and spoke for several of us:
"Have refugees been informed of your plans?... Interms of self-sufficiency, income generation, and
community development, this program is not in theinterest of the refugees. Income generation is notincome generation for the refugee. it is all
related to sugar. I think there is some abuse in
this concept. Shall we deal with something more
human? Self-reliance, as it is engineered here
makes people poorer." (39)
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An income generation meeting was scheduled for
Thursday and the lAC meeting was adjourned.
oucxai (-nange and the UNHCR
Rooted in Ghandian and Buddhist philosophies,
community development is regarded as a "respect for all
life" and "the dignity of the human being." (40)
Antithetical to this is the use of coercion, socio-
economic manipulation, physical force, and violence as
mechanisms to implement community development.
Community development is used by the SDR to extend
their domination of the refugee business. m this
endeavor, they receive HCR support. As a catalyst for
social change, the HCR is in a glaciatic time frame. The
status quo of an elite power structure is firmly
entrenched.
Very simply, in Somalia community development serves
those in control, those with wealth and power, not the
disenfranchised. Taking initiative to organize locally
in "empowering terms" can put you in jail, m the words
Of a refugee farmer from Damka:
take the time to organize and plantrieids If the camp commander has the right to takeour land from us once the crops begin to grow?" ( 41 )
HCR/Somalia views CD on a quantitative, macro scale
of building construction and the dollar amount spent on
large numbers of people. CD is not seen as a development
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strategy because HCR and the SDR do not agree with the
premise of local control over resources. This is one
primary reason why the small scale initiatives of apsc
MCC, and Action Aid were regularly discredited by the Hcn
with the exception of the Social Services Office headed
in turn by Wilhelm Damm and Mieke Weeda. All programming
is highly centralized with decisions made by upper level
UN and SDR Officials. There is virtually total disregard
for local involvement and participation.
This is not a difficult phenomenon to understand.
Being able to participate in a decision making process
and beyond this, to be able to actually be responsible
for making the decisions that affect you and your
community is a very powerful notion. Having power means
control and control within the Somali refugee business
means significant economic and political wealth. It is
understandable that the elite who control would be
threatened by the thought of sharing their wealth and
power with others.
The question that many of us in Somalia were
regularly dealing with was why HCR/Somalia supported such
a self-serving and oppressive system. People such as
Blavo and Langschwert have come under heavy criticism
from voluntary agencies and refugees, the US State
Department, as well as other UN organizations for not
taking a firm stand on refugee rights in the areas of
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protection and assistance. But as one colleague put it,
it wasn-t a matter of individuals, rather the system:
their job." ( 42 )
criticized for not doing
To extract from a dialogue in Belet Weyne between K.
Krishnan of care and Jane Cole of UNICEF, Krishnan
exclaimed that "hcr has no backbone.', cole was not an
apologist for HCR policy, but did defend the UN system
with the rationale that the UN is in Somalia at the
invitation of the Somali government and that the UN
Charter clearly stipulates that no UN organization is to
make national policy; that the UN is in the host country
to assist that country in a way that its national
government feels is most appropriate. (43) Only in this
way, it is argued, can the UN remain apolitical and
therefore neutral.
The gross contradiction is that the UN is very
political. As Freire insists, all education is
political. Therefore all the educative processes of
community development and self-reliance are political.
As far as the HCR is concerned, this is a weak argument
because the HCR does not see itself as an educational
organization. Neither does it view community development
as an educational process. According to Smyser, neither
is the HCR a development oriented organization.
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To not question the Somali government's refusal to
protect refugees from physical, psychological or sexual
abuse; to refuse issue of identification cards as is
required under international law; to blame its refugee
employees when detained and beaten by the Somali army; to
not question military impressment of refugees; to not
question inconsistencies and gross irregularities in the
distribution of food and other resources; to acquiesce to
Somali government whims is to support the Somali govern-
ment and in so doing facilitate oppression and perpetuate
dependency among the refugees. And this is extremely
political. One could conclude from all this that there
IS no theory for social change within the HCR because
there is no mechanism for social action.
One Who Learns, Teaches
...Serrer proverb
I never heard the Serrers use this proverb
reciprocally, that "one who teaches, learns," but the
persuasion behind both of these proverbs is that learning
and teaching are two way propositions. This two-way
communication is exciting when it happens. It is a self-
orienting, giving, and experiential educational process.
When two-way communication is thwarted or when it
just doesn't exist, it can be oppressive, destructive,
and life endangering. Physical, sexual, and
psychological harrassment speak for the education
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orientation of the Somali government. The fact that hcr
does not actively interrupt this oppression speaks for
their orientation as well.
The three social workers at HCR were responsible for
any attempt at education among the refugees. But when
the KSS is following you, the army is beating you up, and
your boss at HCR refers to you as a spy, it is not a
particularly easy setting in which to work, much less
work safely.
In research of mine from 1985, there was a feeling
among volag participants that:
"With HCR programs, there were no learners no
taking^place^»^°445
^^^^ matter, no education was
Although these sentiments aptly describe HCR/Somalia in
an institutional sense, it is important to recognize that
there were a few employees in the organization who were
genuinely concerned about the welfare of the people with
whom they worked. Unfortunately, these people had
neither power nor influence in terms of policy
formulation or implementation.
In Wilhelm Damm's final work report he wrote that
the NRC was administered with the mentality of people
supervising a concentration camp. Mieke Weeda, his
successor as Head of the Social Services Unit shared her
frustration at an HCR/NRC meeting in her office:
"Geneva's patience has run out with Somalia's lack
of accountability with everything.
. .Somali nationals
213don't want the refuaees
often soon fired Manv’^mif hired they are
are over-trained!
. .^hLr?e?r“ refugeesprisoners by the NSS ^^efugees are treated like
and out, bu? afLfawhile ?t S" refugees inOn a policy level it seems anymore,tration. On a practioPiT i to adminis-feel the problem are those^whn' people whothem." (45) ^ ^ to day with
Summary
Co^nity development is a greatly misunderstood
concept in Somalia. There is much discrepancy concerning
the matter, a discrepancy fueled by self-interest,
exploitation, and the political realities of the country.
The following chapter addresses a community development
workers' training program and will discuss the community
development program further.
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CHAPTER 7
training for community development
control who know nothing "Helmut Langschwert, HCR/Hargeisa (i)
community development as previously discussed is:
eA^^qieforthe® the abilities and
democratic processes and voluntary efforts."
( 2 )
In the 1980s, CD has become a fashionable term.
Donors like it because it is laced with democratic
rhetoric that is ethically easy to fund. Deciding on a
policy of community development, HCR must be careful not
to impose this educational alternative on systems and
people within these systems who do not understand it
and/or do not want it. An even greater prerequisite is
that HCR be committed to and understand the principles of
CD so they can effectively assist in the implementation
of CD programs.
This chapter discusses the planning, implementation,
and evaluation of three-week training program for
community development trainees in the Northwest. At the
time of this project (Jan-Feb 1984), I was a Field
Program Assistant for HCR/Somalia in Hargeisa. My
responsibilities involved protection and assistance
issues in the nine Northwest camps.
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Background
To better understand the context o-pv-unoe r f the community
development trainino it i cg, s necessary to briefly describe
a social work training that preceded it.
At HCR's invitiation. Dr. A.H. Shawky, professor of
social work at El Minya University in Egypt, traveled to
Somalia in June of 1982. The purpose of his visit was to
discuss the possibility of implementing a social work
training program for refugees. He met with
representatives from HCR, the NRC, the Ministry of
Education, and the Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs.
He was introduced to representatives from Africare, the
instructional Institute for Teacher Training (iitT)
,
and
some refugees from Mogadisho. He was permitted to visit
one refugee camp.
Shawky 's primary contact was Wilhelm Damm who was
the social Projects Officer for HCR/Mogadisho
. Damm and
Shawky outlined a proposed plan which included the
following areas of concern.
The Probl em
The problem as identified by Damm and Shawky was
that there were over one million refugees in Somalia, all
from the Ogaden and all there for political reasons:
They all suffer from alienation, fear, anxiety
anomie, uncertainty, and leisure. They suffer in
addition to complete dependency on the world
community to solve their problems."
( 3 )
It is convenient to stereotype people. It happens
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with refugees and it is misleading. The refugees are not
all from the Ogaden. Neither do they all suffer from the
above mentioned maladies, albeit a number of them do.
are great distinctions in power and access to
services among camp residents. To say there are over a
million refugees in Somalia is to greatly exaggerate the
g As already discussed, evidence suggests much
less than half of this number in the country.
Damm knew this, but to question the number would
have been to put his job in jeopardy, it is an example
of colluding with oppression through silence. It was a
constraint that he and I and everyone worked under.
The one part of this problem statement with which I
agree is the word dependency. Damm, Shawky, and I
discussed on more than one occassion what we considered
to be an intentional dependency perpetuated by both the
Somali Government and the HCR.
Proposed Sol nt inn
The HCR and NRC both agreed to appointing counselors
who would assist refugees with the following needs:
a) Handle their own personal problems effectively;
fellow refugees to lead a happy,holesome life while waiting for repatriation or
otherwise;
c) Plan realistically for their personal and collectivefuture
;
d) Exert all possible efforts to re-adjust to their new
circumstances; and
e) Co-operate with other professional workers to help
special groups such as women, children, the aged
and the handicapped. (4)
Training Obiectivpg;
It was planned that the social workers/counselors
would possibly be employed by the NRC, HCR, NGOs
Ministry of Education, and Ministry of labor and Social
Affairs, but ultimately they were assigned to only NRC
and HCR. They were expected to help refugees as
"stimulators, advisors, enablers, backers, promoters,
encouragers, teachers, resource persons, etc (IBID)
.
These were the proposed training objectives in the
planning paper. However, there were objectives more
important than these, which were not recognized as such,
in the training proposal. These included:
b) to teach
to become self-educators;
> n^wliSgrf-m-L“?t^a-?-^
---
geneSllL^t?::i rtL^roSnf
°in?rLtIon?"tf)'’°" translate their knowledge
In Shawky's June 83 evaluation report, he wrote:
dev^oc®'"®^^
objective of the training was to
able tc h
5f°dp of para-social workers who would beo help refugees to cope realisticallypositively, and independently with their difficultproblems; and help special cases in need forattention to be able to deal prductively and
courageously with life." (6)
There was no indication in the evaluation report as to
whether this objective had been met. There was, however,
a suggestion:
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Training objectives should be modified and spelled
out in a way that meets the actual needs of refugees
in Somalia. Accordinqlv thp r-r.i<= ,W.th refugees in SoullL sh:uId'L°rede?inec,!°’^
A Classroom discussion of '.coping realistically with
problems" and "dealing courageously with life" could have
little if any functional application in the camps. Openly
and honestly discussing these issues is to self-disclose
and become vulnerable, even among friends. A wrong
assumption to make was that these 15 trainees had a
common goal and purpose. Some were refugees - some were
not. They were from different countries, different
regions, and different ethnic groups.
Auspicpf^
The training was to be organized under the joint
auspices of the HCR, NRC, and Africare, but to my
knowledge the latter agency had little or no input.
Trainee?;
Refugee candidates were to be nominated by NRC, HCR,
The Ministry of Education, The Ministry of Labor and
Social Affairs, and NGOs involved with refugees. A
committee of representatives from HCR, NRC, and Africare
were to interview and select the trainees. This criteria
was used:
...basic perscpnal traits such as warmth, maturity
ability to relate to people and workith them, ability to help persons in trouble, and
willingness to make sacrifices when
needed.
. .whenever possible, secondery schoolgraduates."
The evaluation report included further criteria that the
candidates should satisfy;
a)
b)
c)
d)
e)
f)
( 8 )
represent different ethnic groups-represent both sexes;
^®9ions and ca^ps;1^4 --OX certificate,,
e se ected from younger citizens (20-35 years old).
Trainers
There was considerable concern as to who would train
the social workers. According to the NRC, no Somalis
were trained in social work, as this was a totally new
concept in the country. Neither were there expatriates
Who were trained in social work, only people who taught
related subjects. In the evaluation report it is noted
that the majority of the trainees thought that most of
these instructors "came unprepared to class."
( 9 )
In class, Shawky wanted an atmosphere of
participation, as he put great importance in class
discussions. He wanted:
leitu^P^^^nH^^'
unplanned, repetition between
tlachi4 contradiction between the
pe^le" (^0^ methodology of working with
Subi ect.s
Shawky 's set curriculum included the following
subj ects
:
a) Social-psycho problems of refugees;
b) Introduction to human behavior;
c) Introduction to working with people;
d) Introduction to counseling and guidance;
e) Introduction to informal education, methods, andtools;
f) Local and international
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resources for refugees;
g)
h)
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How to lead a discussion group;How to chair a meeting;
- How to address a group;
“ How to listen;
“ How to record;
- Recreational skills; and
To accomplish this material in a few weeks was an
ambitious endeavor. Shawky proposed the following work
schedule
:
I.
II.
III.
IV.
V.
fieirixperiencH'^''^'"' “^l^ssroom discussions of
work^®"^
months of supervised field
Final two weeks of classroom discussions of fieldexperience. (12) r r i
Shawky and Damm had hoped for a training center in a
refugee camp, but with none available, they settled for a
school in Mogadisho. The final evaluation report
Stipulated:
Future training should be done out of Mogadisho
nearer to refugee camps. The training of the firstbatch proved that the location of the training
center influences the selection process of the
candidates." (13)
Evaluation of Trainees
Evaluation was to be an on-going process. A final
exam measuring memorization was not considered
important. More emphasis was placed on the expression of
knowledge, skills, and attitudes such as:
a) ability to build positive and meaningful relationships
with staff and colleagues;
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b) ability to discuss in clasc: •
the point of view of others-
^ himself, and see
d\ follow;
e Liiity to concent^atr^® learning;
f) ability to
g) creativeness; ‘--‘veiy,
h) enthusiasm for work;
i) participation in extracurricular acri^/ir*i) regularity and punctuality U4^
activities:
The on-going evaluation, of course, was during the
trainees field work. Shawky's initial concerns about
having no trained social workers in Somalia were allayed
by the enthusiasm and responsibility of the expatriate
supervisors during the field experiences. Shawky
considered them;
"...quite useful in field supervision evenproperly trained as lo^dl Zrklts ^
orovid meeting with field supervisorsp e to be extremely useful." (15)
The expatriate supervisors considered the social
workers necessary for refugee work. They felt that the
trainees could carry productive responsibilities with
refugees if properly trained. They also stressed that
western standards and points of view should not be
imposed. Eleven of the 15 trainees completed the train-
ing and received certificates. Three of them were posted
at the Hargeisa SO where I was assigned in July 1983.
The four of us worked closely together on refugee
protection and assistance issues. The team that we built
had mutual respect and trust. This support was essential
as their job descriptions often put them in tense and
224potentially dangerous situations.
They had been mandated to deal with social issues
that included food distribution, access to water
construction materials, health services, forced
'
conscription of refugees into the Somali army, and daily
counseling of new and old refugees. The tasks they were
asked to perform and the services to render were
substantial. They were the
"go-betweens" and were often
caught in the middle. They would be authorized by HCR todo a task and then scapegoated when the consequence was
hegative. The most blatant of many examples of this was
on 2 Nov 1983. social worker Ismail Hussein was given
authorization to go to Agabar camp with driver Mohammed
Hassan. On their return to Hargeisa, they were stopped
by the Somali army, beaten as spies, and put in the
military stockade. The incident report I submitted to
HCR indicated that Hussein and Hassan had been authorized
by both HCR and the army to be on that road. They had
proper identification and were not violating any HCR or
SDR law or standard of conduct.
Langschwert took no action on this matter. m a
letter to Deputy Representative Onesima Silveira,
HCR/Mogadisho, he blamed the victims as being in
violation of HCR guidelines. The fact that they were
beaten would serve as their punishment and in so doing,
"teach them a lesson." (16) The potential for this type
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Of incident was a
could be discussed
daily pressure and not an agenda that
openly in a training program.
Wilhelm Damm was the only Mogadisho employee (at
that time) in either HCR or NRC who recognized these
difficulties, expressed a concern for the social workers
well being, and told them he appreciated their work. m
a memo to HCR/Geneva upon the completion of the social
work training, he wrote that:
had b:in plsSl'Ss^dii tr^ineef
wori"""" =°nsiLrable dlfliiul^ies
reluctlAt’trc'^°°
involved with social work was very
and"^--“®L^'^® devoteS'to tSir workd are worthy of patience and understanding." U 7 )
Planning the Training
Getting Acaua i ntpH
On 24 October, Damm and Shawky arrived in Hargeisa
to discuss the training of social workers in the
Northwest. They were accompanied most of the time by
M. Bulgas of the Somali National Security Service (NSS)
.
A meeting was arranged for them at the HCR office with
Hussein Samatar, RHU Training Consultant and me.
Shawky gave a brief description of his training
objectives which were basically the same as those from
his previous training program. He emphasized the role of
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social workers as community
was uneasy with the idea of
community educators because:
motivators/educators. Hussein
a training program for
"That is what Community HealthThey are specifically trained
education .
”
( is
)
Workers (CHW) do.
to do community
He was threatened by Shawky's training because he
envisioned the loss of his CHWs to the higher salaried
Community Development Workers (CDW) or social workers or
whatever title they would have. There was a definite
attitude that the two programs would be competing rather
than cooperating. He was asked by Shawky if the CHWs
could be trained to be more of a CDW persuasion. He
responded that there was a possibility because CHWs were
already in the community, but due to the RHU policy of
secrecy, they would not give you honest information
because refugees would be afraid of losing rations.
Hussein's words may be interpreted by suggesting that a
CDW would not have the loyalty of a CHW to the RHU
feeding and medical programs. Loyalty implies secrecy to
not reveal actual numbers of people who are being fed,
treated, and vaccinated. Further, Hussein was defensive
about an outsider telling the RHU how their CHWs should
do community work.
Shawky left this meeting with the impression that;
" local RHU officals in Hargeisa welcomed
cooperation with HCR for training CHWs in social
work methods." ( 19 )
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I however, agreed completely with Damm that
-Rm;
offering a polite refusal to cooperate."
( 20 )
This first meeting initiated a fear in both RHU and
IITT that the community development trainees (CDT, would
be recruited from their own CHWs and teachers. This was
a very legitimate concern because HCR was advertising a
salary of 1000/= (shillings, a month whereas CHWs and
IITT teachers were earning 400 and 500/= a month. Not
only was there a financial increment for them, but also
the aspect of further training in a professional area
that could lead to future employment, it had been
mentioned by HCR's three social workers that paying
1000/= a month to CDWs would probably make for jealous
and uncooperative teachers in the camps, but neither HCR
nor RRC gave this serious consideration.
This suspicion of the CDW training program never
abated because the conflict was never resolved, shawky
returned home to Egypt with a misunderstanding between
him and RHU which was never sorted out. At an RHU
monthly meeting this concern was aired by some of those
present. Mohamed Dahir and Hussein made it clear that
they did not want their CHWs participating in the
program. Dahir expressed the concern that:
SheSI are^iL'^r
not represent the camp population,eiks the traditional leaders and should be the
Se^H
I replied that to have a selection of trainees
representative of the camp population would result in 90
of them being women to which 1 had no objection, i
didn't get into the metaphysics of CD, but did explain
that the focus of the training was for the trainees to
assist the refugees in identifying their needs and to
facilitate their decision making. CD was a process, i
explained, that would allow refugees more control over
their lives. I welcomed their recommendations and
suggestions
.
During the interim from October to January misunder
standings and suspicions lingered with assumptions by
nearly everyone because no one (including myself) knew
for sure what was going to happen. It was further
complicated by intentional attempts by HCR and NRC to
undermine the program.
On 9 Nov 1983, Shawky asked me to assist with the
training. it was not clear whether the training was for
social workers or CD workers. As I was questioning him
on specifics, trying to focus on what my role was, he
became angry with me, accused me of trying to take his
program away from him, and added that he was not going to
return in 1984 to do the training unless he was
completely in charge. Damm smoothed things over, but in
the smoothing process, I was unclear as to the purpose,
objectives, and content of the training,
conflict resolved.
Neither was the
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At that point, my role in the training was vague
other than to arrange for teachers, but it wasn-t clear
What the subject matter was to include, nor how much time
to be allotted to each topic area. i requested that he
send me a copy of his curriculum so that I could find
teachers for the courses. His reply was that if i
couldn't find teachers, he would teach the material.
The following morning we met with HCR Representative
Blavo. It was agreed that Shawky was in charge of
curriculum and that I was to assist him. Langschwert was
responsible for the completion of the ELU/CARE food store
in Damka (Dam Refugee Camp) to be used as a dormitory,
and the construction of the CD Center in which we were to
have classrooms and office space.
Langschwert thought that Damm, Shawky, and I were
operating behind his back to keep him out of the train-
ing. He indicated his displeasure that afternoon when he
interrupted a meeting among Damm, Social Workers Douale,
Hussein, and Ibrahim, and me. He disrupted the meeting
by shouting at us that we didn-t need meetings and
sharing of information; that all we needed was for one
person to go ahead and do it. He did add, however that
he was in favor of the training for two reasons:
1) An excuse to finish construction of the food store in
Damka
;
2) Give him something to write about in his monthly
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reports. Daitim was exasperated with Langschwert
• s
belligerency and asked him simply and directly why he
refused to cooperate. His response was to leave the
room. I confided in Damm that once back in the Northwest
he would attempt to sabotage the program. Upon returning
to Hargeisa, Langschwert requested that I design a train-
ing program. i refused on the grounds that Blavo had
made it perfectly clear that the training curriculum was
to be Shawky's design and should not be interfered with.
t^d"™! Mogadisho that 1 can do it he
(22)
’
“°5adisho thinks I can do’ it."
When I asked him who in particular felt this way, he
indicated UNHCR Representative Blavo, "Blavo doesn't
think I can do it.”
I suggested that if it was of such personal
importance to him, that he put together his own proposal
and submit it to Blavo. it was my belief that if
Langschwert had a curriculum, he would send it to Shawky
with the intention of insulting him, and as a result have
him refuse to do the training. My refusal to design this
program was a continual source of conflict between us.
It had the unfortunate consequence of making his negative
attitude towards CD more negative and increasingly
strained our ability to work together. The last time it
came up was 27 December 1983, 19 days before the training
started. Langschwert had just returned from Mogadisho
where, he told me:
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pJogra^'tStend ^
was a good idet" ^^reed. He thought it
I responded that I had already given him an outline of
topics.
"NO," he replied, "„e have to put a training sched-
ule together to be able to use in case he doesn't come."
"Why wouldn't he come," i asked.
His reply was, "Maybe he'll change his mind."
I mentioned this conversation to Blavo a month
later. He was angry that Langschwert would say such a
thing, "I never said that," Blavo told me privately, "it
is a lie." ( 24 )
After the 27 December conversation, l immediately
sent a note to Damm explaining Langschwert
• s obsession
with the curriculum. I don't know what Damm said to
Blavo, but the latter sent a radio message to Langschwert
ordering him to be responsible only for the construction
of the two buildings and nothing else.
Damm, Shawky, and I had discussed in Mogadishu that
for the training to be most effective, it must have the
support and cooperation of the Hargeisa community,
including local government agencies, NGOs, RRC, and UN
organizations, but after this radio message from Blavo,
Langschwert ordered me to stop all public relations or
community education regarding the training.
assume
This was a clumsy posture for the HCR to
because it left several organizations uncertain about the
training, as well as not allowing me to do what ground-
work was necessary to arrange teachers. Langschwert then
told me that he would take care of the teachers which he
never did. Due to these uncertainties and contradictions
there were several areas of conflict.
The Trainefi!^
On 10 November at a meeting in Mogadisho with
Shirdon (Deputy Commissioner for NRC)
, Abdirahman (NRC
Counseling Unit), Damm, and me, it was agreed that there
be 30 students in the training. Twenty-three of these
were to come from the Northwest camps and seven were to
be from the CD unit at the regional levels (the proposed
supervisors of whom I knew nothing)
he criteria for students had previously been designated
by Shawky. it was suggested that the trainees:
^Lmps^
among refugees, preferably those living in
b) speak, write, and read English;
"with^rSugeel;
d) be at the secondery school level; and
e) be motivated ( 25 )
Social workers Douale, Hussein, and Ibrahim went to
the nine camps with application forms, leaving 10-15
applications with the camp commanders to distribute among
possible candidates. Where possible, meetings with youth
groups were organized to discuss the training, but the
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responsxbility for distributing and collecting the forms
remained with the camp commanders. Urban refugees were
invited to apply through RRC and HCR in Hargeisa.
Langschwerfs lack of cooperation was illustrated
with his dictum to Ibrahim to go to Darbi Xore, Dare
Ma-an, Tug Wajale, and Arabsiyo camps in one day with no
overnight. Langschwert knew it was 8-9 hours to Darbi
xore and one can assume 8-9 hours back to Hargeisa, not
including side trips to three other camps. He told
Ibrahim there was no need to discuss the forms, rather
just leave them with the camp commanders. He added that
there was no need for social workers to spend the night
in a camp, "stirring up trouble" and that Ibrahim could
leave at 4:00 A.M.
I explained to Langschwert that this was
unreasonable, it would mean that Ibrahim would be back
in Hargeisa sometime around midnight at the earliest
except that there were checkpoints which wouldn't allow
him to travel after 5:00 p.m. out of Borama. i also
expressed curiosity at this abrupt "change of policy"
which had previously criticized Hussein for being on a
different road {with authorization) at 5:00 p.m. and now
was allowing Ibrahim an unrequested extension of travel
time to circumvent a night or two in a camp. Langschwert
Changed his mind and Ibrahim spent
Darbi Xore and Dare Ma'an,
one night each in
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A week later, I accompanied Douale, Hussein, and
Ibrahim to some of the camps, interviewing the applicants
to have a personal knowledge of them, primarily to test
their English language ability, some of the camp
commanders had done nothing with the forms. There were
no applicants from Dare Ma'an. The Las Dhure commander
Haii Modu tried to persuade refugees not to apply. The«
was only one each from Darbe Xore, Tug Wajale, and
Arabsiyo hand picked by the camp commanders.
An overriding motivating factor for young men to
apply was the refugee conscription law, which was to go
into effect in January 1984. It stipulated that any
unemployed man between the ages of 15-40 regardless of
refugee status was subject to military service in the
Somali army. This was part of the Somali Government's
policy of refugee assimilation, Geneva Convention not-
withstanding. In some of my interviews, men in this age
group appeared desperate with fear of the Somali army.
During the application period we were in frequent
contact (3-4 times a week) with RRC Deputy Commissioner
Hiis and Commissioner Botan. Hiis had application forms
and we periodically checked in with him to see if he had
any names. He told us he had 15-17 interested refugees,
but never produced them.
The deadline for applicants was 17 December, but
Langschwert wanted to select on the 15th to "get it over
with.
”
235
Present with Langsohwert were Ibrahim, Hussein,
and I. It was suggested that either Botan or Hiis be
'
present, but Langsohwert indicated that Mohamed and
Hussein represented RRC and that we shouldn't "worry
about Botan", that he would "deal with Botan later." (26)
Of the 54 applicants, 24 were chosen, taken (I
think) by Langsohwert to Botan for approval and agreed
to. Langsohwert told us that he had told Botan that the
list was being sent to Mogadisho and that there were no
complaints. Two days later, Botan told Hussein that
Langsohwert had had no right to send any names. Deputy
commissioner Hiis had accused the social workers of doing
things behind his back which was completely untrue as
Hiis had always been informed of the prooedings.
Hiis shouted at Hussein that they only wanted to
work with HCR, not rrc to which Botan responded, "They
don't get paid, why should they want to work for RRC?"
The issue of the applicants was left unsettled.
Hiis wanted to check our list, plus he restated he had
15-17 of his own applicants. We returned on 20 December
and Hiis wanted to check our list again. Botan asked him
why he had to keep reohecking it to which Hiis replied,
"I have my own way of doing things."
On 21 December Hiis said there were complaints from
Agabar and Las Dhure camps about the application process
and therefore he was going to hold the applications until
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24 DeceMber. The two cahp colanders in question were
both in Hargeisa that day. vmen we asked ther, about
this, neither one knew what Hiis was talking about. Hiis
later changed his story on 26 Dece,„ber £ro» Agabar and
Las Dhure to Damka and Saba
-ad camps.
He told Langschwert that the social workers had gone
in to these camps without informing the camp commanders
and then passed out forms to their friends, an accusation
Which was totally unsubstantiated, yet with this
information, Langschwert berated the social workers for
causing trouble by by-passing the camp commanders,
therefore supporting Hiis- accusation; another example of
the social workers being discredited and scapegoated.
This was the day after Christmas. Langschwert
reminded me that I had refused to write the training
program, and if the program failed, it would be my
fault. He also told me to rewrite my performance report
to Geneva, it was too negative, he said,
-too much
conflict." He told me that he would have to criticize me
and besides, "Why have a fight? It'll look bad on your
record and you'll never get another job with the U.N." i
didn't change the report and Langschwert didn't send it.
Meanwhile, Hiis delayed the list for two weeks on
the grounds that it was a biased selection favoring
Oromos. Ibrahim confronted him with the fact that he
only wanted Ogadeni names. An RRC office worker
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confirmed this in early January, telling Ibrahim that
Hiis was intentionally discriminating against Oromos.
only eight of the 24 trainees were Oromo.
Hiis had previously made a similar accusation
against the recruitment of twelve refugee women for
vocational training in Hargeisa, claiming that they were
all oromo, when only one woman was of this ethnicity.
Two days before the training started. Camp Commander
Jeeh submitted the name of a person he wanted in the
training. There was no application and we knew nothing
other than he was Jeeh's friend. The selection committee
was opposed to his inclusion except for Langschwert who
wanted him even though two weeks earlier he had
exclaimed, "No more names. Everyone else is too late."
Democracy not withstanding, (4-1 against) he was put on
the list, but never appeared for the training.
The American Friends Service Committee (AFSC) had
requested that an employee of theirs who was involved
with CD be allowed to attend the training. He was
permitted to do so, but left for personal reasons during
the first week.
At the end of the first week of training, Sa'ada
Mohamed Afar, the only woman to apply, was admitted.
There had been a mix-up between her name and another
refugee who had been admitted by mistake. He was allowed
to stay. On day six of the training, Hiis sent six
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trainees to participate in the program. There were no
applications, but they were allowed to stay which was
done entirely for political reasons. One of the six {who
was an IITT teacher) wasn't interested and left on his
first day saying that he had "no idea what was going on,"
that he had been told to come by Hiis. Two others of the
six were also IITT teachers who had to leave when lITT
came to retreive them. One student was a CHW and the RHU
wanted him back. The CHW indicated he had quit his job
and was allowed to stay. This worsened relations with
IITT and RHU as a specific criteria had been not to allow
entry to any of their people either presently or
previously employed.
Hiis student number five spoke no English and did
not understand what was being said in class. Hiis
student number six was an NSS informant, as was one of
the IITT teachers who had been dismissed. The obvious
NSS prescence was a deterrent to open discussion, as well
the motivation of the late arrivals.
C. The Instructors
During the 9 November 83 meeting among Damm, Shawky,
and me, Shawky said he needed someone to do staff
development. To me staff development meant training
staff members to increase their level of information and
awareness about training philosophy, content, or to
increase training skills such as group facilitation or
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problem solving. i suggested it would be nice to have a
few days before the training coimnenoed to do this work.
When Shawky arrived on 14 January, he asked me ifi
had done staff development to which 1 replied that there
was no staff and explained why. it took a couple of days
for me to realize that Shawky and I had two different
meanings for staff development. To me it was training
staff. For him it was just finding them.
On the first complete day of training, 16 January,
Shawky told me I would be responsible for the study
groups and informal education. Seeking clarity, i asked
him to explain what he meant by informal education. His
description led me to comment that at U/Mass Center for
International Education we call that non formal educa-
tion. informal education is incidental and unstructured
and didn't seem to be what we wanted here. Reed concurs:
"Informal learning is not education
, it isunorganized, often unintended, and often lessconciously aimed at identified objectives."
( 27 )
He didn't appreciate the clarification so I dropped it.
He continued that we must find teachers for the
areas of Refugee Problems, Human Behavior, Working with
People, and Community Development skills. This was a
difficult task as their was still no schedule for the
training nor a concise description of what exact areas of
Human Behavior or CD (for example) should be addressed.
I shared with Shawky that there were several talented
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people in Hargeisa, but they needed direction as did 1
regarding content. i gave him some examples of what I
considered to be appropriate and was capable of doing,
stressing that 1 didn't want to duplicate material he had
planned for his classes, when I asked Shawky what his
curriculum entailed, he became very defensive and once
again expressed to me that I not try to take over his
program; that he had a Ph.D. from Columbia and knew what
he was doing. i assured him that I only wanted to know
What he was going to teach so that I could plan my
classes accordingly. He informed me that what he was to
do in his class sessions was his business and that he
likewise would not interfere with my sessions, to wit, "i
have nothing to do with your classes and you have nothing
to do with mine." (28) Throughout the training there was
no concept of a team approach.
To follow through on staff development as defined by
Shawky, all interested people were invited to discuss
their roles in the training. This meeting occurred on 22
January, day seven of a 20 day program, shawky drew up a
schedule for the remaining 13 days. Of the 58 available
class periods, he slotted eight for himself, nine for me,
two organizational meetings, two parties, and three stu-
dent evaluations done by the staff, plus one session with
Representative Blavo during his visit. The remaining 33
sessions were filled with 22 people from the community.
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Implementation
e 22 January meeting, Shawky addressed three
main issues relevant to the training program.
1 ) Condition of Refuaee.q
Shawky described refugees as:
"overdependent.
. .are totally insecure enHaccordingly unrer-t-;, -i m a d behave
future., n in their
2) ^at is Community Pevel
Shawky emphasized that:
is the key to community development
ch^nae R important as material
^
C a g
... Building a road is not necessariiv
process of woLing
whit irto°h^ problem, of planning^ done, teaches something about
^
democracy and builds the road at the same time.-
Bo le of the Commun ity Development Wn-rVo>-
development workers are stimulators,
ers ?hPv
planners, coordinators, teach-
.. T ey
_
assist communities towards self-help oraction where refugees organize to say what
y need. . .community development is a method...
a
£-^ i OCGS S •
Rather than addressing these areas, the main issue
for discussion was to whom the CD trainees would report;
who would supervise them. It had been Shawky 's intention
to have the supervision come from qualified expatriates
with community development experience who would work with
Somalis from the CD Units. It was his concern that CD
was a new phenomenon and needed strong guidance and
training, especially in the area of supervision, by
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Skilled people. AFSC, MCC, Action Aid, and HCR all had
enthusiastic and talented staff who wanted to become
involved and assist with the supervision.
Langschwert
- s idea was to keep expatriates from
having any Involvement with the trainees' supervision.
Privately, with Abdulahi Jama Samatar, Head of the CD
Team in the Northwest, it was agreed that that
arrangement would be followed. shawky was very upset
with this decision as he saw the CD Team as having-
philosophy behind the
.orr?-in?Ag L%“-pe\--
He was right on both counts. It allowed the HCR and nrc
to manipulate the program to fit their personal interests
while they simultaneously sabotaged the principles of CD.
Training Approach
Shawky 's training approach as described in his end of
training evaluation report was:
"...full time training in a camp like situation;intensive all day work; informal, but well-disciplined atmosphere; paper writing; smalldiscussion groups; problem solving approach; use offield case records; full participation; supervised
recreation; very close and warm attention totrainees; exchange of experiences among teaching
staff members." ( 30 )
As stated earlier, Shawky wanted:
No serious, unplanned repitition between lectures
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ssis-s ss;
Vet the lack of a team approach facilitated a lack
of continuity from session to session. Shawky was
generally not in the classroom if he was not teaching and
as a consequence was not exposed to contrary philosophies
of CD and to sessions which had nothing at all to do with
CD. This physical separation from what was being
discussed, or better said lectured, distracted from the
program's clarity and effectiveness, as well, of course
from the content. As I remember, Shawky sat in on only
seven sessions in which he was not the leader, three of
which were mine.
For example, Langschwert told the trainees that
refugees had to be c^vinced to do what was good for
them. "You have to convince them because it is in their
interest." (32) Suleiman Gulaid from NRC stated that
refugees could not express themselves and therefore you
had to plan for them, " Sitting in Mogadisho, l can tell
you what every refugee needs. l don't have to go to the
camp." This attitude was confusing and destructive.
The Northwest Region Agriculture Development Project
and The Muslim World League had well-planned sessions
that were clear, interesting, and informative, but for
the time and place, not particularly appropriate to the
needs of the training. in lieu of this, we could have
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included more work on CD skills, especially since so
little time was allotted to this area.
Another problem was the absenteeism of Gulaid and
Jana. Gulaid was present for only two of a scheduled six
hours during the first week. Jama Samatar was present
for only two of his five sessions and was frequently
criticized by shawky for having little visible interest
in the students.
The breakdown for the entire training follows:
Total number of instructional sessions = 67
.
The figures illustrate that over 55% of class time was
led by 24 different people, none of whom had any idea
what the whole of the training looked like and how they
integrated with other trainers. Many presenters had an
inadequate understanding of CD and a few didn't believe
in It. They were primarily agency directors and
representatives explaining their work in the Northwest.
Some merely introduced their organizations. Others
taught skills, i.e. administration, gardening,
statistics, etc.
The critical question raised by this data is
continuity from class to class. it has already been
mentioned that Shawky knew not what I was teaching and
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that I was only aware of his content by sitting in on his
lessons, similarly, the instructors from the community
only participated during their particular session and had
no first hand knowledge of what the others were doing
except for Lutful Kabir of CARE and B.P. sharma from the
Technical School, who planned their work together. i was
frustrated in trying to integrate and share the
presentations because I never knew exactly what Shawky
wanted nor did I want to duplicate his material.
The other end of this is that some important CD
skills were not being addressed at all. A significant
component of CD work is organizing and facilitating group
discussions, yet the trainees received virtually no
training in this area. Originally it was my intention to
emphasize this in the NFE classes, but as the training
progressed, it was my understanding that Shawky was going
to do this in his “Working with Groups" sessions. Not to
point a figure at anyone, it was a typical example of
poor communications between him and me.
January 22nd was the day when all prospective
teachers gathered and the only time such a meeting
occurred. it would have been a more effective meeting
had It been arranged before the start of the training.
Some people, like Jane Cole, Regional Director for
UNICEF, didn't know the training had begun and wondered
why no one had contacted her. Other organizations were
similarly confused.
246
There was a tendency among some people in the
Northwest to criticize Shawky for the confusion. On the
one hand, this is justified as he had not shared any
concrete planning concerning curriculum previous to his
arrival. However, HCR/Hargeisa could have reduced this
confusion considerably by projecting a more positive
attitude in a public relations/information sharing way.
Notable Incidents
The incentive for Jama and Gulaid and NRC in general
to participate in this training was financial, as well as
political. The refugee business, operates on the
principle of maximized accumulation. During the training
this was done through intimidation and manipulation.
At the first organizational meeting on day one. Jama
was absent. The students had many concerns that they
presented instead to Douale who worked closely with me on
the training. He passed them on to Jama who told Douale
he was to have nothing to do with the trainees. This
attitude was consistent with his lack of regard for the
trainees and the program. When present at the training,
he promoted neither discussion nor problem solving.
At the end of the first week of training, Shawky was
upset with Jama's abscence from the training. He was
also irritated that Jama hadn't paid the trainees their
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walk around allowance. Again, Douale was asked to find
him in Hargeisa and get the noney. This tine, Douale and
I were both acoussed by Jama of making trouble for him.
The following day, the students were upset over the
lack Of food and asked me how many Shillings had been
allocated in the budget. I told them to ask Jama since
ha was in charge of this. Three days later they asked me
again because Jama had not been available for comment.
Eighty Shillings a day for 28 days for 40 people had been
budgeted. The students complained to me that of this
3200/- a day, the cooks were receiving only 1000/= a day
for food. I shared this information with Shawky who
proceded to call me a trouble maker. Douale, Hussein,
and I suggested to the students that they bring up this
issue with Jama at the next organizational meeting. The
1000/= a day were never mentioned at the meeting, but it
was agreed to form a food committee of three student
representatives who would provide input into the
planning, but no action was ever taken.
A student food committee was part of the 1983 para-
social workers training and it had been our (HCR Program
Officer El Tayeb, the social workers, and I) intention to
incorporate it into this training, but Langschwert was
strongly against the idea of students having this
control, as he told El Tayeb and me, "They should have no
control, otherwise we should just give them the money."
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So Instead it went home with Jama Samatar.
Perhaps the most revealing incident of the training
began in a class session I was leading on self-reliance.
The discussion centered on whether political democracy or
economic democracy was the most critical first step in
initiating a democratic society. A few days later, I
received a warning letter from Langschwert accusing me of
causing trouble and interfering with the training.
Training Budget
The final training budget of 162,000/= was never
authorized nor did l ever see a copy of it. The
authorized budget I have included is for 159,890/=. The
line Item amounts came largely from the suggestion of
NRC/Mogadisho Director of Training, Jusuf Dunqal. The
accounts sheet of training expenditures from this budget
arrived in Mogadisho two months after the training
finished. It was accommpanied by neither vouchers nor
receipts. i discussed the irregularities of the budget
with Mieke Weeda, Head of HCR Social Services.
On 29 April 84 she sent a letter to Dunqal informing
him there were no vouchers or receipts accompanying the
expenditures statement. "You will note," she wrote, "the
discrepancies between the amount and lines in the
approved budget and the final accounts." No one was ever
held accountable nor any action taken regarding these
In the
discrepancies
.
Below is a copy of the original budget,
column to the right is my estimate of what was spent on
legitimate training needs. in August 1985 I sent a
letter to HCR/Mogadisho requesting a copy of the final
evaluation report with the statement of expenditures, but
received no reply. These figures illustrate that only
1/4 of the training budget was spent on the program.
CommunitY Development Training Program Budget Jan-Feb 84
DSA for 30 Trainees @ 20/=
Food 80/= @ day x 40 x 28-
Local Hirp
a day x 28
Budget
16,800
89 , 600
Librarian/Secretary § 70/= @ day x 28Secretary @ 70/= @ day x 28 I-
4 Group Leaders
Consultants each 350/day x 5
1 Training Director incentive
Cook 60/= /day x 28
Cook Ast. 50/= /day x 28
Language instruction 48 hrs. / 80/= -
1,960
4 ,800
1,750
2 , 000
1,680
1,400
3 , 840
Incentive Fund
0 Air Fare from Mogadisho
Towels 30 each 120/=
Recreational games
Miscellaneous and unanticipated
expenses
-14 , 000
— 3 , 600
— 3 , 600
— 1,500
15 . 000
159,890
Budget Increase 2 , 110
162 , 000
Spent
9,700
20,000
0
840
3 , 600
0
2 , 000
1,200
0
0
0
0
1,840
0
3 , 000
42 , 180
Evaluation
There were two evaluation periods; one circa day 10
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and one at the end of the training. The interviewers
were usually shawky, Douale, Hussein, and I. it was
during these sessions that Shawky 's caring for the
students usually surfaced as well as his frequent use of
the words dependency to describe what existed and
democracy to describe what was needed. There was no such
thing as failing a student, neither the Hiis students who
had no interest in CD, the NSS informant, nor the three
students who had no capacity with English and therefore
had no linguistic understanding of classroom activities.
The instructors were evaluated anonymously by the
students. The students expressed considerable across the
board appreciation for the training and instructors.
They were also, however, explicit in their distrust and
dislike for Samatar, Gulaid, Blavo, and Langschwert.
Conclusion
At the end of the last trainee evaluation interview,
Shawky turned to me and said, "My friend, we have
performed a miracle," but I was not sure what the miracle
was. Speaking subjectively, Shawky was very insecure in
his role. I think he felt threatened by HCR, NRC, and
me. I think he also felt great concern for the safety of
the social workers and the trainees. He had a strong
conviction to democratic principles and CD neither of
which were alive and well in Somalia, and this I'm sure
had him concerned with his own job security.
Mieke Weeda asked me in Mogadisho if this program
was worth continuing. My reply was that in its present
state, it only served to support the elite status quo of
NRC and HCR; that it now legitimized a corrupt CD program
which would exploit refugee aid to the personal
aggrandizement of the few who held power.
At an emotional level it meant a lot to the trainees
to have the educational experience, but as soon as Shawky
was gone and I was moved from the Northwest, the program
was coopted by HCR and NRC, two autocracies with no
interest in participatory processes.
A miracle? Certainly not of the Red Sea parting or
the 69 Mets variety. Actually, when 3/4 of your budget
is siphoned and you have no political base to prevent
that from happening, miracles are easy to come by.
Summary
This chapter has discussed the planning, design,
implementation, and evaluation of a training program for
community development workers in Northwest Somalia.
Similar to Chapter Five, Chapter Six illustrate the
contradictions and difficulties of doing a training.
It is important to recognize that the power relationships
present at the local level in this training program are
consistent with the political dynamics at the national
and regional levels.
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CHAPTER 8
ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSIONS
"We thought you werejournalist." Major
someone dangerous,
Daoud, April 1984
like a
( 1 )
"We Have a Big Mess Here"
When asked about the refugee program, Robert J.
Luneburg, Head of the US Food Program in Somalia in 1981,
had no doubts that it was dramatically wrong:
dis4st»i^'
record about that. It's a
breafuo'th^?r these people on a dole ando k up thei traditional relationships of familvand clan without ruining the society. it's ^
^ disaster. And the longer itgoes on, the more disastrous it is." (2)
UNHCR/Somalia Representative Hagenbuchle called the
program a "disservice to the people it was meant to aid."
"When you have a relief operation carrying on like
rhocf ;
must, to an extent, admit thepossibility, even the probability, that a
substantial number of people have been attractedbecause you
_ have a focal point. it may create amomentum which encourages people to come." ( 3 )
In December 1983, Assistant HCR Representative
Robert Smyser told volags in Hargeisa, "We have a big
mess here .
" ( 4 )
For Edward Rist, World Food Program Representative,
the refugee situation in Somalia was "a disaster."
"You know, a few days ago I did a big TV thing -
interview. Why didn't I tell the truth? Well, l
would have lost my job for one thing. But that's
not the point. The point is that if I'd told the
truth, the whole thing might have come crashing
down, and then what would happen?" (5)
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The truth.
.
.
255
An acquaintance of mine was once put under house
arrest in Hargeisa. Major Daoud of the Somali army later
apologized to her, "We are sorry, but we thought you were
someone dangerous, like a journalist."
My first day in Somalia I received a briefing from
HCR Deputy Representative, Onesima Silveira. I asked him
to clarify some of the ethnocentric issues and their
relationship to my work. He declined to offer any
explanation. "We do not talk about tribes," he said.
"Everything you need to know you will find out in
Hargeisa." End of briefing.
My next meeting with Silveira was initiated by a
report I had written concerning Somali military
recruitment of about 350 young men in Dari Ma'an refugee
camp (Chapter Five)
. silveira told me to leave the
Somali army alone, that this was their country and that
we could not tell them how to run it. when I asked if
recruiting of refugees was not against international law.
He replied that the people taken were all deserters.
Silveira added that when I learned how the UNHCR
operated, a person of my ability could have a very
successful career with the organization. "There are a
lot of benefits with the UN," he said, "A person can have
a nice career with them."
Although not stated, I understood that silence was
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Official policy. CARE food monitor reports were often
edited to be in suitable language when they left the
country. m January 1934, an official from HCR/Geneva
was visiting the HCR/Hargeisa office and ashed be about
food distribution. 1 shared some concerns that a food
monitor had discussed with me that weeh and suggested to
the HCR Official that he talk with the monitor. Before
returning to Geneva, he told me that the monitor had not
acknowledged some of the critical issues I had mentioned:
"It's not as bleak as you make it sound," he said.
I was stuck. I had committed the error of
discussing controversial elements of a colleague's
program with an outsider.
"Was he keeping something from me?" he inquired.
"I won't contest what the monitor told you," I replied,
but It would be good if you could experience a food
distribution.
"
Cramer writes:
compel this silence? the
mo™ 5
machine runs, after a while, on its ownmomentum.
. .Few will blow the whistle on their ownprograms. Would we ever see a relief grou^
erred?^^^* money. We may have
in any business, success is
life-saving intervention, well-publicized, that draws more donations and, hencemore contracts, more programs, more jobs." ( 6 )
Neal Kenny of SCF/Somalia compared his agency to a
business, stressing the importance of good publicity and
good exposure:
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after the same^refugee^doilar°as^ev^^^^^^ going
SsSL“~
room to move!°“nf
For Mark Masters, Team Leader for Interchurch
Response, business was going well:
here h “ ^ to be
it^rrhPh ^ booming business. I mean, for me 23It s t e business to be in now. You travel vou ael
for ?he Kxt six “p
our e^Senses are'taLn ca^e^Sl
Although I am always disgusted with media and
personal misinformation and deception, it was easy to
comprehend in Somalia as I came to understand the
different fears and interests with which people were
^P®^^ting, including the refugees.
Expatriates with the best of intentions found
security in silence. One health worker told me she
refused to answer a visitor's questions when she asked
about corruption. She was afraid it would become public
and less food would be sent to starving people.
I often thought of Freire's "culture of silence",
putting the HCR, State Department, and volags into this
context. Most foreigners in the refugee business in
Somalia had careers and organizations to protect. This
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preoccupation with personal protection and nurturance of
privilege precluded empowering themselves to confront a
power structure that was generally resented as unfair and
corrupt, for fear of reprisal. Refugees used similar
logic when deciding how to get involved with a project,
avoid controversy, or when to simply remain anonymous.’
Yet it is these government and NGOs that impose the
hetoric of self-reliance and empowerment on camp
populations without recognizing that they themselves are
neither empowered nor self-reliant to begin with.
The punishments for speaking out are real. HCR
Representative Art DeFehr was asked by the SDR to leave
When he requested more accountabilty of financial and
material resources.
HCR removed me from the Northwest border for
identifying irregularities with HCR policy and promoting
in their place alternative approaches that may have been
less wasteful, less harmful, and more self-determinant
for camp populations. During my contract with the HCR,
Geneva requested two reports from me concerning my work.
Neither left Somalia, as they were covered up by HCR
administration. My boss, Helmut Langschwert, later told
that he did it to 'protect' mei
had read your report, they wouldn't haveliked It and you would never have gotten a career
with the UN." (9)
The feeling of several agency people was that the
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refugee program was so overwhelming that individuals made
no difference; that the system was so entrenched and
lumbering, that one had to move with it at its own
velocity, merely reacting to its moods.
Hagenbuchle's Deputy saw the program as a long
' chain:
'
intervene, then you have to do
And Saris whK S S^doinr^wr^r^^
worst thing we could probably the
Michael Maren, Food Monitor for AID, was one of the
few and perhaps the most articulate in describing a
condition of self-rightousness, self-interest, and
naivete within the relief effort. Michael saw the food
diversion as a symptom of a much greater problem in
Somali society:
"You know, a volag or UNHCR or some expat team will
^ they SantSo d^And that plan takes on a life of its own. it
Sr-SiiS "" ^
For Maren, we were engineering a gross change in
Somali society, "and doing it, even with good intentions,
blindly and ignorantly." He considered the media's
cooperation with the volags as largely culpable for the
misrepresented images in the States and Europe. With
refeience to Kenny's (SCF) emphasis on the importance of
packaging the agency's product, Maren felt this was lying
by omission resulting in:
"...things that will turn this mass jumble of
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-ttlers, one
United Statesians live in an anesthetized society.
To deal with social realities, many dull their senses
with alcohol and pills. Many use the fantasies of
television soap operas and situation comedies while
nurturing their fears with the violent images of "Miami
Vice" and Rambo. others use their bank accounts to buy
self-esteem or rid themselves, upon seeing the picture of
a starving child, of middle class guilt.
The giving, says Maren, becomes self-perpetuating:
In**order^t
a voluntary agency needs is moneyord o get money they have to do somethino togive something. They have to come up wi^fproposals. They have to get grants.
They're under pressure to come up with oroiectsSuccess IS growth - doing more so you're gettinqmore, so you're giving more, having morl
result, which means more visibilitywhich means more money, which means more jobs to'proposals to offer, more desks, more
telex, or even an airplane anddirect phone links to New York,
creating needs. You create needs so you can
• -With the food you create a camp, which
water. It needs medical clinicsbecause these people have never lived in thisproximity and contagion. They need fuel for thefirst time because they can't find firewood for somany people.
You make need for sanitation, for transportation,for education in mass. And because the land cannot
support thousands of people in one place, they needfood in perpetuity. Which means roads and trucks
and fuel and storehouses and logistics men - all
needs the volags are jumping to fulfill.
And everthing that's added creates more need. in apoor country like Somalia, more means more foreign
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help. And that means more
Something is backward here
dependence
,
" (13)
not less.
Durable Solutions
Bob Koepp, Head of the WFP office in Hargeisa, used
to throw his hands in the air and say in both a joking
and serious way, "Just send them back where they came
from." It is well documented that the main influx of
camp populations were in 1979, a response to advertised
food in Somalia, not from the war in 1977-78. The camps
in 1987 are a result of this relief effort. Take away
the food and the camps may very well disappear.
It is a little ironic, but it was my Somali
colleagues who would admit, off the record, that everyone
in the camps had a place to go; that everyone had family;
that the clan would provide. it was Somalis who told me
of their herds in the Ogaden and occasionally returning
there for meat and milk. Somalis told me that as long as
the food comes, the country will take it, and smiling the
"I know you know" grin, that Barre will manipulate the
West for every gram of wheat flour he can.
I can not document that everyone has a place to go,
could well be the case. There were several Oromos
who mentioned to me that they would leave the country if
the Somali government would let them. Some expatriates
estimated maybe a few hundred or a few thousand Oromos
would need assistance in some form. The point is, they
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would emphasize, it is not one million, a high ranWng
AID official in Mogadisho estimates "maybe 100,000
refugees in the camps." Nine out of thirteen State, AID,
and FFP employees interviewed see food as the incentive
'
for refugees to come to and stay in Somalia, six of
these people replied that the Ogadenis are in Somalia as
support for Barre. The other interviewees declined to
respond to this question or said they didn-t know. (14)
AS Of April 1987, Somalia (according to AID and FFP)
has 14 months of grain reserves for everyone in the
country, much of this from their own agricultural
production. Now would be a very appropriate time to
begin cutting back the food. A reduction in food aid has
been suggested by some decision makers in Washington.
The 1985 allotment was 38,000 metric tons, in 1986 it was
35,000 metric tons. m 1987, 33,000 metric tons are
being sent. Twenty-three thousand metric tons are
planned for 1988.
While discussing these figures with AID people in
April 1987, a cable arrived from the SDR indicating a
food shortage in their country. Two refugee affairs
officials complained that Barre was trying to manipulate
more food from the US:
"He (Barre) does this. Whenever we talk about
cutting back food, he comes up with a crisis food
shortage situation. He knows that this ploy works
with some people here." (15)
In conjunction with the food reduction to Somalia,
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the US must stop giving food assistance to Colonel
Mengistu. If the US is seriously concerned with social
lustice and feeding the hungry, it will work with the
organizations of the liberation groups defending
themselves against Mengistu. However, for this to
happen, US policy in the region must change from
imperialism to one that supports the legitimacy of
autonomous and self-determinant movements. Similarly,
the role of the UN and volags must be re-examined to
clarify if they support oppressive governments or people
Struggling against these governments.
The Developers
The Washington Interviews were conducted at the
State Department Building and at the Arlington offices
for AID and FFP. I was surprised by the amount of time I
was given. People with whom I had appointments intro-
duced me to and gave me the names and numbers of other
contacts. My observation was that people wanted to talk
about their work. Usually within the first 5-10 minutes
of the interviews, the following comments were made:
"None of this is for attribution."
"Forget where you got this."
"I don't want my name anywhere in your book."
"If my name comes up in your work, I'll deny we had
this conversation."
"Keep me out of your bibliography."
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I want to remain anonymous."
All Of the people with whom I talked in Washington have
been given anonymity. Three people did not raise the
issue Of anonymity, but they are getting it in fairness
to everyone. The interviews became less guarded when
anonymity was promised, although I always felt the
interviewees were holding back.
There are many secrets in Washington; information
that is disguised and concealed. Who are the secrets
protecting? Does this covered up information protect you
and me? Does it protect refugees in the Horn? Or does
it protect the secret keepers?
On the Community Development questionnaire, 81% of
the respondents indicated that it is common for agencies
to cover up the truth through their silence,
unwillingness to confront authorities, or intentional
misrepresentation of facts. (16)
One State Department employee answered this statement:
It's common for everyone to do that if it isperceived to be in their best interests."
What does "best interests" mean? Does it mean some
people are silent because they recognize the benefits
they receive from being in a dominant position of
society, or because they are scared, or because they
actively collude with the oppression because they are
seduced and debased by the dehumanizing social and
economic values of the system for which they work?
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Ninety one percent of the respondents agreed that
there is active competition and suspicion among the
agencies.
( 17 )
one respondent who agreed with this statement wrote that
this suspicion must be viewed in another context:
about mistrust here where T
similar response.” °®P^'^ais, etc., I'd give a
This is a good point. Why should the political
dynamics of working with refugees in Somalia be different
from the business of health care in the US? What are the
ethical considerations for working with refugees in
Somalia and are they any different; should they be
different from the concerns we have when working in the
states? Maren has stated that refugee work is a
business, self-serving, incompetent, and corrupt, where
"We're all after the same refugee dollar," all after
power and control
.
In terms of community development, only one of the
questionnaire respondents thought refugees had the power
to identify problems and control their programs. (18) CD
was viewed to be mostly in the interest of the SDR. (19)
One respondent wrote:
"If community development schemes exist, they are
operating in a climate of NRC corruption, UNHCR
incompetence, and volag competition."
Among the Washington interviewees no one thought
that refugee projects were primarily in the interest of
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refugees. The main benefactor they thought, was the
Somali government. (20) No Washington respondent thought
that a community development program existed. One
State Department advisor stated that the primary
objective of programs in Somalia was to create a market
economy which would be in the interest of the US.
During the Iran-Contra Hearings, Secretary of state
Charles Schultz emphasized that us foreign policy existed
for the benefit of the United states and no one else. He
stressed that foreign aid was intended for those
countries who cooperated with the United States. He went
so far as to say that we should call foreign aid US aid
because its primary intent was to aid and strengthen the
United States rather than develop other countries.
This self-serving attitude is common among the
population working within the US foreign aid structure.
Consider the Peace Corps television promo that shows the
volunteer in Louga, Senegal stating, "I've made a lot of
friends here, but more important, I've made a lot of
friends for America."
Secretary Schultz agrees that aid is much more a
matter of promoting strategies to meet US political and
economic objectives. Aid can safeguard these interests
by rewarding friends and penalising "enemies".
Representative Broomfield from the Hearings Committee
concurred with Schultz, "Let's look at foreign policy as
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'that's good for America."
us aid is a way of opening up markets be it with
high technology or food assistance. Hayter and Watson
suggest:
"Once a country has imported a steel mill nr- -raiir
for
,
imports fr^^"?^: s^rsoSrcl!" LanSo^^f""
If the aid had not been avai^abll irtL°firsl
oases' have"be®’'^^^®c , been provided from local sources." (21)
US aid IS also a mechanism to inhibit ("rollback")
social, political, and economic reform movements in
exploited countries, while controlling and reinforcing
governments that are considered cooperative. m January
88, Eliot Abrams was in Central America telling
governments in the region to support the Contras or else
US aid to these countries would be cut off. (22)
When Charles Wick was appointed as Reagan's director
of USIA, he commented that it was an excellent position
from which to fight communism. Under Wick, the intent of
USIA programming has been to reward elites from
cooperating countries. in January 1987, "The Guardian"
recognized Charles Wick as "Anti-communist of the year"
in the Reagan administration.
US aid in Somalia supports the Barre government
while simultaneously creating dependency on wheat flour
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and arms, although Barre is upset with the type of
weaponry he has been receiving from the US so has gone to
China and Romania for other weapons. (23) six of 13
Washington interviewees agreed that US refugee assistance
to Somalia is creating dependency. Five of 13 disagreed,
two Of Whom said the assistance is creating markets. Two’
people didn't know. (24)
Nine of these 13 said that food was the incentive
for refugees to go to Somalia. Three said
Marxism/Leninism and one person said the drought.
( 25 )
Responding to the guestion:
Are the Ogadenis in Somalia for the expresspurpose of supporting the Barre government?
Six out of six Washington respondents answered "yes."
Volags Are Nice People But,
One NRC official in Somalia commented:
Volags are nice people and they mean well, but theydo not know more than we do about our people.Somalis know what is best for Somalia, notforeigners .
"
Shawcross writes of Thailand:
The Prime Minister added that food for the new
arrivals should be
_ bought in Thailand. It would be
by Thais. He did not want any foreign
relief officials in the field. "Send the supplies
to us. We will do it." Then in a remark which
summed up what officials in third-world countries
often feel about international humanitarian
agencies, he said, "Refugee officials are wonderful
but unrealistic and only look at one aspect." This
was a clash of priorities which was to occur again
and again throughout the Cambodian drama, as through
many others." (26)
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So what doss thic; ^i- iis say to the agencies and
individuals working within the parameters of US foreign
policy, as well as the social, economic, and political
realities of a recipient country? How effective can an
agency or an individual be in this system?
rian Walker, Director General of Oxfam in 1979,
stated that all agencies should accept the conditions set
by host countries:
"I think all agencies that are guests in any countrvmust accept what is laid down by the government of
^
This was operational policy for UNHCR/Somalia and led to
much criticism by voluntary agencies that rebuked the HCR
for having no backbone, because all the volags were under
the HCR umbrella.
The Politics of Aid
After the Cuban revolution, Fanon wrote that the US
would have to actively work to establish a counter-
revolutionary force in the Caribbean and Central America
if they wanted to prevent other Cubas from happening.
"Progressives" in the Kennedy administration saw Peace
Corps and the Alliance for Progress as an alternative, a
strategy under the guise of benevolence to contain the
contagion of liberation movements in the region. ( 28 )
My experiences with agricultural extension and rural
development work with Peace Corps in Colombia and Senegal
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were weak attempts at taking the edge off poverty by
participating in bogus rural assistance programs that
gave neither political nor economic power to people. On
the contrary, these programs often resulted in debt and
loss of land for the poor.
When democratic reform movements have occurred in
Latin America, the US has been quick to respond with
military force. The US invasion of the Dominican
Republic in 1965 with 20,000 troops (up from 1900
soldiers when the US attacked in 1911) was an obvious US
preference for fascism as opposed to a democratic
government that would have been more difficult to
control. (29)
Dominican Republic President Juan Bosch was not a
military threat. Neither was Fidel Castro nor Arbenz in
1954. The threat, of course, is an economic and
political model that can be followed by other countries
if these models are allowed to succeed. These models
threaten the "strategic interests" of the United States
because they threaten imperial control as defended by
wing dictatorships in exploited countries.
Understanding this premise, it is easier to
understand why foreign aid is used to pay off our proxies
and why it is withheld to punish alternative economic
models. Castro in Cuba, Manley in Jamaica, Goulart in
Brazil, Cheddi Jagan in Guyana, Popular Unity in Chile,
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he New Jewel Movement in Grenada, and the Sandinistas in
Nicaragua are a few examples of the US cancelling foreign
aid in an attempt to destabilze a country.
When we were in New Zealand in November 1984, the
Lange government declared that their ports and sea lanes
would not permit ships carrying nuclear weapons. The
immediate response of the Reagan administration was that
Lange's government was influenced by communist elements.
The us discussed sanctions against New Zealand
agricultural products, and ultimately excluded New
Zealand from military manuvers and the sharing of
intelligence as provided for under the Anzus Treaty.
The following month, in Fiji, my impression was
Fijians wanted the Ratu government to declare a nuclear
free Fiji. Prime Minister Ratu was in Washington at that
time telling Reagan that his nuclear warships would
always be welcome in Fijian harbors.
Fijians told me their island was economically
dependent on the US; that Ratu knew if he didn't obey
Reagan, the US would delay food shipments (primarily
wheat flour)
,
and cancel the bilateral agreement to buy
Fijian sugar, which the US did anyway.
In 1987, Fijians elected a new prime minister, Dr.
Timoci Bavadra who advocated a nuclear free Fiji. He was
promptly overthrown by the CIA with John Singlaub in
attendance. (30) The Reagan government had no comment
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other than to say it was a racial incident
Blacks overthrew the Indians.
in which the
A 1988 reality is that most United Statesians avoid
dealing with the global destructiveness wrought by this
country, our educational system lulls us into the
complacent thinking that it is other peoples, other
races, and other cultures that are destroying each other
and themselves from within. United Statesians are
conditioned to be oblivious or to misunderstand this
destruction in other countries, as well as the self-
destruction in our own society.
Orwell understated the degree to which the thought
police could control US society. From "Dragnet" to "Dick
Tracy" i learned to be suspicious of difference. My
earliest images of Black, Asian, and Native people framed
them in terms inferior to whites. Foreigners were
inferior to people (white ones) born in the United
States. Notions of superiority deeply rooted in a
citizenry are essential to orchestrate a foreign policy
mooted in the ideology of empire.
It allows, for example, the notion that the United
States is above international law and can therefore
delegate legality in its own terms. (31) it legitimizes
rape, torture, and murder by proxy armies and death
squads in the name of a "free" world. It also
facilitates self-rightous and condescending attitudes and
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bohavioirs towaird the poor".
Development workers should be educators for social
responsibility. The historical context of US oppression
in terms of race, class, and gender must be understood.
The oppression is systemic, rather than the work of
individuals, but it is individuals who keep the system
going with naive band aid approaches to social change.
US international aid programs are similar to social
assistance programs in the US in that they are necessary
for the corporate warfare/welfare state to take the edge
off poverty. It is an attempt to clean up the plantation
just enough so the slaves won't revolt. Some of the poor
may become less desperate. Some slip through the cracks
to become active consumers in the economy, which is
necessary to maintain the vision and myth of upward
mobilization, but power relationships do not change.
Liberals advocating social change become
implementers of these programs and are simultaneously
coopted. For the wealthy, social assistance is small
change and is necessary for the rich to maintain their
power and privilege in a system offering no significant
economic and political alternatives for the poor.
Self-Reliance
The key word in the Somali refugee business is self-
reliance. The US is not a self-reliant nation. Why
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should they promote a policy that refugees in Somalia be
self-reliant?
Seventy-four percent of the respondents do not view
self-reliance as a feasible development objective in the
refugee camps, 71 % strongly disagreeing. One volag
wrote, "Refugees and self-reliance are two terms that
contradict each other."
Another volag worker wrote;
projects will make any difference
the refugees' oSn
not^sure
didn't apply themselvis. I'mif that was out of fear or if they justwanted everything given. ^ ^ ^
The government (Somali) was against most of thesesmall projects. They wanted big moneyprojects.
. .The only way to make refugees self-reliant IS to get them out of the camps."
An AID respondent wrote that a real "burden" is put
on the term self-reliance:
"I think if you separate the buzz word from the realword you get two different answers. Refugee
encampments on foreign (if i way) soil do not allowfor freedom of choice or self-reliance, per se.Money is sent in to support people who await a
^ political - solution. That goes for
all buzz word" programs; "Community development",
"self-reliance", "self-sufficiency", etc.
On another plane, however, I think they offer ajustifiable form of relief activity - once you'vedefined the parameters. These projects target
economic assistance in ways which potentially
broaden the dispersion of such assistance. Simply,
these projects realize that people in captivity will
get assistance, and some of it is better tied to
needs other than food and shelter. It will lead tobusy work, skewed implementation objectives, power
conflicts and no small sum of diversion, but it is
not worse in this regard than other assistance to
artificially constructed populations."
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I do not deny that an element of human concern is
involved with foreign aid. There is David Crosby (1968)
"We can save the world, it's dying," idealism combined
with activism. There is the self-rightous "Somethings are
worth saving" Peace Corps add displaying a globe thrown
away in a waste basket. There is middle class guilt, "I
have so much, the least I can do is give up two years of
my life for these people."
( 32 )
There are others who are well-aware they are doing
nicely on the gravy train, "There is a lot of money to be
made in the development pie and I want my slice." ( 33 )
The Point
The point of this dissertation is to share my
experiences. The point is to raise questions to help
development workers "pack to go" or maybe unpack. The
point is n^ to tell people they shouldn't work for the
UN, a volag, or the US Government.
For me the deciding issue is power. As a change
agent, as an educator for social responsibility, I have
more power here in the US than in any other country. My
sphere of influence is the US. I write letters and
articles, I teach, do trainings and presentations, lead
workshops, vote
,
organize, and am in the streets (or in
the case of General Dynamics in the Groton River with the
Peace Navy) to protest illegal actions and injustice for
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Which this country is responsible.
I do not have these forms of expression in Somalia
or El Salvador. My power to change US policy in the Horn
or in Central America is here in the States.
I will continue to work in other countries, but with
organizations that are in solidarity with governments I
can support. I will return to Nicaragua or work with the
FMLN, but not with US foreign aid that supports the
contras or Duarte.
USAID and USIA do not support liberation movements
such as the ANC, Sahrawi, and the EPLF. They do support
"controlled villages", homelands, and the generals in
Central America. The US government chooses to work with
South Africa and Ethiopia. It is their choice. I choose
differently.
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COLATED DATA FROM WASHINGTON INTERVIEWS
The following questions were primary areas of
discussion. There are different numbers of responses for
different questions because not all interviews addressed
the same issues.
1. Is self-reliance a feasible objective in Somali
refugee camps?
Yes 0-0% No 11 - 85% Don't Know 2 - 15%
2. Is refugee assistance creating dependency?
Yes 6-46% No 5 - 38% Don't Know 2 - 15%
3. Was food aid sent to Ethiopia in 1985 to wean
Mengistu from the USSR to the US?
Yes 0 - 0%, No 7 - 70%, Maybe 1 - 10%, Didn't work 2-20%
4. What is the incentive for Ethiopians to leave their
country for Somalia?
Refugee food 9 - 69%, Marxism/Leninism 3 - 23 %
Drought 1-8%
5. Is it politically expedient for Barre to have a large
number of Ogadeni refugees in Somalia for support?
Yes 6 - 100%
6. Is food aid to Somalia a disincentive to local
farmers because it competes with their production?
Yes 3 - 60% No 1 - 20% Don't Know 1 - 20%
7. In whose interest are refugee projects?
SDR 2 - 40%, HCR 1 - 20%, US 1 - 20%, Business 1 - 20%
Appendix B
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COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT QUESTIONNAIRE LETTER
concerning «ith some of you
inclosrr^eriirnriiII^®"''°‘^ "" completing the
opinir^i II III ?iiirit°iiii’^L^i:ii iriiir
DIRECTIONS
!
Please express your opinion concerning the
^estionnaire
' s responses. If you strongly disagree withthe statement, please write a 0 in the space provided
r IluI’IIIi statement; pleLe writ4 aj. Yo r cho ces are these:
Strongly Disagree,
False Statement
Mostly Mostly Strongly Agree,
Disagree Agree True Statement
I encourage you to comment at length and/or provide anydocumented information that helps to substantiate or
refute an argument. If possible, I would enjoy gettingtogether with you to discuss these issues.
Enclosed is a self-addressed, stamped envelope. I
realize you are probably immersed in your own work. As
such, I very much appreciate your taking the time to be apart of this research.
Sincerely,
Tom Neilson
Health Education
Health Services
University of Massachusetts
Amherst, Ma 01003
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DATA FROM THE COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT QUESTIONNAIRE
statement, the data is coded in the following
Of projecfmlnagement?'
Disagree 22 - 96% Agree 1 - 4 %
b. Community development projects
and designed by; are mostly identified
1. UNHCR
2 . SDR 3
- 14%
10 - 55%
4. refugees
—
-Disagree
-Disagree
2 - 11 %
17 - 89%
Agree 19 - 86 %
Agree 8 - 45 %
Agree 17 - 89%
Agree 2 - 11 %
c.
1 .
2 .
3 .
4 .
Community development projects
UNHCR Disagree 9 - 50 %SDR Disagree 9 - 47 %
volags Disagree 3 - 14 %
refugees Disagree 16 - 89%
are managed by;
Agree 9 - 50%
Agree 10 - 53%
Agree 18 - 86%
Agree 2 - 11 %
d. Community development projects
interest of;
are mostly in the
1 .
2 .
3.
4.
UNHCR
SDR
5 - 26%2-9% AgreeAgree 14 - 74%20 - 91%
refugees-
—Disagree
4 - 21%
9 - 47%
Agree
Agree
15 - 79%
10 - 53%
e.
of
The community development program is an integral
refugee settlement in Somalia.
part
Disagree 17 - 77% Agree 5 - 23%
f. The goals and objectives of the CD program are
understood, agreed to, and supported with the active
cooperation of all agencies.
Disagree 16 - 76% Agree 5 - 24%
g. There is active competition and suspicion among the
agencies.
9%Disagree 2 -
h» If guestion g is true
are:
'
Agree 20 - 91%
the competition and suspicion
1* among the volags.
Disagree 7 - 41% Agree 10 - 59 %
2. between the volags and the UNHCR,
Disagree 4-21% Agree 15 - 79 %
3
. between the volags and the Somali government.
Disagree l - 5 % Agree 19 - 95 %
4. between the UNHCR and the Somali government,
Disagree 2 - 10 % Agree 18 - 90%
5. within the UNHCR,
Disagree 7 - 50% Agree 7 - 50 %
6
.
within the Somali government.
Disagree 1 - 6 % Agree 15 - 94 %
i. It is common for agencies to cover up the truththrough their silence, unwillingness to confront
authorities, or intentional misrepresentation of facts.
Disagree 4 - 19 % Agree 17 81%
is a feasible development objective inthe refugee camps. j x
Disagree 17 - 74% Agree 6 - 26%
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AC - Africa Confidential
CARE - Service Committee
CDT^
Cooperation for American Relief EverywhereI - Center for Defense InformationCommunity Development TraineeCommunity Development Worker
~ Community Health Worker
- Emergency Logistics Unit
People's Liberation Front
^^itrean Relief Association
Food for the Hungry International
~ Family Life Center
: Liberation of AngolaUN High Commission for Refugees
~ Interagency Council
sponsor^d?^^
Liberation Army (South African
- Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola
- Mennonite Central Committee ^
- Medecins Sans Frontieres
- Northern Frontier District
- Non-Government Organization
National Refugee Commission
- National Security Council
Northwest Regional Agricultural Project
- Northwest Regional Water Supply UnitOromo Liberation Front
- Private Volunteer Organization
- Refugee Agriculture Unit
- Tigray Relief Society
- Refugee Health Unit
- Regional Refugee Commission
- Regional Refugee Commissioner
Save the Children Federation
- Somali Democratic Republic
Somali National Movement
- Sub Office (UNHCR)
- Somali Salvation Liberation Front
- Social Services Office (UNHCR)
- Tigray People's Liberation Front
- United Nations High Commission for Refufgees
UNITA - Unity for the Total Liberation of Angola (US
sponsored)
VITA - Volunteers in Technical Assistance
CDT
CDW
CHW
ELU
EPLF
ERA
FHI
FLC
FNLA
HCR
lAC
MLA
MPLA
MCC
MSF
NFD
NGO
NRC
NSC
NWRAP
NWRWSU
OLF
PVO
RAU
REST
RHU
RRC
RRC
SCF
SDR
SNM
SO
SSDF
SSO
TPLF
UNHCR
VOLAG - Voluntary Agency
WSLF - Western Somalia Liberation Front
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